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ART. I.—*A Discourse concerning the Influence of America on the Mind, being the Annual Oration delivered before the American Philosophical Society, at the University in Philadelphia, October 18, 1823.* By C. J. INGERSOLL. Philadelphia, A. Small. 8vo. pp. 67.

WE shall use the work prefixed to this article, as ministers are sometimes said to use their texts. We shall make it a point to start from, not the subject of our remarks. Our purpose is to treat of the importance and means of a National Literature. The topic seems to us a great one, and to have intimate connexions with morals and religion, as well as with all our public interests. Our views will be given with great freedom, and if they serve no other purpose than to recommend the subject to more general attention, one of our principal objects will be accomplished.

We begin with stating what we mean by national literature. We mean the expression of a nation's mind in writing. We mean the production among a people of important works in philosophy, and in the departments of imagination and taste. We mean the contribution of new truths to the stock of human knowledge. We mean the thoughts of profound and original minds, elaborated by the toil of composition and fixed and made immortal in books. We mean the manifestation of a nation's intellect in the only forms by which it can multiply itself at home, and send itself abroad. We mean that a nation shall take a place, by its authors, among the lights of the world. It will be seen, that we include under literature all the writings of

superior minds, be the subjects what they may. We are aware that the term is often confined to compositions which relate to human nature, and human life ; that it is not generally extended to physical science ; that mind, not matter, is regarded as its main subject and sphere. But the worlds of matter and mind are too intimately connected to admit of exact partition. All the objects of human thought flow into one another. Moral and physical truths have many bonds and analogies, and whilst the former are the chosen and noblest themes of literature, we are not anxious to divorce them from the latter, or to shut them up in a separate department. The expression of superior mind in writing, we regard then, as a nation's literature. We regard its gifted men, whether devoted to the exact sciences, to mental and ethical philosophy, to history and legislation, or to fiction and poetry, as forming a noble intellectual brotherhood, and it is for the purpose of quickening all to join their labors for the public good, that we offer the present plea in behalf of a national literature.

To show the importance which we attach to the subject, we begin with some remarks on what we deem the distinction which a nation should most earnestly covet. We believe that more distinct apprehensions on this point are needed, and that for want of them, the work of improvement is carried on with less energy, consistency, and wisdom, than may and should be brought to bear upon it. The great distinction of a country, then, is, that it produces superior men. Its natural advantages are not to be disdained. But they are of secondary importance. No matter what races of animals a country breeds. The great question is, does it breed a noble race of men. No matter what its soil may be. The great question is, how far is it prolific of moral and intellectual power. No matter how stern its climate is, if it nourish force of thought and virtuous purpose. These are the products by which a country is to be tried, and institutions have value only by the impulse which they give to the mind. It has sometimes been said, that the noblest men grow where nothing else will grow. This we do not believe, for mind is not the creature of climate or soil. But were it true, we should say, that it were better to live among rocks and sands, than in the most genial and productive region on the face of the earth.

As yet, the great distinction of a nation on which we have insisted, has been scarcely recognised. The idea of forming a

superior race of men has entered little into schemes of policy. Invention and effort have been expended on matter, much more than on mind. Lofty piles have been reared; the earth has groaned under pyramids and palaces. The thought of building up a nobler order of intellect and character, has hardly crossed the most adventurous statesman. We beg that we may not be misapprehended. We offer these remarks to correct what we deem a disproportioned attention to physical good, and not at all to condemn the expenditure of ingenuity and strength on the outward world. There is a harmony between all our great interests, between inward and outward improvements; and by establishing among them a wise order, all will be secured. We have no desire to shut up man in his own spiritual nature. The mind was made to act on matter, and it grows by expressing itself in material forms. We believe, too, that in proportion as it shall gain intellectual and moral power, it will exert itself with increased energy and delight on the outward creation; will pour itself forth more freely in useful and ornamental arts; will rear more magnificent structures, and will call forth new beauties in nature. An intelligent and resolute spirit in a community, perpetually extends its triumphs over matter. It can even subject to itself the most unpromising region. Holland, diked from the ocean, Venice, rising amidst the waves, and New England, bleak and rock bound New England, converted by a few generations from a wilderness into smiling fields and opulent cities, point us to the mind as the great source of physical good, and teach us that in making the culture of man our highest end, we shall not retard, but advance the cultivation of nature.

The question which we most solicitously ask about this country, is, what race of men it is likely to produce. We consider its liberty of value, only as far as it favors the growth of men. What is liberty? The removal of restraint from human powers. Its benefit is, that it opens new fields for action, and a wider range for the mind. The only freedom worth possessing, is that which gives enlargement to a people's energy, intellect, and virtues. The savage makes his boast of freedom. But what is its worth? Free as he is, he continues for ages in the same ignorance, leads the same comfortless life, sees the same untamed wilderness spread around him. He is indeed free from what he calls the yoke of civil institutions. But other, and worse chains bind him. The very privation of civil government,

is in effect a chain; for, by withholding protection from property, it virtually shackles the arm of industry, and forbids exertion for the melioration of his lot. Progress, the growth of power, is the end and boon of liberty; and without this, a people may have the name, but want the substance and spirit of freedom.

We are the more earnest in enlarging on these views, because we feel that our attachment to our country must be very much proportioned to what we deem its tendency to form a generous race of men. We pretend not to have thrown off national feeling; but we have some stronger feelings. We love our country much, but mankind more. As men and Christians, our first desire is to see the improvement of human nature. We desire to see the soul of man, wiser, firmer, nobler, more conscious of its imperishable treasures, more beneficent and powerful, more alive to its connexion with God, more able to use pleasure and prosperity aright, and more victorious over poverty, adversity, and pain. In our survey of our own and other countries, the great question which comes to us, is this; Where and under what institutions are men most likely to advance? Where are the soundest minds and the purest hearts formed? What nation possesses in its history, its traditions, its government, its religion, its manners, its pursuits, its relations to other communities, and especially in its private and public means of education, the instruments and pledges of a more resolute virtue and devotion to truth, than we now witness? Such a nation, be it where it may, will engage our warmest interest. We love our country, but not blindly. In all nations we recognise one great family, and our chief wish for our native land, is, that it may take the first rank among the lights and benefactors of the human race.

These views will explain the vast importance which we attach to a national literature. By this, as we have said, we understand the expression of a nation's mind in writing. It is the action of the most gifted understandings on the community. It throws into circulation through a wide sphere the most quickening and beautiful thoughts, which have grown up in men of laborious study or creative genius. It is a much higher work than the communication of a gifted intellect in discourse. It is the mind giving to multitudes whom no voice can reach, its compressed and selected thoughts, in the most lucid order and attractive forms which it is capable of inventing. In other words, literature is the concentration of intellect for the purpose of spreading itself abroad and multiplying its energy.

Such being the nature of literature, it is plainly among the most powerful methods of exalting the character of a nation, of forming a better race of men. In truth, we apprehend that it may claim the first rank among the means of improvement. We know nothing so fitted to the advancement of society, as to bring its higher minds to bear upon the multitude; as to establish close connexions between the more and less gifted; as to spread far and wide the light which springs up in meditative, profound, and sublime understandings. It is the ordinance of God, and one of his most benevolent laws, that the human race should be carried forward by impulses which originate in a few minds, perhaps in an individual; and in this way the most interesting relations and dependences of life are framed. When a great truth is to be revealed, it does not flash at once on the race, but dawns and brightens on a superior understanding, from which it is to emanate and to illumine future ages. On the faithfulness of great minds to this awful function, the progress and happiness of men chiefly depend. The most illustrious benefactors of the race have been men, who, having risen to great truths, have held them as a sacred trust for their kind, and have borne witness to them amidst general darkness, under scorn and persecution, perhaps in the face of death. Such men, indeed, have not always made contributions to literature, for their condition has not allowed them to be authors; but we owe the transmission, perpetuity, and immortal power of their new and high thoughts, to kindred spirits, which have concentrated and fixed them in books.

The quickening influences of literature need not be urged on those who are familiar with the history of modern Europe, and who of course know the spring given to the human mind by the revival of ancient learning. Through their writings the great men of antiquity have exercised a sovereignty over these later ages, not enjoyed in their own. It is more important to observe, that the influence of literature is perpetually increasing; for, through the press and the spread of education, its sphere is indefinitely enlarged. Reading, once the privilege of a few, is now the occupation of multitudes, and is to become one of the chief gratifications of all. Books penetrate everywhere, and some of the works of genius find their way to obscure dwellings, which, a little while ago, seemed barred against all intellectual light. Writing is now the mightiest instrument on earth. Through this, the mind has acquired a kind of

omnipresence. To literature we then look, as the chief means of forming a better race of human beings. To superior minds, which may act through this, we look for the impulses by which their country is to be carried forward. We would teach them, that they are the depositaries of the highest power on earth, and that on them the best hopes of society rest.

We are aware that some may think, that we are exalting intellectual above moral and religious influence. They may tell us, that the teaching of moral and religious truth, not by philosophers and boasters of wisdom, but by the comparatively weak and foolish, is the great means of renovating the world. This truth we indeed regard as 'the power of God unto salvation.' But let none imagine, that its chosen temple is an uncultivated mind, and that it selects, as its chief organs, the lips of the unlearned. Religious and moral truth is indeed appointed to carry forward mankind; but not as conceived and expounded by narrow minds, not as darkened by the ignorant, not as debased by the superstitious, not as subtilized by the visionary, not as thundered out by the intolerant fanatic, not as turned into a drivelling cant by the hypocrite. Like all other truths, it requires for its full reception and powerful communication, a free and vigorous intellect. Indeed, its grandeur and infinite connexions demand a more earnest and various use of our faculties than any other subject. As a single illustration of this remark, we may observe, that all moral and religious truth may be reduced to one great and central thought, Perfection of Mind; a thought which comprehends all that is glorious in the Divine nature, and which reveals to us the end and happiness of our own existence. This perfection has as yet only dawned on the most gifted human beings, and the great purpose of our present and future existence is to enlarge our conceptions of it without end, and to embody and make them manifest in character and life. And is this sublime thought to grow within us, to refine itself from error and impure mixture, to receive perpetual accessions of brightness from the study of God, man, and nature, and especially to be communicated powerfully to others, without the vigorous exertion of our intellectual nature? Religion has been wronged by nothing more, than by being separated from intellect; than by being removed from the province of reason and free research, into that of mystery and authority, of impulse and feeling. Hence it is, that the prevalent forms or exhibitions of Christianity, are comparatively inert, and that most which is written

on the subject is of little or no worth. Christianity was given, not to contradict and degrade the rational nature, but to call it forth, to enlarge its range and its powers. It admits of endless developement. It is the last truth which should remain stationary. It ought to be so explored and so expressed, as to take the highest place in a nation's literature, as to exalt and purify all other literature. From these remarks it will be seen, that the efficacy which we have ascribed to literary or intellectual influence in the work of human improvement, is consistent with the supreme importance of moral and religious truth.

If we have succeeded in conveying the impressions which we have aimed to make, our readers are now prepared to inquire with interest into the condition and prospects of literature among ourselves. Do we possess, indeed, what may be called a national literature? Have we produced eminent writers in the various departments of intellectual effort? Are our chief resources of instruction and literary enjoyment furnished from ourselves? We regret that the reply to these questions is so obvious. The few standard works which we have produced, and which promise to live, can hardly, by any courtesy, be denominated a national literature. On this point, if marks and proofs of our real condition were needed, we should find them in the current apologies for our deficiencies. Our writers are accustomed to plead in our excuse our youth, the necessities of a newly settled country, and the direction of our best talents to practical life. Be the pleas sufficient or not, one thing they prove, and that is, our consciousness of having failed to make important contributions to the interests of the intellect. We have few names to place by the side of the great names in science and literature on the other side of the ocean. We want those lights which make a country conspicuous at a distance. Let it not be said, that European envy denies our just claims. In an age like this, when the literary world forms a great family, and the products of mind are circulated more rapidly than those of machinery, it is a nation's own fault, if its name be not pronounced with honor beyond itself. We have ourselves heard, and delighted to hear, beyond the Alps, our country designated as the land of Franklin. This name had scaled that mighty barrier, and made us known where our institutions and modes of life were hardly better understood than those of the natives of our forests.

We are accustomed to console ourselves for the absence of

a commanding literature, by urging our superiority to other nations in our institutions for the diffusion of elementary knowledge through all classes of the community. We have here just cause for boasting, though perhaps less than we imagine. That there are gross deficiencies in our common schools, and that the amount of knowledge which they communicate, when compared with the time spent in its acquisition, is lamentably small, the community begin to feel. There is a crying need for a higher and more quickening kind of instruction than the laboring part of society have yet received, and we rejoice that the cry begins to be heard. But allowing our elementary institutions to be ever so perfect, we confess that they do not satisfy us. We want something more. A dead level of intellect, even if it should rise above what is common in other nations, would not answer our wishes and hopes for our country. We want great minds to be formed among us, minds which shall be felt afar, and through which we may act on the world. We want the human intellect to do its utmost here. We want this people to obtain a claim on the gratitude of the human race, by adding strength to the foundations, and fulness and splendor to the developement of moral and religious truth; by originality of thought, by discoveries of science, and by contributions to the refining pleasures of taste and imagination.

With these views we do and must lament, that, however we surpass other nations in providing for, and spreading elementary instruction, we fall behind many in provision for the liberal training of the intellect, for forming great scholars, for communicating that profound knowledge, and that thirst for higher truths, which can alone originate a commanding literature. The truth ought to be known. There is among us much superficial knowledge, but little severe, persevering research; little of that consuming passion for new truth, which makes outward things worthless; little resolute devotion to a high intellectual culture. There is nowhere a literary atmosphere, or such an accumulation of literary influence, as determines the whole strength of the mind to its own enlargement, and to the manifestation of itself in enduring forms. Few among us can be said to have followed out any great subject of thought patiently, laboriously, so as to know thoroughly what others have discovered and taught concerning it, and thus to occupy a ground from which new views may be gained. Of course exceptions are to be found. This country has produced original and profound thinkers. We have

named Franklin, and we may name Edwards, one of the greatest men of his age, though unhappily his mind was lost, in a great degree, to literature, and, we fear, to religion, by vassalage to a false theology. His work on the Will throws, indeed, no light on human nature, and, notwithstanding the nobleness of the subject, gives no great or elevated thoughts; but as a specimen of logical acuteness and controversial power, it certainly ranks in the very highest class of metaphysical writings. We might also name living authors who do honor to their country. Still, we must say, we chiefly prize what has been done among us, as a promise of higher and more extensive effort. Patriotism, as well as virtue, forbids us to burn incense to national vanity. The truth should be seen and felt. In an age of great intellectual activity, we rely chiefly for intellectual excitement and enjoyment on foreign minds, nor is our own mind felt abroad. Whilst clamoring against dependence on European manufactures, we contentedly rely on Europe for the nobler and more important fabrics of the intellect. We boast of our political institutions, and receive our chief teachings, books, impressions, from the school of monarchy. True, we labor under disadvantages. But if our liberty deserve the praise which it receives, it is more than a balance for these. We believe that it is. We believe that it does open to us an indefinite intellectual progress. Did we not so regard it, we should value it little. If hereditary governments minister most to the growth of the mind, better restore them than to cling to a barren freedom. Let us not expose liberty to this reproach. Let us prove, by more generous provisions for the diffusion of elementary knowledge, for the training of great minds, and for the joint culture of the moral and intellectual powers, that we are more and more instructed, by freedom, in the worth and greatness of human nature, and in the obligation of contributing to its strength and glory.

We have spoken of the condition of our literature. We now proceed to the consideration of the causes which obstruct its advancement; and we are immediately struck by one so prevalent, as to deserve distinct notice. We refer to the common doctrine, that we need, in this country, useful knowledge rather than profound, extensive, and elegant literature, and that this last, if we covet it, may be imported from abroad in such variety and abundance, as to save us the necessity of producing it

among ourselves. How far are these opinions just? This question we purpose to answer.

That useful knowledge should receive our first and chief care, we mean not to dispute. But in our views of utility, we may differ from some who take this position. There are those who confine this term to the necessities and comforts of life, and to the means of producing them. And is it true, that we need no knowledge, but that which clothes and feeds us? Is it true, that all studies may be dispensed with, but such as teach us to act on matter, and to turn it to our use? Happily, human nature is too stubborn to yield to this narrow utility. It is interesting to observe how the very mechanical arts, which are especially designed to minister to the necessities and comforts of life, are perpetually passing these limits; how they disdain to stop at mere convenience. A large and increasing proportion of mechanical labor is given to the gratification of an elegant taste. How simple would be the art of building, if it limited itself to the construction of a comfortable shelter. How many ships should we dismantle, and how many busy trades put to rest, were dress and furniture reduced to the standard of convenience. This 'utility' would work great changes in town and country, would level to the dust the wonders of architecture, would annihilate the fine arts, and blot out innumerable beauties, which the hand of taste has spread over the face of the earth. Happily, human nature is too strong for the utilitarian. It cannot satisfy itself with the convenient. No passion unfolds itself sooner than the love of the ornamental. The savage decorates his person, and the child is more struck with the beauty, than the uses of its raiment. So far from limiting ourselves to convenient food and raiment, we enjoy but little a repast which is not arranged with some degree of order and taste, and a man, who should consult comfort alone in his wardrobe, would find himself an unwelcome guest in circles which he would very reluctantly forego. We are aware that the propensity to which we have referred, often breaks out in extravagance and ruinous luxury. We know, that the love of ornament is often vitiated by vanity, and that, when so perverted, it impairs, sometimes destroys, the soundness and simplicity of the mind, and the relish for true glory. Still, it teaches, even in its excesses, that the idea of beauty is an indestructible principle of our nature, and this single truth is enough to put us on our guard against vulgar notions of utility.

We have said that we prize, as highly as any, useful knowledge. But by this we mean knowledge which answers and ministers to our complex and various nature; we mean that which is useful, not only to the animal man, but to the intellectual, moral, and religious man; useful to a being of spiritual faculties, whose happiness is to be found in their free and harmonious exercise. We grant, that there is a primary necessity for that information and skill by which subsistence is earned, and life is preserved; for it is plain that we must live, in order to act and improve. But life is the means; action and improvement the end; and who will deny that the noblest utility belongs to that knowledge, by which the chief purpose of our creation is accomplished? According to these views, a people should honor and cultivate, as unspeakably useful, that literature which corresponds to, and calls forth the highest faculties; which expresses and communicates energy of thought, fruitfulness of invention, force of moral purpose, a thirst for the true, and a delight in the beautiful. According to these views, we attach special importance to those branches of literature, which relate to human nature, and which give it a consciousness of its own powers. History has a noble use, for it shows us human beings in various and opposite conditions, in their strength and weakness, in their progress and relapses, and thus reveals the causes and means by which the happiness and virtue of the race may be enlarged. Poetry is useful, by touching deep springs in the human soul; by giving voice to its more delicate feelings; by breathing out and making more intelligible, the sympathy which subsists between the mind and the outward universe; by creating beautiful forms or manifestations for great moral truths. Above all, that higher philosophy, which treats of the intellectual and moral constitution of man, of the foundation of knowledge, of duty, of perfection, of our relations to the spiritual world, and especially to God; this has a usefulness so peculiar as to throw other departments of knowledge into obscurity; and a people among whom this does not find honor, has little ground to boast of its superiority to uncivilized tribes. It will be seen from these remarks, that utility, with us, has a broad meaning. In truth, we are slow to condemn as useless, any researches or discoveries of original and strong minds, even when we discern in them no bearing on any interests of mankind; for all truth is of a prolific nature, and has connexions not immediately perceived; and it may be that what we call vain speculations, may,

at no distant period, link themselves with some new facts or theories, and guide a profound thinker to the most important results. The ancient mathematician, when absorbed in solitary thought, little imagined that his theorems, after the lapse of ages, were to be applied by the mind of Newton to the solution of the mysteries of the universe, and not only to guide the astronomer through the heavens, but the navigator through the pathless ocean. For ourselves we incline to hope much from truths, which are particularly decried as useless; for the noblest and most useful truth is of an abstract or universal nature; and yet the abstract, though susceptible of infinite application, is generally, as we know, opposed to the practical.

We maintain that a people, which has any serious purpose of taking a place among improved communities, should studiously promote within itself every variety of intellectual exertion. It should resolve strenuously to be surpassed by none. It should feel that mind is the creative power, through which all the resources of nature are to be turned to account, and by which a people is to spread its influence, and establish the noblest form of empire. It should train within itself men able to understand and to use whatever is thought and discovered over the whole earth. The whole mass of human knowledge should exist among a people, not in neglected libraries, but in its higher minds. Among its most cherished institutions, should be those, which will insure to it ripe scholars, explorers of ancient learning, profound historians and mathematicians, intellectual laborers devoted to physical and moral science, and to the creation of a refined and beautiful literature.

Let us not be misunderstood. We have no desire to rear in our country a race of pedants, of solemn triflers, of laborious commentators on the mysteries of a Greek accent or a rusty coin. We would have men explore antiquity, not to bury themselves in its dust, but to learn its spirit, and so to commune with its superior minds, as to accumulate on the present age, the influences of whatever was great and wise in former times. What we want, is, that those among us, whom God has gifted to comprehend whatever is now known, and to rise to new truths, may find aids and institutions to fit them for their high calling, and may become at once springs of a higher intellectual life to their own country, and joint workers with the great of all nations and times in carrying forward their race.

We know that it will be said, that foreign scholars, bred under institutions which this country cannot support, may do our intellectual work, and send us books and learning to meet our wants. To this we have much to answer. In the first place, we reply, that to avail ourselves of the higher literature of other nations, we must place ourselves on a level with them. The products of foreign machinery we can use, without any portion of the skill which produced them. But works of taste and genius, and profound investigations of philosophy, can only be estimated and enjoyed, through a culture and power corresponding to that from which they sprung.

In the next place, we maintain, that it is an immense gain to a people, to have in its own bosom, among its own sons, men of distinguished intellect. Such men give a spring and life to a community by their presence, their society, their fame; and what deserves remark, such men are nowhere so felt as in a republic like our own; for here the different classes of society flow together and act powerfully on each other, and a free communication, elsewhere unknown, is established between the gifted few and the many. It is one of the many good fruits of liberty, that it increases the diffusiveness of intellect; and accordingly a free country is above all others false to itself, in withholding from its superior minds, the means of enlargement.

We next observe, and we think the observation important, that the facility with which we receive the literature of foreign countries, instead of being a reason for neglecting our own, is a strong motive for its cultivation. We mean not to be paradoxical, but we believe that it would be better to admit no books from abroad, than to make them substitutes for our own intellectual activity. The more we receive from other countries, the greater the need of an original literature. A people, into whose minds the thoughts of foreigners are poured perpetually, needs an energy within itself to resist, to modify this mighty influence, and without it, will inevitably sink under the worst bondage, will become intellectually tame and enslaved. We have certainly no desire to complete our restrictive system, by adding to it a literary non-intercourse law. We rejoice in the increasing intellectual connexion between this country and the old world. But sooner would we rupture it, than see our country sitting passively at the feet of foreign teachers. Better have no literature, than form ourselves unresistingly on a foreign one. The true sovereigns of a country are those who determine its mind,

its modes of thinking, its tastes, its principles; and we cannot consent to lodge this sovereignty in the hands of strangers. A country, like an individual, has dignity and power only in proportion as it is self-formed. There is a great stir to secure to ourselves the manufacturing of our own clothing. We say, let others spin and weave for us, but let them not think for us. A people, whose government and laws are nothing but the embodying of public opinion, should jealously guard this opinion against foreign dictation. We need a literature to counteract, and to use wisely the literature which we import. We need an inward power proportionate to that which is exerted on us, as the means of self-subsistence. It is peculiarly true of a people, whose institutions demand for their support a free and bold spirit, that they should be able to subject to a manly and independent criticism, whatever comes from abroad. These views seem to us to deserve serious attention. We are more and more a reading people. Books are already among the most powerful influences here. The question is, Shall Europe, through these, fashion us after its pleasure? Shall America be only an echo of what is thought and written under the aristocracies beyond the ocean?

Another view of the subject is this. A foreign literature will always, in a measure, be foreign. It has sprung from the soul of another people, which, however like, is still not our own soul. Every people has much in its own character and feelings, which can only be embodied by its own writers, and which, when transfused through literature, makes it touching and true, like the voice of our earliest friend.

We now proceed to an argument in favor of native literature, which, if less obvious, is, we believe, not less sound, than those now already adduced. We have hitherto spoken of literature as the expression, the communication of the higher minds in a community. We now add, that it does much more than is commonly supposed, to *form* such minds, so that without it, a people wants one of the chief means of educating or perfecting talent and genius. One of the great laws of our nature, and a law singularly important to social beings, is, that the intellect enlarges and strengthens itself by expressing worthily its best views. In this, as in other respects, it is more blessed to give than to receive. Superior minds are formed, not merely by solitary thought, but almost as much by communication. Great thoughts are never fully possessed, till he who has con-

ceived them, has given them fit utterance. One of the noblest and most invigorating labors of genius, is to clothe its conceptions in clear and glorious forms, to give them existence in other souls. Thus literature creates, as well as manifests, intellectual power, and without it, the highest minds will never be summoned to the most invigorating action.

We doubt whether a man ever brings his faculties to bear with their whole force on a subject, until he writes upon it for the instruction or gratification of others. To place it clearly before others, he feels the necessity of viewing it more vividly himself. By attempting to seize his thoughts, and fix them in an enduring form, he finds them vague and unsatisfactory, to a degree which he did not suspect, and toils for a precision and harmony of views, of which he never before felt the need. He places his subject in new lights; submits it to a searching analysis; compares and connects with it his various knowledge; seeks for it new illustrations and analogies; weighs objections, and through these processes often arrives at higher truths than he first aimed to illustrate. Dim conceptions grow bright. Glorious thoughts, which had darted as meteors through the mind, are arrested, and gradually shine with a sunlike splendor, with prolific energy, on the intellect and heart. It is one of the chief distinctions of a great mind, that it is prone to rush into twilight regions, and to catch faint glimmerings of distant and unbounded prospects; and nothing perhaps aids it more to pierce the shadows which surround it, than the labor to unfold to other minds the indistinct conceptions which have dawned on its own. Even where composition yields no such fruits, it is still a great intellectual help. It always favors comprehensive and systematical views. The laborious distribution of a great subject, so as to assign to each part or topic its just position and due proportion, is singularly fitted to give compass and persevering force of thought.

If we confine ourselves simply to the consideration of style, we shall have reason to think that a people among whom this is neglected, wants one important intellectual aid. In this, great power is exerted, and by exertion increased. To the multitude, indeed, language seems so natural an instrument, that to use it with clearness and energy, seems no great effort. It is framed, they think, to the writer's hand, and so continually employed as to need little thought or skill. But in nothing is the creative power of a gifted writer seen more

than in his style. True, his words may be found in the dictionary. But there they lie disjointed and dead. What a wonderful life does he breathe into them, by compacting them into his sentences. Perhaps he uses no term which has not been hackneyed by ordinary writers; and yet with these vulgar materials what miracles does he achieve. What a world of thought does he condense into a phrase. By new combinations of common words, what delicate hues or what a blaze of light, does he pour over his subject. Power of style depends very little on the structure or copiousness of the language which the writer of genius employs, but chiefly, if not wholly, on his own mind. The words arranged in his dictionary, are no more fitted to depict his thoughts, than the block of marble in the sculptor's shop, to show forth the conceptions which are dawning in his mind. Both are inert materials. The power which pervades them, comes from the soul; and the same creative energy is manifested in the production of a noble style, as in extracting beautiful forms from the lifeless stone. How unfaithful, then, is a nation to its own intellect, in which grace and force of style receive no culture.

The remarks now made on the importance of literature as a means of educating talent and genius, we are aware, do not apply equally to all subjects or kinds of knowledge. In the exact or physical sciences, a man may acquire much without composition, and may make discoveries without registering them. Even here, however, we believe, that, by a systematic development of his views in a luminous style, he will bring great aid to his own faculties, as well as to others'. It is on the vast subjects of morals and human nature, that the mind especially strengthens itself by elaborate composition; and these, let it be remembered, form the staple of the highest literature. Moral truth, under which we include everything relating to mind and character, is of a refined and subtle, as well as elevated nature, and requires the joint and full exercise of discrimination, invention, imagination, and sensibility, to give it effectual utterance. A writer who would make it visible and powerful, must strive to join an austere logic to a fervent eloquence; must place it in various lights; must create for it interesting forms; must wed it to beauty; must illuminate it by similitudes and contrasts; must show its correspondence with the outward world, perhaps must frame for it a vast machinery of fiction. How invigorating are these efforts! Yet it is only in writing, in elabo-

rate composition, that they are deliberately called forth and sustained, and without literature they would almost cease. It may be said of many truths, that greater intellectual energy is required to express them with effect, than to conceive them ; so that a nation, which does not encourage this expression, impoverishes, so far, its own mind. Take for example, Shakspeare's Hamlet. This is a developement of a singularly interesting view of human nature. It shows us a mind, to which life is a burden ; in which the powers of meditation and feeling are disproportioned to the active powers ; which sinks under its own weight, under the consciousness of wanting energies commensurate with its visions of good, with its sore trials, and with the solemn task which is laid upon it. To conceive clearly this form of human nature, shows indeed the genius of the writer. But what a new power is required to bring it out in such a drama as Shakspeare's ; to give it life and action ; to invent for it circumstances and subordinate characters, fitted to call it forth ; to give it tones of truth and nature ; to show the hues which it casts over all the objects of thought. This intellectual energy we all perceive ; and this was not merely *manifested* in Shakspeare's work, but without such a work, it would not have been awakened. His invention would have slumbered, had he not desired to give forth his mind in a visible and enduring form. Thus literature is the nurse of genius. Through this, genius learns its own strength, and continually accumulates it ; and of course, in a country without literature, genius, however liberally bestowed by the Creator, will languish, and will fail to fulfil its great duty of quickening the mass amidst which it lives.

We come now to our last, and what we deem a weighty argument in favor of a native literature. We desire and would cherish it, because we hope from it important aids to the cause of truth and human nature. We believe, that a literature, springing up in this new soil, would bear new fruits, and, in some respects, more precious fruits, than are elsewhere produced. We know that our hopes may be set down to the account of that national vanity, which, with too much reason, is placed by foreigners among our besetting sins. But we speak from calm and deliberate conviction. We are inclined to believe, that, as a people, we occupy a position, from which the great subjects of literature may be viewed more justly than from those which most other nations hold. Undoubtedly we labor under disadvantages. We want the literary apparatus of Europe ; her

libraries, her universities, her learned institutions, her race of professed scholars, her spots consecrated by the memory of sages, and a thousand stirring associations, which hover over ancient nurseries of learning. But the mind is not a local power. Its spring is within itself, and under the inspiration of liberal and high feeling, it may attain and worthily express nobler truth than outward helps could reveal.

The great distinction of our country, is, that we enjoy some peculiar advantages for understanding our own nature. Man is the great subject of literature, and juster and profounder views of man may be expected here, than elsewhere. In Europe, political and artificial distinctions have, more or less, triumphed over and obscured our common nature. In Europe, we meet kings, nobles, priests, peasants. How much rarer is it to meet *men*; by which we mean, human beings conscious of their own nature, and conscious of the utter worthlessness of all outward distinctions, compared with what is treasured up in their own souls. Man does not value himself as man. It is for his blood, his rank, or some artificial distinction, and not for the attributes of humanity, that he holds himself in respect. The institutions of the old world all tend to throw obscurity over what we most need to know, and that is, the worth and claims of a human being. We know that great improvements in this respect are going on abroad. Still the many are too often postponed to the few. The mass of men are regarded as instruments to work with, as materials to be shaped for the use of their superiors. That consciousness of our own nature, which contains, as a germ, all noble thoughts, which teaches us at once self-respect and respect for others, and which binds us to God by filial sentiment and hope, this has been repressed, kept down by establishments founded in force; and literature, in all its departments, bears, we think, the traces of this inward degradation. We conceive that our position favors a juster and profounder estimate of human nature. We mean not to boast, but there are fewer obstructions to that moral consciousness, that consciousness of humanity, of which we have spoken. Man is not hidden from us by as many disguises as in the old world. The essential equality of all human beings, founded on the possession of a spiritual, progressive, immortal nature, is, we hope, better understood; and nothing, more than this single conviction, is needed to work

the mightiest changes in every province of human life and of human thought.

We have stated what seems to us our most important distinction. But our position has other advantages. The mere circumstance of its being a new one, gives reason to hope for some new intellectual activity, some fresher views of nature and life. We are not borne down by the weight of antiquated institutions, time-hallowed abuses, and the remnants of feudal barbarism. The absence of a religious establishment, is an immense gain, as far as originality of mind is in question; for an establishment, however advantageous in other respects, is, by its nature, hostile to discovery and progress. To keep the mind where it is, to fasten the notions of one age on all future time, is its aim and proper business; and if it happened, as has generally been the case, to grow up in an age of strife and passion, when, as history demonstrates, the church was overrun with error, it cannot but perpetuate darkness and mental bondage. Among us, intellect, though far from being free, has broken some of the chains of other countries, and is more likely, we conceive, to propose to itself its legitimate object, truth, everlasting and universal truth.

We have no thought of speaking contemptuously of the literature of the old world. It is our daily nutriment. We feel our debt to be immense to the glorious company of pure and wise minds, which in foreign lands have bequeathed us in writing their choicest thoughts and holiest feelings. Still we feel, that all existing literature has been produced under influences, which have necessarily mixed with it much error and corruption, and that the whole of it ought to pass, and must pass, under rigorous review. For example, we think that the history of the human race is to be rewritten. Men imbued with the prejudices which thrive under aristocracies and state religions, cannot understand it. Past ages, with their great events, and great men, are to undergo, we think, a new trial, and to yield new results. It is plain, that history is already viewed under new aspects, and we believe that the true principles for studying and writing it, are to be unfolded here, at least as rapidly as in other countries. It seems to us that in literature an immense work is yet to be done. The most interesting questions to mankind, are yet in debate. Great principles are yet to be settled in criticism, in morals, in politics; and above all, the true character of religion is to be rescued from the disguises and corruptions

of ages. We want a reformation. We want a literature, in which genius will pay supreme, if not undivided homage, to truth and virtue; in which the childish admiration of what has been called greatness, will give place to a wise moral judgment; which will breathe reverence for the mind, and elevating thoughts of God. The part which this country is to bear in this great intellectual reform, we presume not to predict. We feel, however, that if true to itself, it will have the glory and happiness of giving new impulses to the human mind. This is our cherished hope. We should have no heart to encourage native literature, did we not hope that it would become instinct with a new spirit. We cannot admit the thought, that this country is to be only a repetition of the old world. We delight to believe that God in the fulness of time, has brought a new continent to light, in order that the human mind should move here with a new freedom, should frame new social institutions, should explore new paths, and reap new harvests. We are accustomed to estimate nations by their creative energies, and we shall blush for our country, if, in circumstances so peculiar, original, and creative, it shall satisfy itself with a passive reception and mechanical reiteration of the thoughts of strangers.

We have now completed our remarks on the importance of a native literature. The next great topic is, the means of producing it; and here our limits forbid us to enlarge; yet we cannot pass it over in silence. A primary and essential means of the improvement of our literature, is, that, as a people, we should feel its value, should desire it, should demand it, should encourage it, and should give it a hearty welcome. It will come if called for, and under this conviction, we have now labored to create a want for it in the community. We say, that we must call for it; by which we mean, not merely that we must invite it by good wishes and kind words, but must make liberal provision for intellectual education. We must enlarge our literary institutions, secure more extensive and profound teaching, and furnish helps and resources to men of superior talent for continued, laborious research. As yet, intellectual labor, devoted to a thorough investigation and a full developement of great subjects, is almost unknown among us; and without it, we shall certainly rear few lasting monuments of thought. We boast of our primary schools. We want universities worthy of the name, where a man of genius and literary zeal, may possess himself of

all that is yet known, and may strengthen himself by intercourse with kindred minds. We know it will be said, that we cannot afford these. But it is not so. We are rich enough for ostentation, for intemperance, for luxury. We can lavish millions on fashion, on furniture, on dress, on our palaces, on our pleasures; but we have nothing to spend for the mind. Where lies our poverty? In the purse, or in the soul?

We have spoken of improved institutions as essential to an improved literature. We beg, however, not to be misunderstood, as if these were invested with a creating power, or would necessarily yield the results which we desire. They are the means, not causes of advancement. Literature depends on individual genius, and this, though fostered, cannot be created by outward helps. No human mechanism can produce original thought. After all the attempts to explain by education the varieties of intellect, we are compelled to believe that minds, like all the other products of nature, have original and indestructible differences, that they are not exempted from that great and beautiful law, which joins with strong resemblances as strong diversities; and, of consequence, we believe, that the men, who are to be the lights of the world, bring with them their commission and power from God. Still, whilst institutions cannot create, they may and do unfold genius; and for want of them, great minds often slumber or run to waste, whilst a still larger class, who want genius, but possess admirable powers, fail of that culture, through which they might enjoy and approach their more gifted brethren.

A people, as we have said, are to give aid to literature by founding wise and enlarged institutions. They may do much more. They may exert a nobler patronage. By cherishing in their own breasts the love of truth, virtue, and freedom, they may do much to nurse and kindle genius in its favored possessors. There is a constant reaction between a community and the great minds which spring up within it, and they form one another. In truth, great minds are developed more by the spirit and character of the people to which they belong, than by all other causes. Thus, a free spirit, a thirst for new and higher knowledge in a community, does infinitely more for literature, than the most splendid benefactions under despotism. A nation under any powerful excitement, becomes fruitful of talent. Among a people called to discuss great questions, to contend for great interests,

to make great sacrifices for the public weal, we always find new and unsuspected energies of thought brought out. A mercenary, selfish, luxurious, sensual people, toiling only to secure the pleasures of sloth, will often communicate their own softness and baseness to the superior minds which dwell among them. In this impure atmosphere, the celestial spark burns dim, and well will it be, if God's great gift of genius be not impiously prostituted to lust and crime.

In conformity with the views now stated, we believe that literature is to be carried forward, here and elsewhere, chiefly by some new and powerful impulses communicated to society; and it is a question naturally suggested by this discussion, from what impulse, principle, excitement, the highest action of the mind may now be expected. When we look back, we see that literature has been originated and modified by a variety of principles; by patriotism and national feeling, by reverence for antiquity, by the spirit of innovation, by enthusiasm, by scepticism, by the passion for fame, by romantic love, and by political and religious convulsions. Now we do not expect from these causes, any higher action of the mind, than they have yet produced. Perhaps most of them have spent their force. The very improvements of society seem to forbid the manifestation of their former energy. For example the patriotism of antiquity and the sexual love of chivalrous ages, which inspired so much of the old literature, are now seen to be feverish and vicious excesses of natural principles, and have gone, we trust, never to return.

Are we asked then to what impulse or power, we look for a higher literature than has yet existed. We answer, to a new action or developement of the religious principle. This remark will probably surprise not a few of our readers. It seems to us, that the energy with which this principle is to act on the intellect, is hardly suspected. Men identify religion with superstition, with fanaticism, with the common forms of Christianity; and seeing it arrayed against intellect, leagued with oppression, fettering inquiry, and incapable of being blended with the sacred dictates of reason and conscience, they see in its progress only new encroachments on free and enlightened thinking. Still, man's relation to God is the great quickening truth, throwing all other truths into insignificance, and a truth, which, however obscured and paralysed by the many errors which ignorance and fraud have hitherto linked with it, has ever been

a chief spring of human improvement. We look to it as the true life of the intellect. No man can be just to himself, can comprehend his own existence, can put forth all his powers with an heroic confidence, can deserve to be the guide and inspirer of other minds, till he has risen to communion with the Supreme Mind; till he feels his filial connexion with the Universal Parent; till he regards himself as the recipient and minister of the Infinite Spirit; till he feels his consecration to the ends which religion unfolds; till he rises above human opinion, and is moved by a higher impulse than fame.

From these remarks it will be seen, that our chief hopes of an improved literature, rest on our hopes of an improved religion. From the prevalent theology, which has come down to us from the dark ages, we hope nothing. It has done its best. All that can grow up under its sad shade, has already been brought forth. It wraps the Divine nature and human nature in impenetrable gloom. It overlays Christianity with technical, arbitrary dogmas. True faith is of another lineage. It comes from the same source with reason, conscience, and our best affections, and is in harmony with them all. True faith is essentially a moral conviction; a confidence in the reality and immutableness of moral distinctions; a confidence in disinterested virtue or in spiritual excellence as the supreme good; a confidence in God as its fountain and almighty friend, and in Jesus Christ as having lived and died to breathe it into the soul; a confidence in its power, triumphs, and immortality; a confidence, through which outward changes, obstructions, disasters, sufferings, are overcome, or rather made instruments of perfection. Such a faith, unfolded freely and powerfully, must 'work mightily' on the intellect as well as on practice. By revealing to us the supreme purpose of the Creator, it places us, as it were, in the centre of the universe, from which the harmonies, true relations, and brightest aspects of things are discerned. It unites calmness and enthusiasm, and the concord of these seemingly hostile elements is essential to the full and healthy action of the creative powers of the soul. It opens the eye to beauty and the heart to love. Literature, under this influence, will become more ingenuous and single-hearted; will penetrate farther into the soul; will find new interpretations of nature and life; will breathe a martyr's love of truth, tempered with a never failing charity; and, whilst sympathizing with all human suffering, will still be pervaded by a healthful cheerful-

ness, and will often break forth in tones of irrepressible joy, responsive to that happiness which fills God's universe.

We cannot close our remarks on the means of an improved literature, without offering one suggestion. We earnestly recommend to our educated men a more extensive acquaintance with the intellectual labors of continental Europe. Our reading is confined too much to English books, and especially to the more recent publications of Great Britain. In this we err. We ought to know the different modes of viewing and discussing great subjects in different nations. We should be able to compare the writings of the highest minds in a great variety of circumstances. Nothing can favor more our own intellectual independence and activity. Let English literature be ever so fruitful and profound, we should still impoverish ourselves by making it our sole nutriment. We fear, however, that at the present moment English books want much which we need. The intellect of that nation is turned now to what are called practical and useful subjects. Physical science goes forward, and what is very encouraging, it is spread with unexampled zeal through all classes of the community. Abuses of government, of the police, of the penal code, of charity, of poor laws, and corn laws are laboriously explored. General education is improved. Science is applied to the arts with brilliant success. We see much good in progress. But we find little profound or fervid thinking, expressed in the higher forms of literature. The noblest subjects of the intellect receive little attention. We see an almost total indifference to intellectual and moral science. In England there is a great want of philosophy, in the true sense of that word. If we examine her reviews, in which much of the intellectual power of the nation is expended, we meet perpetually a jargon of criticism, which shows a singular want of great and general principles in estimating works of art. We have no ethical work of any living English writer to be compared with that of Degerando, entitled, '*Du Moral Perfectionnement*;' and although we have little respect for the rash generalizations of the bold and eloquent Cousin, yet the interest which his metaphysics awaken in Paris, is in our estimation a better presage than the lethargy which prevails on such topics in England. In these remarks we have no desire to depreciate the literature of England, which, taken as a whole, we regard as the noblest monument of the human mind. We rejoice in our descent from England, and esteem our free access to her

works of science and genius, as among our high privileges. Nor do we feel as if her strength were spent. We see no wrinkles on her brow, no decrepitude in her step. At this moment she has authors, especially in poetry and fiction, whose names are 'familiar in our mouths as household words,' and who can never perish but with her language. Still we think, that at present her intellect is laboring more for herself than for mankind, and that our scholars, if they would improve our literature, should cultivate an intimacy not only with that of England, but of continental Europe.

We have now finished our remarks on the importance and means of an improved literature among ourselves. Are we asked what we hope in this particular. We answer, much. We see reasons for anticipating an increased and more efficient direction of talent to this object. But on these we cannot enlarge. There is, however, one ground of expectation, to which we will call a moment's attention. We apprehend that literature is to make progress through an important change in society, which civilization and good institutions are making more and more apparent. It seems to us that, through these causes, political life is less and less regarded as the only or chief sphere for superior minds, and that influence and honor are more and more accumulated in the hands of literary and thinking men. Of consequence more and more of the intellect of communities is to be drawn to literature. The distinction between antiquity and the present times, in respect to the importance attached to political life, seems to us striking; and it is not an accidental difference, but founded on permanent causes which are to operate with increased power. In ancient times, everything abroad and at home, threw men upon the public, and generated an intense thirst for political power. On the contrary, the improvements of later periods incline men to give importance to literature. For example, the instability of the ancient republics, the unsettled relations of the different classes of society, the power of demagogues and orators, the intensity of factions, the want of moral and religious restraints, the want of some regular organ for expressing the public mind, the want of precedents and precise laws for the courts of justice, these and other circumstances gave to the ancient citizen a feeling as if revolutions and convulsions were inseparable from society, turned his mind with unremitting anxiety to

public affairs, and made a participation of political power an important, if not an essential means of personal safety.—Again, the ancient citizen had no home, in our sense of the word. He lived in the market, the forum, the place of general resort, and of course his attention was very much engrossed by affairs of state.—Again, religion, which now more than all things, throws a man upon himself, was in ancient times a public concern, and turned men to political life. The religion of the heart and closet was unknown. The relation of the gods to particular states, was their most prominent attribute, and to conciliate their favor to the community the chief end of worship. Accordingly religion consisted chiefly in public and national rites. In Rome the highest men in the state presided at the altar, and adding to their other titles that of Supreme Pontiff, performed the most solemn functions of the priesthood. Thus the whole strength of the religious principle was turned into political channels. The gods were thought to sustain no higher office than a political one, and of consequence this was esteemed the most glorious for men.—Once more, in ancient times political rank was vastly more efficient, whether for good or for evil, than at present, and of consequence was the object of a more insatiable ambition. It was almost the only way of access to the multitude. The public man held a sway over opinion, over his country, perhaps over foreign states, now unknown. It is the influence of the press and of good institutions to reduce the importance of the man of office. In proportion as private individuals can act on the public mind; in proportion as a people read, think, and have the means of expressing and enforcing their opinions; in proportion as laws become fixed, known, and sanctioned by the moral sense of the community; in proportion as the interests of the state, the principles of administration, and all public measures, are subjected to free and familiar discussion, government becomes a secondary influence. The power passes into the hands of those who think, write, and spread their minds far and wide. Accordingly literature is to become more and more the instrument of swaying men, of doing good, of achieving fame. The contrast between ancient and modern times, in the particulars now stated, is too obvious to need illustration, and our great inference is equally clear. The vast improvements, which in the course of ages have taken place in social order, in domestic life, in religion, in knowledge, all conspire

to one result, all tend to introduce other and higher influences than political power, and to give to that form of intellectual effort, which we call literature, dominion over human affairs. Thus truth, we apprehend, is more and more felt, and from its influence, joined with our peculiar condition and free institutions, we hope for our country the happiness and glory of a pure, deep, rich, beautiful, and ennobling literature.

ART. II.—*The Christian Duty of Granting the Claims of the Roman Catholics. With a Postscript, in Answer to the Letters of the Rev. G. S. Faber.* By THOMAS ARNOLD, D. D. Head Master of Rugby School, and late Fellow of Oriel College, Oxford. 1829.

THE removal of some restraints and liabilities from the Catholics of England, is there considered as an astonishing triumph of liberality and wisdom; and the Minister who ventured so hazardous an experiment, is thought to have given a character of moral dignity and improvement, not to his administration only, but the age.

Americans, when their attention is drawn to this subject, must necessarily feel stronger attachment to the institutions of their country. For what is this mighty achievement, this new and enlightened policy, but a copy in some faint degree, and towards one class of Englishmen, of the fundamental principles of our Federal Constitution, which extends to all citizens of every religious denomination, a perfect equality of political rights?

That the measure should have been so long delayed, strikes us with more astonishment than that it should have been finally accomplished. To our minds, accustomed to the free and liberal doctrines of a popular government, it appears to be a matter of private and personal right, rather than one of political expediency. We have been accustomed to consider the conscience and faith of man above and beyond the lawful regulations of civil government. It has been our habit to consider, that every man has an inherent right to worship God according to his own sentiments of propriety and duty, and that with the exercise of this right government has no authority to interfere, and can interfere only by the exercise of an odious and disgusting tyranny.

When any class of the christian community has been suffering under the restraints of political power, it has commanded our sympathy ; and when the bonds that held it are broken, we rejoice. But we rejoice as with men, who have acquired their natural and inherent rights, and not as if there had been conferred upon them a gratuitous and unmerited favor. We exult in the improved condition of a single individual over whose faith the secular arm relaxes its authority ; who is permitted to walk forth under the control only of his own judgment, and the guidance, which, by God's grace, he may derive from the revelation of the divine will ; and although his mode of faith is not ours, although in the exercise of his own faculties he adopts opinions and conforms to articles and acknowledges powers and joins in creeds from which our sober judgment wholly dissents, yet the weight of artificial forms is removed from his mind ; the strong rays of truth are permitted to throw their cheering influence on his heart. He may follow its direction when he can understand it ; and sooner or later he will understand it. Error will be done away, or greatly diminished. Without indulging expectations too sanguine ; without supposing that men may sit still with folded arms, and grow better and wiser by the progress of time ; without denying that energy and exertion and labor are required to urge on the progress and triumph of truth, we do yet believe that it is destined to enlarge its empire, and to prevail, if not universally and entirely, yet vastly beyond its present boundaries. The purity and simplicity of the gospel dispensation, the message of love and peace and charity and good will, must be seen and felt and known ; and the first step toward this grand consummation, is the destruction of all human authority, which impiously places itself between the Creator and his children,—the overthrow of that despotism, which controls the human mind, of that usurped power, which, arrogating the place of divine revelation, undertakes to command obedience and to regulate man's duty to God, his highest and principal duty, by paltry considerations of political expediency.

To a certain extent and over one portion of English subjects, this assumed power has been modified, and 'the emancipation of the Catholics' is now a favorite subject of exultation, in which, if we are not greatly mistaken, may be discovered quite

as much of the triumph of party as regard for religious freedom and liberty of conscience.

Indeed, in the elaborate arguments by which the ministerial measures were defended, we are at a loss to discover any stress laid on the only ground which could be interesting to a christian community, and we have some doubt whether the leaders and favorers of the plan would be pleased to have any such imputed to them. Emancipation was not granted as a matter of right, but of favor. It was not granted with any regard to christian principles, but with reference solely to political expediency. It was proposed, not to extend religious liberty, but to strengthen the power of government; not to bring converts to the cross, but subjects to the crown. The Catholics had grown strong and numerous and powerful. They had become restive and factious under the oppression which ground them to the earth. They were outcasts and aliens on their own soil. Instead of adding, by their population and physical force, to the strength of the empire, they leaned with mighty weight upon its pillars and threatened its destruction. Their affections were alienated, and a sullen spirit of discontent either broke out into bold acts of insubordination, or accumulated angry elements for future eruption. They grew wiser and better instructed in their condition and rights. They began to perceive that government was a human institution, which ought to have for its object the happiness of its subjects, and that if it threw a line of circumvalation around the whole of their fraternity and excluded them from its benefits, it forfeited, so far as they were concerned, all title to allegiance. It became, therefore, the duty of a wise statesman to coerce or conciliate them. He was required to put down opposition or disarm it. He was obliged either to compel submission under the existing laws, by a force constantly exerted and too great for resistance, or to take away the desire of resistance, and render the Catholics good and loyal subjects, by granting them the privileges for which they were contending. The former had been the current of state policy, but rivers of blood had flowed on the scaffold and in the field, and done nothing towards destroying the earnest wishes of their hearts. The other course was attempted, and for a time at least, with success. Their claims are partially accorded to them, and the exultation it excites drowns all minor subjects of uneasiness. The murmurs of those who

opposed this measure of policy, are lost in the general joy which reverberates through the empire.

The literature of the country partakes of the coloring of the times, and the *Edinburgh Review*, which so often doled out its lugubrious notes over the miserable condition of the Catholics, when the minister of the day was not the favorite of their party, now swells its cathedral chant to bolder music, and substitutes for the inspiration of genius an extravagance that is little less than delirium. With what appears to us to be a singular misnomer, it gives to its latest lucubration the title of the *Last of the Catholic Question*; * as if now all controversy were at an end; as if now all parties were satisfied; as if peace, tranquillity, and confidence were restored; as if, after this grand effort for conciliation, there were nothing further to be done for the conscience or the faith of men; as if justice were satisfied and liberality exhausted, and as if not only the dominant party had nothing more to give, but no other party had anything more to require.

We shall be surprised if the matter is so easily disposed of; first, because this emancipation, to adopt the popular phrase, was a merely political measure, and not dictated by that religious, and of course liberal temper, which could alone direct it with advantage. Hence it is, that, although some restraints are removed, and some disqualifications taken off, others still remain as badges of inferiority, and incentives to distrust and resentment. Instead of resting on the broad principles of religious freedom, the laws, as we have said, were framed on the narrower basis of political expediency, and stopped in their grants, precisely at the point where it was supposed that power in the hands of the government might be preserved. The emancipation, as it is called, is therefore no emancipation at all. Some advantages no doubt follow to some individuals from the new condition of things; but equality of rank and rights is not yet restored to the Catholic, and the Pharisaical spirit of the established hierarchy, still says to him, in the very letter of the existing laws, ‘Stand off, come not near me, I am holier than thou.’ A Catholic is now excluded from the universities, sundry high offices and other places accessible to Protestant subjects. And why? Simply for his religious faith. His mind is clearer than it was before, but its poisonous ingredients are not

* *Ed. Review*, No. 97, page 218.

entirely worked off. There is still a leaven of unrighteousness to mark his evil character. There is a dividing and impassable line between him and his fellow subjects, as broad and as well defined as ever ; and the fact that such a line exists, and not the point of its position, is calculated to produce jealousy, uneasiness, and disaffection.

It may be asked whether in prudence more could have been done. Whether a wise statesman would have been justified in taking a wider leap. Whether the stability of the government and the permanency of the indulgence accorded to the Catholics, would not have been jeopardized by any more liberal concession, and if so, whether complaint is not as impolitic as ungrateful and captious.

All that is implied in such questions we readily admit. That it would be hazardous to the English government to have made a wider departure from its ancient system, and that the *civil policy* of that which has been done may be defended, we do not deny. And it is this very subject to which we are desirous of drawing the attention of our readers, not to excite in them any ill feeling, most certainly, toward the English Constitution, but by the comparison to warm their admiration and strengthen their confidence in their own.

The evils heretofore complained of by the English Catholics, the danger to be apprehended from whatever has been done in their favor, and the hazard of a precedent of which other classes as well as Catholics may claim the benefit, result absolutely from a fundamental provision of the British Constitution ; to wit, the existence of an ecclesiastical establishment connected with the civil power of the state. This establishment was eminently Catholic, while the authority of the Pope pervaded Christendom. It was changed at the Reformation ; not, indeed, because the monarch or his court were Protestants, but because the forms of the new system better comported with his power and policy. The character of Henry VIII. forbids us to imagine that this alteration of the national religion proceeded from any real change of faith or conviction of judgment. Whether professing to be Catholic or Protestant, he had no religion at all. For temporal convenience and the gratification of iniquitous passions, he chose to change the nominal and political character of his creed, and the nation was obliged to change with him. Under several successive reigns the bigotry or fanaticism or convenience of the monarch, changed and rechang-

ed the national religion, until at length, under the House of Brunswick, the Protestant faith has become the creed of the empire.

Wherever there is a national religion established by law, the professors of it must enjoy some special prerogatives or favor. The consequence seems legitimately to follow from the fact. If the law may establish faith as it can regulate actions, and direct as well what a man may believe, as what he shall do, conformity to such law necessarily deserves reward, and contumacy requires punishment. It would otherwise be without a sanction, and of course a dead letter. The right to punish a violation of such law, if the law be justly enacted, is as perfect as in the case of any other law; and the quantity and severity of punishment is to be regulated in this, precisely as in other cases, by considerations of expediency and political advantage.

But governments, even the most despotic, have been too sensible of the injustice of the main position, to follow its consequences as far as they might be legitimately carried, and while they have maintained their abstract right, have modified its exercise. Hence toleration to some extent has been granted. The professors of a faith not established by law, have not of late times been burned or slaughtered or banished. No such violent and ancient penalties have been awarded against them. They have been permitted to indulge themselves in their own peculiarities under some restraints or impositions or taxations, more or less severe, as the government judged advisable. Now this very idea of toleration, is, next to persecution, most unjust and offensive. For what is toleration but a permission by government, to exercise that religious faith, which, without such permission, is not to be exercised? It implies a power in the civil magistrate to grant, and therefore to refuse to grant; to permit at his pleasure, and therefore to restrain. This very power, in the view of our more liberal frame of government, is in itself a persecution, less excessive in degree, but as objectionable in practice, as that which lighted the flames of martyrdom and erected scaffolds and gibbets.

But the most liberal toleration must make some discrimination between the members of the national establishment, and those whom it tolerates in the belief of what it unavoidably considers as erroneous; and this difference must be measured, either

by punishments and penalties for the one, or rewards and distinctions in favor of the other.

The consequence is, that parties are formed among the subjects of a state, with regard to their religious sentiments. So long, however, as the minor party is exceedingly small, and with little influence or wealth or physical power, or is too ignorant to understand very fully the nature of its rights, or is too indifferent to contend for them, the machinery of the state is not disturbed, and the power of the oppressor, like multitudes of other evils which there are no means to redress, must be borne in silence. But there is a light beaming in darkness. There is a power above the artificial contrivances of human society, which speaks to the hearts of men. There is a growing and animating intelligence, which is extending and improving the mind, and instructing it in its duties and its rights. This principle is abroad in the world, and we have an example of its incipient power among the people of England.

The Catholics are probably not so numerous at present, as they were in the earlier years of the present dynasty. They have not now more eminent or influential men to lead them. The injustice they were lately suffering was not greater than they had formerly suffered, and their complaints and resistance and menaces, though constantly carried to the foot of the throne, were not more formidable than when they were spurned at with contempt. The power of the government was the same as it ever had been, and in the opinion of the late monarch, and by the declaration of a late probable successor to the crown, was, by all the solemnity of a coronation oath, to be exerted against any relaxation of its claims. Nevertheless the fundamental provisions of the laws have been changed. A new and unheard of liberality has been exerted. The Catholic has not only gained, in some degree, what he demanded, but the Protestant has yielded readily and generously to his views. The impolicy of the general doctrine of a national religion, has been so far admitted as to give some hope that the doctrine itself may one day be abandoned, and that which is now, with some profusion of gratitude, called emancipation, may become so in fact.

We confess our gratification on this subject is quite as much founded on the hopes it encourages, as in the results that have been already accomplished. There are other classes of Christians, struggling under the embarrassments of opposition to the

established hierarchy, and anticipating the future benefit of this magnanimous precedent, with whom our sympathies are naturally stronger than they can be with the Catholics. The Dissenters, whether Baptists, Methodists, or Unitarians, are severely pressed by the operation of laws quite as burdensome to them as any under which the Catholics were sufferers. They are in the Lord's keeping, and we trust that in progress of time the bonds which hold them will be broken, and that they will enjoy the same liberty of conscience which is secured to their fellow Christians in the United States.

If the melioration of the laws in regard to Catholics, had sprung from a principle of religious duty, and a prevailing sense of the injustice of exercising civil powers over the consciences of men, entire freedom would have been extended to all sects of Dissenters. If these Dissenters had now the same concentration of power and influence, which the Catholics had, their claims would be equally respected; but having only the eternal law of justice and equity, they cannot prevail at a tribunal, which merely regards policy and expediency, and the maintenance of civil power, and the supremacy of the crown.

In the evils of past times, and in the remedy of the present, which is a manifest encroachment on the fundamental principles of the church establishment, we have an admonitory lesson of the danger of connecting the religious institutions of a people with the authority of government. A recent traveller in our country, fails to gather this lesson as the fruit of experience among us, and has left on record his deliberate expression of dissatisfaction that there is no connexion here between church and state. Few Americans join in such a sentiment, but it may be inquired, with some anxiety, how far the spirit of secular authority is seen in the conduct of any of our religious partisans. The power of our government is in the people and the institutions established by them; and to excite the passions of the people against any religious community, or to exasperate the people against ancient institutions for nonconformity of doctrine, what is it but the manifestation of a spirit, which wants only the sword of the magistrate to exercise as stern a severity? A spirit of exclusiveness, of denunciation, a denial of the christian name and the christian character to whole classes of men who profess to be believers in the gospel of salvation, what is this but carrying to its extremest bounds, all the existing power

of a party, and giving evidence, that, if more could be obtained, it would all be unsparingly exercised? If in the halls of legislation political measures are decided in reference to religious faith; if in elections to places of political trust peculiarities of doctrine and abstract opinions in theology, are publicly set up as qualifications for suffrage; if intolerance is carried into the common relations of society, and men are to be dealt with in their several trades, occupations, or professions, not according to their capacity or honesty, but according to the sect to which they belong and the forms under which they worship, what is wanting, in point of will, towards incorporating the civil and ecclesiastical power, and giving a death blow to religious liberty? Is it not done, as far as it may be done under our free Constitutions? Is it not to be discountenanced and reprobated by every one who feels a pride in the institutions of the Republic, and wishes them to be secure and permanent?

ART. III.—*Some Account of the Writings and Opinions of Justin Martyr.* By JOHN, Bishop of Lincoln, and Master of Christ's College, Cambridge. Cambridge and London. 1829. 8vo. pp. 219.

IN some observations on Justin, in a preceding number, we pointed out what we conceive to be his principal defects as a writer; defects, however, which, as we intimated, are chargeable chiefly on the times. Of his opinions we treated only incidentally, for the purpose of illustrating his intellectual character and habits. We now proceed to state his sentiments respecting some important points of theology; and first, with regard to the *logos*, or divine nature of Christ, as it is called. On this subject he has expressed himself much at length, and though he is occasionally somewhat obscure and mystical, a careful examination of the several terms and illustrations he employs, leaves little doubt as to his real meaning. His system presents one or two great and prominent features, about which we can hardly be mistaken, and which will serve as the basis of our future reasonings. Before we proceed to our citations, however, we must request our readers to bear in mind, that both Jews and Heathens constantly alleged the humble ori-

gin and ignominious death of Jesus as a reproach on Christianity. Other sects borrowed lustre from the names of their founders. But the 'new superstition,' as it was called, which now began widely to diffuse itself, was derived, as it was urged, from an obscure individual, who perished as a malefactor, with every mark of dishonor. This reproach the Christians of Justin's time, unlike Paul, who gloried in what was 'to the Jews a stumbling-block, and to the Greeks foolishness,' began to be desirous of wiping off. It was with acknowledged reference to such a state of feeling, on the part of Christians, and the objections urged by their adversaries, that Justin expresses himself, in substance, as follows.

In the beginning, before all creatures, God begat of himself a certain rational power, which by the Holy Spirit is sometimes called the glory of the Lord, now Son, now wisdom, now angel, now God, now Lord, and *logos* (reason, wisdom, or speech); for he has all these appellations, because he ministers to the will of the Father, and by the will of the Father was begotten. To explain this process of generation, Justin takes the examples of human speech and of fire. For in uttering speech (*logos*), he says, we beget speech; yet not by abscission, nor so that the speech (*logos*), that is in us, or power of speech, or reason whence speech proceeds, is by this act diminished. So, too, one torch is lighted from another, without diminishing that from which it is lighted, but the latter remaining unaltered, that which is lighted from it exists and appears, without lessening that whence it was lighted. These are intended to be illustrations of the mode in which the Son is produced from the Father. In confirmation of his views, Justin quotes, from the Septuagint Version, the passage in Proverbs,* in which wisdom, by which he supposes is meant the Son, is represented as saying, 'The Lord created me in the beginning of his ways to his works,—before the ages he founded me, in the beginning, before he made the earth, or the abyss,—before the hills, he begat me.' This wisdom Justin regarded as God's offspring, produced as above described, and him, this first of his productions, he supposes God to address, when he says, Gen. i. 26, 'Let us make man in our own image.' †

Language, corresponding to the above, occurs in the first Apology, with an additional observation worthy of notice.—

* Prov. viii. 21-36.

† Dial. 158, 159. Thirlb. 266, 268.

Christ is the first-born of God, and that reason (*logos*), of which the whole human race partakes ; and those who have lived according to reason are Christians, though esteemed Atheists. Such among the Greeks were Socrates and Heraclitus, and among the barbarians, Abraham, Ananias, Azarias, Misael, and Elias, and many others.* So, in the second Apology, we are told that Socrates acknowledged Christ, in part ; for he is that reason (*logos*), which is in all, † and which, together with the writings of the Hebrew prophets, also inspired by it, suggested to the Gentile philosophers whatever correct views they entertained concerning the Deity. He calls it the 'insown' or 'implanted' *logos*, or reason, of the seed of which all possess some portion. These, and other equivalent expressions, occur more than once. They seem intended to refer to a principle different from the ordinary faculty of reason in man ; that is, to a peculiarly existing *logos*, or reason, which has in its nature something divine, being derived immediately from God by emanation. This *logos* was Christ, who afterwards became flesh ; it guided Abraham and the patriarchs, inspired the prophets ; and the seed of it being implanted, as just said, in every mind, all, as well illiterate as philosophers, who in former ages obeyed its impulse, were partakers of Christ, the Son of God, and might therefore be called Christians, and as such were entitled to salvation. ‡

That Justin believed this divine principle of reason to be converted into a real being, the following passage, among numerous others, plainly and expressly shows. There are some, he says, who suppose that the Son is only a virtue or energy of the Father, emitted as occasion requires and then again recalled, as for example, when it comes to announce the commands of the Father, and is therefore called a messenger, or when it bears the Father's discourse to men, and is then called *logos*. They, as he observes, think that the Son is inseparable from the Father, as the light of the sun on the earth is inseparable from the sun, which is in the heavens, and is withdrawn with it at its setting. But from these, he tells us, he differs. Angels have a separate and permanent existence ; so this virtue, which the prophetic spirit calls God and angel, is not, as the light of the sun, to be distinguished from the Father in name only, but is something numerically different ; that is, it is not

* p. 71.

† p. 95.

‡ See Brucker, T. III. pp. 374, 375.

the Father under another name, but a real being, wholly distinct from him.*

Justin frequently draws comparisons and illustrations from the Heathen mythology. The following, in which Mercury is introduced, presents a coincidence of language a little remarkable. When we say that Jesus Christ, our teacher, was the *logos*, the first progeny of God, born without commixtion, that he was crucified, and died, and arose, and ascended into heaven, we affirm nothing very different from what is said by you of the sons of Jove. You know how many sons your esteemed writers attribute to him. There is Mercury, the *interpreting logos*, and *teacher of all*, and Æsculapius, and Bacchus, and the rest.†

Again, speaking of the generation of the Son, he says, When we call him the *logos* of God, born of him in a peculiar manner, and out of the course of ordinary births, we speak a common language with you, who call Mercury the *angelic logos* from God.‡

From the extracts above given, it is evident, that although Justin employs the term *logos* in different senses, the primary meaning he usually attributes to it, when used with reference to God, is that of reason, considered as an attribute of the Father,—and that, by the generation of the Son, he understood the conversion of this attribute into a real person. The *logos*, which afterwards became flesh, originally existed in God, as his reason, or perhaps his wisdom or energy. Having so existed from eternity, it was, a little before the creation of the world, voluntarily begotten, thrown out, or emitted, by the Father, or proceeded from him; for these terms are used indiscriminately to express the generation of the Son, or the process by which what before was a quality, acquired a distinct personal subsistence. That such was the doctrine of Justin, and of the Ante-Nicene Fathers generally, concerning the generation of the Son, the whole strain of their writings affords abundant evidence. They supposed, we repeat, that the *logos*, or reason, which once constituted an attribute of the Father, was at length converted into a real being, and that this was done by a voluntary act of the Father. To this process they applied the term generation, and sometimes of emission or prolation, nor do they appear originally to have objected to that of creation.

* Dial. p. 221. Thirlb. pp. 312, 413.

† Apol. I. p. 56. Thirlb. p. 31.

‡ Ibid. p. 57. Thirlb. p. 33.

The enquiry now presents itself, whence were these views, which evidently constitute the germ of the trinity, derived? From the Jewish and Christian scriptures, or from the doctrines of Plato, as expounded by his later followers? We say, without hesitation, the latter. The term *logos*, which Justin and the other Fathers use to express the divine nature of the Son, frequently occurs, as our learned readers well know, in the Septuagint Version of the Hebrew scriptures, and is rendered in our bibles by *word*. But neither the original Hebrew term, nor the corresponding term, *logos*, in the Septuagint, ever bears the meaning which these Fathers attach to it, but is used in a totally different sense; nor do we find, in the whole bible, the least trace of the generation of the Son, by the conversion of an attribute of the Father into a real person. One of the passages adduced by Justin, as sanctioning his views of the preexistence, and agency of the *logos*, Son, or rational power, produced as above described, is the following. 'By the *word* of the Lord were the heavens made;' by which, as he tells us, the Psalmist meant that they were made by the rational power, or Son, of which we speak. The expressions in Proverbs, 'The Lord created me in the beginning of his way,'—'before the depths he begat me,'—were adduced as referring to his birth, or production. Numerous other expressions, occurring in the Old Testament, may be referred to the same class, and were explained in a similar manner. But the Jews attributed no such meaning to the language in question, nor does it appear naturally fitted to suggest it. The notions it conveyed to their minds were very simple and obvious. The sentiments of the Fathers savoured of a metaphysical and speculative philosophy, evidently the growth of a different soil. The Jews were not familiar with the abstractions of philosophy, as their current phraseology bears ample testimony. They describe the perfections and agency of the Divine Being, in precisely the language which we should expect would occur to the minds of an exceedingly primitive, and in some respects, rude people. They resort, as was natural, chiefly to comparisons and images borrowed from sensible objects and human modes of action. Their views were very little spiritualized, and many of the expressions they employed in reference to the Deity, were strictly anthropomorphitcal.

We will explain our meaning by a few examples, in which the attributes and agency of God are illustrated by allusions,

which, to us, familiar as we are with the sublimer discoveries of Christianity, and the improvements of modern science, appear feeble and inadequate. Thus, to convey a notion of his eternity, they speak of him as existing before the hills.* To aid the imagination in comprehending his immensity and greatness, they are content to draw illustrations from human sovereignty. They represent him as a mighty king, having the heavens for his throne, and the earth for his footstool. To give some conception of his power, his universal presence, and knowledge embracing all objects, they describe him as having human organs, as hands, eyes, and ears, ever active and vigilant. His eyes run to and fro over the whole earth; his arm is outstretched to punish or to save; he whets his sword, he bends his bow, he discharges the swift arrows of his wrath. When he wishes to know what is passing on earth, he is exhibited to our view as descending from a height above us; thus, 'the Lord came down to see the tower, which the children of men builded.'† Again, hearing reports of the wickedness of Sodom, he resolves to 'go down,' and ascertain whether they are correct, 'and if not,' he is introduced as saying, 'I will know.'‡ He is described as walking abroad, and conversing familiarly with man; as having human passions and affections, as repenting and grieved for what he had done, as angry and taking revenge, as laughing at the distresses of his enemies, as mocking and deriding. In consistency with this language, which ascribes to him human organs, affections, and modes of action, he is represented, when about to exert his power, or produce an effect he wills, as *speaking*, or issuing his *word*, or command. Thus, in the process of creation, he is introduced as proclaiming an order at every step. 'Let there be light,—Let there be a firmament,—Let the waters under the heaven be gathered together into one place, and let the dry land appear,—Let us make man.' Everything is said to be done by a command, because human sovereigns are accustomed to issue a *word*, or order, when they wish their designs to be carried into effect. In conformity with this usage, the Psalmist says, 'By the *word* of the Lord were the heavens made, and all the host of them by the breath of his mouth. He spake, and it was done; he commanded, and it stood fast.'§

* Souverain, c. iv.
 ‡ lb. xviii. 21.

† Gen. xi. 5.
 § Psalm xxxiii. 6, 9.

In all this there is no mystery.* God issues his command, or his *word*, and it is executed, and the heavens and the earth appear; that is, he produces an effect; there is an exertion of his power; he wills, and the event corresponds to his will. Here is no allusion to any intermediate agent; to a Son, who receives and executes his commands; a rational power, emanating from his own substance, and forming a link between him and his creatures. All this is a fiction of later times.

Such is the meaning of the term *word*, or *word of the Lord*, as used by Moses, the Patriarchs, and by David. The notion the Jews attached to it, was the simplest and most obvious imaginable. There is no obscurity whatever attending it. The term formed part of their anthropomorphitcal language, and is to be classed with other terms constantly used by them in reference to the Deity; as hands, mouth, nostrils, all of which they apply to him. A similar explanation is to be given of the term when it occurs in such phrases as the following; 'The word of God came to Nathan,' or to the prophets. This is a mere idiom of speech, growing out of the very primitive notions of the people who employed it. It was not the result of policy or reflection, but rather of untutored and childlike simplicity. The meaning is simply, that the prophets received divine communications. The apostle very correctly expresses this meaning, when he says, 'holy men of God spake as moved by the Holy Ghost;' that is, by a divine impulse.†

Let us now proceed to the Proverbs, or the ethical writings of the Old Testament. Justin and the other Fathers, as before stated, imagined that by wisdom, of which we have a magnificent description in the eighth chapter of Proverbs, was meant the *logos*, or Son, a real being, the agent or minister of the Father, in the work of creation.‡ But the author of the chapter in question, had evidently no such thought. Nothing, in

* All the effects of his provident designs, every occurrence, which takes place by his remote agency, is spoken of in similar language. Thus, 'He sendeth forth his commandment upon earth; his word runneth very swiftly. He giveth snow like wool; he scattereth the hoar frost like ashes. He sendeth out his word and melteth them.' Psalm cxlvii. 15, 16, 18.

† 2 Pet. i. 21.

‡ Dr Watts once supposed that by wisdom, in this place, was meant Christ's preexistent human soul united with the divine nature. (Glory of Christ, Dis. iii. § 5.) He was led into a belief of this strange doctrine of the preexistence of Christ's human soul, from the circumstance, that the scriptures in several passages, in which, as he supposes, they speak of his existence before his incarnation, evidently ascribe to him a nature inferior to God. We are not surprised that Dr Watts, entertaining these views, afterwards became a Unitarian.

fact, was further from his meaning, as the whole structure and connexion of the passage puts beyond doubt. The Oriental imagination, as every one knows, delighted in metaphor and bold and striking imagery. The strongest figures were often employed to express a very obvious and simple fact or sentiment, and among these a favorite one was personification, by which abstract qualities are clothed with the properties of a real being, and represented as speaking and acting as such. This figure frequently occurs in the sacred writings of the Jews, particularly in their poetical books. Thus, truth, justice, mercy, and other abstract properties, are often introduced as possessing proper personality; in other words, as real beings; as, 'Mercy and Truth are met together, Righteousness and Peace have kissed each other. Truth shall spring out of the earth; and Righteousness shall look down from heaven.'* By the same lively figure, the author of the Proverbs gives Wisdom a voice, and represents her as offering counsel and admonition, and calling on men to listen; and to show her title to respect, she proceeds to describe her antiquity and excellence; speaks of herself as guiding the great and noble of the earth, as having her residence of old with God, as one brought up with him, and rejoicing always in his presence. The purport of this language, no one, at the present day, mistakes. All admit it to be only a bold personification of the attribute of wisdom, as it is possessed by the Divine Being, and, in a feebler degree, by his intelligent offspring; in other words, only a well known rhetorical figure.† Such language could never have suggested to the early Fathers their peculiar views of the *logos*, or Son of God. That they should have considered it as having reference to him, after those views had been imbibed from other sources, however, need not surprise us. So, too, they conceived that the generation of the Son was alluded to in the first verse of the fortyfifth Psalm, in our English bibles—'My heart is inditing a good matter;' but, as it stands in the Version of the Seventy, the only medium through which they were acquainted with the books of the Old Testament,—'My heart threw out a good *logos*.'

* Psalm lxxxv. 10, 11.

† Similar instances of personification occur in the literature of all nations, and are resorted to occasionally by the gravest writers. Hooker, in his Ecclesiastical Polity, (B. I. § 16,) has a specimen of it, remarkable for its beauty. Speaking of law, he says, 'Her seat is the bosom of God, her voice the harmony of the world; all things in heaven and earth do her homage, the very east as feeling her care, and the greatest as not exempt from her power.'

If we proceed to examine the writings of the Jews, which belong to a period subsequent to the formation of the sacred canon, and which, though not of authority as a rule of faith, are yet valuable as a record of opinions, we arrive at conclusions similar to the foregoing. We find instances of bold personification, but discover no traces of the metaphysical doctrine of the *logos*, or generation of the Son, as held by the early christian Fathers.*

The Chaldee Paraphrasts are sometimes quoted as furnishing an example of the application of a term corresponding to *logos*, or word of God, to the Son. But this argument is met by the observation, that the expression alluded to, constitutes only an idiom of language, and is to be viewed in the same light as the *Numen Jovis*, or *Numen Junonis* of the Latins, and that it is intended to refer to God himself, or to his operations, and not a being distinct from him.

If we turn to the authors of the Gospels and the Epistles of the New Testament, we find, that their views agree, in all essential points, with those inculcated by the writers under the old dispensation. Their language and conceptions are more spiritualized and refined. There is less of grossness in their modes of representing the Deity. Still, much of the ancient phraseology is retained, and where a departure is made from it, this departure is not such as indicates that the opinions of the Jews, or Jewish Christians, concerning the divine nature and operations, had undergone that change, which the supposition of their belief in the doctrine of the generation

* Thus, the author of the Wisdom of Solomon, the work of some Alexandrine Jew, though he sometimes uses expressions which savour a little of the Egyptian school, had evidently no conception of the conversion of an attribute into a real being. After speaking of Wisdom as 'the breath of the power of God, and a pure influence, flowing from the glory of the Almighty—the unspotted mirror of the power of God, an image of his goodness,' he proceeds, (chap. viii. 3, 4,) 'In that she is conversant with God, she magnifieth her nobility. For she is privy to the mysteries of the knowledge of God, and a lover of his works.' In a prayer, recorded in the next chapter, the following expressions occur:—'O God of my fathers, and Lord of mercy, who hast made all things with thy word, and ordained man through thy wisdom,—give me Wisdom that sitteth by thy throne.—And Wisdom was with thee, which knoweth thy works, and was present when thou madest the world. O send her out of thy holy heavens, and from the throne of thy glory.' Chap. ix. 1, 4, 9, 10. Again, the Son of Sirach (Ecclesiasticus, xxiv. 3, 4, 9,) introduces Wisdom as saying, 'I came out of the mouth of the Most High, He created me from the beginning, before the world. I dwell in high places, and my throne is in a cloudy pillar.' But who does not see, that these instances are only specimens of the style, in which the Oriental genius, ever fond of glowing representations, metaphor, and fiction, is accustomed to give utterance to its thoughts?

of the Son, as explained by the Fathers, would imply, but the reverse. The New Testament, if we except the introductory verses to John's Gospel, is remarkably free from expressions which have the least appearance of favoring the metaphysical notions of these Fathers concerning the nature of the Son, and those verses, as we shall hereafter show, favor them only in appearance. The remaining part of the Gospels and Epistles, that is, the whole New Testament with the exception of a fragment of a chapter, is, in our view, totally opposed to those notions and everything resembling them. The language of Jesus and his apostles certainly never could have suggested them, and the general strain of it cannot, by the greatest exercise of ingenuity, be distorted into a shape which lends them the feeblest support. To those who doubt the truth of this statement, we would say, Take the language of Justin, as we have represented it, faithfully as we believe; render your minds familiar with it, and then sit down and read over carefully the writings of the apostles and evangelists, you will rise from the perusal, we are confident, with a firm conviction, that, with the exception above made, no trace of such language is found in those writings, and that they could not possibly have been the source whence it was derived. This conviction, we think, must force itself upon the mind of every one, who, without prejudice, compares the style of the authors of the New Testament, with that of Justin and subsequent Fathers, who trod in his steps. He must be struck with the total dissimilarity between the two classes of writings, not a dissimilarity in modes of expression merely, but a real dissimilarity, or rather opposition, of sentiment. The plain inference is, that the Fathers alluded to, drew from other sources besides the bible, and that they suffered their learning to corrupt the simplicity of their faith.*

This inference derives support from the fact, that the com-

* It may be said, possibly, that there is a class of passages in the New Testament which favor the doctrine of the Fathers that God employed the Son as his agent in forming the universe. We refer to those, they are very few, in which the following language, or something like it, occurs. 'By whom he also made the worlds,' or ages, Heb. i. 2.—'For by him,' that is Jesus as an instrument, 'were all things created,' Colos. i. 16. These and similar phrases, however, very evidently refer to that new and spiritual creation, that moral renovation, which it was the great design of Christianity to effect. That they do not refer to the creation of the material world, appears obvious from the fact, that the current language of both the Old and New Testament, ascribes this creation immediately to God, the maker, preserver, and governor of the universe.

positions attributed to the apostolic Fathers, those especially of which the antiquity can be ascertained with any approach to certainty, afford no countenance to the opinions, the origin and history of which we are examining. These compositions, several of them at least, give evidence that their authors were somewhat infected with that fondness for allegory, far fetched conceits, and forced and mystical interpretations, which Philo and other Jews had acquired in the Egyptian schools; but we search them in vain for those views of the *logos*, or Son, a personified attribute of the Father, so prominent in the writings of the philosophical converts to Christianity. The sentiments they utter, when divested of their allegorical dress, though not in all respects conformable to the representations of the scriptures, afford certainly no specimens of the metaphysical doctrines, which gained a footing in the church during the second and third centuries. We speak now of those parts of the productions in question not manifestly spurious. Take as an instance Clemens' first Epistle to the Corinthians, for the genuineness of which the evidence, though not altogether satisfactory, is stronger than can be adduced in favor of any other of these productions. The supremacy of the Father is asserted or implied throughout, and Jesus is spoken of in terms mostly borrowed from the scriptures. He is once called 'the sceptre of the majesty of God,'* and this figurative expression is the most exalted applied to him in the whole Epistle. In conformity with scriptural usage God is said to have made all things 'by the word of his power,' and by the same word, it is added, 'he is able to destroy them.'† Again, 'by his almighty power he fixed the heavens, and by his incomprehensible wisdom he adorned them;'—'above all, he with his holy and pure hands formed man, the most excellent, and, as to his understanding, truly the greatest of all earthly creatures—the character of his own image.'‡ This language, we hardly need say, is utterly at variance with that of Justin and the Ante-Nicene Fathers generally, who represent God as producing from himself a rational power or Son, to be his minister in creating and adorning the earth and the heavens.

We have thus shown, we think conclusively, that the views entertained by Justin, and the other philosophical converts before the council of Nice, were not, and could not have been,

* Chap. xvi. Archbp. Wake's Translation. Ed. 5th.

† Chap. xxvii.

‡ xxxiii.

derived from the sacred writings. The meaning which the Jews attributed to the term *logos*, or *word*, as used throughout the Old Testament, and to *wisdom*, as employed by their ethical writers before and after the formation of their sacred canon, differs essentially from the meaning ascribed to them by those Fathers. The Jews never intended to designate by them a real person or being, which was the sense in which the Fathers uniformly understood them. The language of the New Testament, and of the christian writings of the first century, so far as we have any means of judging of it, contains no traces of this permanent personification of a divine attribute in Jesus Christ. The doctrine was unknown to the church as long as the converts to Christianity were confined to the uneducated classes. It appeared with Justin, who came over to Christianity deeply imbued with the corrupt philosophy of the age. We are authorised hence to infer, that he brought it with him, or the rudiments of it at least, from the schools of human learning.

This inference, we conceive, would be just, were the evidence that Justin's sentiments respecting the *logos* corresponded, in their essential features, with those of the later or Alexandrine Platonists, far less satisfactory than it is. Were there an entire want of evidence of this kind, our argument might appear to be embarrassed with one difficulty ; for it would leave the origin of the sentiments in question unexplained, and this circumstance, it might be urged, ought to excite distrust of its soundness. The objection would have some force, though far from being insuperable. But the opponents of the proposition we are endeavouring to establish, are, by their own concessions, deprived even of this refuge. The proofs of the similarity contended for, between the sentiments of Justin and the Alexandrine Platonists, are so strong, that the best informed of all parties have yielded a ready assent to them. Few names stand higher in the Romish church than those of Petavius and Huet, or Huetius ; the latter, Bishop of Avranches, a learned man, and the original editor of Origen's Commentaries on the New Testament ; the former, a Jesuit, profoundly versed, as his writings prove, in a knowledge of christian antiquity. Among Protestants, Cudworth, author of the Intellectual System, stands preeminent for erudition, and Mosheim, and many will add, Horsley, the antagonist of Dr Priestley, have no mean fame. Yet all these, and we might mention several others, all belonging to the ranks of Trinitarians, admit in substance the

charge of Platonism brought against the Fathers.* They all concede that the modes of expression, the arguments and illustrations employed by the early Fathers, were often derived from Platonic sources. Horsley says expressly that the Platonizing Fathers were 'the Orthodox of their age,' and contends for 'such a similitude' between the doctrine of the Fathers and Platonists, 'as speaks a common origin;'† and Cudworth has instituted a very labored comparison to show that 'there is no so great difference,' as he expresses it, 'between the genuine Platonic trinity, rightly understood, and the Christian.'‡ The abovementioned writers, as Trinitarians, suppose, of course, that the trinity was originally derived either from the bible or from tradition; but all of them, we believe, if we except Horsley, admit that it became somewhat corrupted by an infusion of Platonic sentiments. This may be regarded as satisfactorily proved by the learned Brucker, the historian of philosophy, also a Trinitarian.§

The great points of resemblance between the views of the Platonists and those of the christian Fathers, and of Justin in particular, on the subject of the *logos*, Son, or second God, may be stated in few words. Plato had spoken of three principles; God, his reason or *logos*, embracing the patterns or archetypes of things afterwards formed, and the soul of the world. The latter he made distinct and subordinate to the others. The second, which, as we have just said, he calls the reason,

* Petav. Theol. Dogmat. T. II. lib. i. c. iii. et seqq. Huet. Origeniana lib. ii. c. i. and c. ii. Quæst. 2d. Ed. 1658. See also, Chris. Disciple, Vol. I. pp. 398, et seqq. New Series, where the language of Mosheim is quoted.

† See General Repository and Review, Vol. III. pp. 18, 19.

‡ The whole subject is treated with great learning, Intell. Sys. lib. i. c. 4. pp. 557, et seqq. Ed. Lon. 1678.

§ Hist. Crit. Phil. See especially T. III. pp. 313—459, which contain the result of a diligent examination of the writings of Justin, Tatian, Theophilus of Antioch, Athenagoras, Irenæus, Tertullian, Clemens of Alexandria, Origen, and others. His conclusion, in which he is fully borne out by his citations, is, that the taint of Platonism strongly adhered to these Fathers, and that through their writings the whole church, in fact, became infected. To the abovementioned authorities we may add that of James Basnage, also a learned man and a Trinitarian. History of the Jews, b. iv. c. vi. § 21, 22.

Professor Stuart, in his Letters on the Eternal Generation of the Son of God, attempts to soften the charge of Platonism against the early Fathers, but the general strain of his remarks goes to substantiate it, though the reverse was intended. He admits that they erred in their views of the 'generation of the Son of God;' and intimates, if he does not assert, that their acquaintance with Plato's doctrine of a '*logos*, or *nous*, to which he ascribes the creation of the world,' and their familiarity with the heathen notions of 'emanation and generation, applied to the divine nature,' were the source of their error. Let. III.

or, as it would sometimes seem, the intellect of God, he pronounces 'the divinest of all things,' and admits it into the number of his primary principles. Whether he regarded it as having a real and proper subsistence, or only an attribute represented as a person by a sort of poetical fiction, it is of no consequence to determine. It is acknowledged that he sometimes speaks of it in terms, which cannot easily be explained, except on the supposition, that he considered it a real being distinct from the supreme God, or united with him only as proceeding from the fountain of his divinity. Certain it is that it was so explained by his later followers of the Egyptian school, especially after they had become acquainted with the Oriental doctrine of emanations.

Of the opinions of this school, Philo, a learned Jew of Alexandria, who flourished soon after the christian era, and who had been called the Jewish Plato, from the striking resemblance of his opinions to those of the Athenian sage, may be regarded as a fair representative. Fortunately, his writings, the bulk of them at least, have been preserved, and from them we may gather the sentiments of the Alexandrine Platonists of his time. He admits that there is one supreme God, but supposes that there is a second, inferior to him, and begotten of him, called his reason, *logos*, the term, as we have seen, employed by Plato to designate his second principle. To this *logos*, or intelligent nature emanating from God, as he considers it, he attributes all the properties of a real being, and calls him the most ancient of all beings begotten or made,*—the most ancient and chief angel, the mediator between God and man, not unbegotten as God, nor begotten in the same manner as we are, but holding a middle place between the two extremes,†—the first born of God, discharging the office of high priest in the temple of the universe.‡ He applies the title of God to him, not using the term, as he says, in the highest sense.§ At other times he speaks of him as the image of God,|| and again, the reason of God, embracing, like Plato's *logos*, the ideas or archetypes, according to which the sensible world was framed. He calls God the fountain of the *logos*, and the *logos* his instrument, or minister, in forming, preserving, and governing the world, his messenger and the interpreter of his will to man. Expressions

* Opp. p. 71. Ed. 1613. † Ib. pp. 397, 8. ‡ Ib. p. 463. § Ib. p. 465.
|| Ib. p. 5.

similar to the above, abound throughout his writings. Thus, using the term *logos* in the sense of reason, having a proper subsistence, and distinct from God, though emanating from the fountain of his divinity, he departed from the usage of the sacred writers, who, as we have shown, never attribute to it this meaning. The sum of the matter, is, the authors of the Septuagint Version and the Platonists hit upon the same term to express totally different views; the former intending by it simply a mode of action in the Deity, the latter a real being, his agent and minister in executing his will. The coincidence is merely verbal, and, as it would seem, accidental.

The subject might be further illustrated by an appeal to later writers of the same school, as Plotinus and others, but it is unnecessary. Justin and the subsequent Fathers, we know, read Philo, and their thoughts and expressions often exhibit a remarkable coincidence with his. Indeed so deeply are their writings imbued with his sentiments and spirit, that without him, as Mosheim observes, they would often be 'altogether unintelligible.' No one, who compares their sentiments in reference to the *logos*, with those entertained and expressed by him, can doubt, we think, that they must have been derived from a common source, and this could be no other than the doctrines of Plato, as explained by his later followers. Justin, as related in the former part of this article,* expressly informs us that he became acquainted with these doctrines before his conversion to Christianity, and took incredible delight in them. The process by which he engrafted them on the original truths of the gospel, without any premeditated design of corruption, which we do not impute to him, can, we think, be easily explained. We must beg our readers to bear in mind what, as we conceive, was satisfactorily proved in the preceding number, that as a writer and critic he was not exempt from the prominent faults of his age, and was but very imperfectly acquainted with the laws of exposition and the principles of correct reasoning. Keeping this fact in view, we can readily conceive, that the good Father, deceived by an apparent resemblance between the language of John, in the introductory verses of his Gospel, and that of the Platonists in whose school he had been educated, might rashly conclude that the evangelist and the philosophers really taught the same doctrine. We say *apparent* resem-

* p. 144.

blance in modes of expression, for we are convinced that it is only such. That the apostle entertained no such view of the *logos*, or first begotten of God, as was taught in the Platonic schools, is, we think, quite plain from the manner in which he has ordinarily expressed himself in his writings, and he could not, therefore, have meant to teach it in the passage under consideration. A careful examination of the passage, far from weakening, goes to strengthen, this conclusion. It appears not improbable, that in writing it he had in view the errors, which even in his day began to insinuate themselves into the church, and designed to correct them. Le Clerc supposes that he had reference to the very errors of Platonism to which we allude, and some imperfect acquaintance with which he might have obtained from conversation or books, during his long residence in Asia Minor, and particularly at Ephesus, the inhabitants of which maintained a free intercourse with Alexandria. Others contend, that he alluded to certain tenets of the Oriental philosophy, which inculcated a belief of numerous *æons*, or inferior intelligences emanating from the divine mind, and taught that this world was produced by one of these intelligences, and not by the supreme God. This doctrine was held by the Gnostics, a sect which became widely diffused during the second and third centuries; and which may be traced back to the times of the apostles. But though distinct in their origin, the Oriental and Greek philosophy became in some respects blended in the Platonic schools of Alexandria. It was a doctrine of those schools, as before shown, that God created and governs the world by the agency of another being, produced or emanating from him, and inferior to him. This doctrine, we are persuaded St John intended to combat, as unscriptural, false, and pernicious. On this supposition his language appears perfectly intelligible and appropriate. He means simply to assert, that the world was formed by the immediate agency of God; that the *logos*, word, wisdom, or energy employed in its production, was no other than an attribute of God actively exerted; that he always possessed this attribute; that it was with him from the first; that it was inseparable from him, entering into his very essence and constituting him what he is; that it was the source of life and light to the world; that it was especially manifested through Jesus of Nazareth, in whom, as the representative, image, copy, or resemblance of God, it might be said to have been embodied, and to have dwelt among us. Such appears

to be the meaning of John, divested of the peculiar phraseology in which it is expressed ; a phraseology which to Jewish minds must have appeared much less extraordinary than to us, for they were familiar with similar modes of speech, and similar bold and figurative descriptions. But the misfortune, as it regards Justin and the Fathers, was, that, retaining, in some respects, the language of the apostle, they explained it conformably to their own philosophical notions, and thus inadvertently fastened on Christianity one of the errors of the Platonists.

We have pointed out some features in which the views of the *logos* entertained by the Fathers, coincided essentially with those of the Platonists. Both the Fathers and Platonists used the term in the sense of reason, which they converted into a real person, and thus departed from the primitive notions of the Jews, and the sentiments uniformly inculcated in the Hebrew and Christian scriptures. Further, the Platonists regarded the *logos*, or Son, as distinct from the Unbegotten One, and essentially inferior. And so, we add, did the Fathers, and this constitutes another striking point of resemblance. The inferiority of the Son was generally, if not uniformly, asserted by the Ante-Nicene Fathers. This has been admitted by several learned advocates of the doctrine of the trinity. Cudworth fully and expressly asserts it* of 'the generality of the christian doctors for the first three hundred years after the apostles' times ;' and Brucker, Petavius, and Huetius, already referred to, and we may add Le Clerc, entertained substantially the same opinion. That the opinion is well founded, has been incontestably proved, we conceive, by Whiston, author of *Primitive Christianity Revived*, † and by Whitby in a work, which never has been, and we hazard nothing in saying, never can be refuted. ‡ That they viewed the Son as distinct from the Father is evident from the circumstance, that they plainly assert his inferiority. Besides, they often either directly affirm it, or use language which necessarily implies it. § They considered him distinct and sub-

* *Intellect. Sys.* p. 595. † vol. iv. ‡ *Disquisitiones Modestæ in Cl. Bulli Defensionem Fid. Nic.*

§ In fact, the Fathers of the council of Nice and their predecessors, never thought of asserting, that the Son and the Father were *numerically* one. This was a refinement of later times. The term *consubstantial*, as used by these Fathers and by the Platonists, the learned well know, implied not a *numerical*, but only a *specific* identity. By saying that two beings were consubstantial, as that the Son was consubstantial with the Father, they only meant to affirm that they partook of the same common or specific nature, just as two individual men partake of a common nature, that is, a human nature, though they constitute two distinct beings, having a separate will and consciousness.

ordinate. This appears, as it regards Justin, from the passages already adduced, in the account given of his sentiments, a few pages back. We shall now exhibit further evidence of the fact.

First, we would observe, that Justin expressly contends for two Gods, and two Lords, against what he considered the cavils of the Jews. He speaks of the Lord in heaven as Lord of that Lord who appeared on earth, and the source of all his power, titles, and dominion, 'the cause of his being powerful and Lord and God.'* The expression, 'The Lord rained fire from the Lord out of heaven upon Sodom,' he contends, shows that they are really two in number. The same is implied, he says, in the words, 'Adam has become as one of us;' words, he maintains, which are not to be regarded as a mere figure of speech, as sophists contend. He then quotes the passage from Proverbs already repeatedly referred to, and adds, whence you may understand, if you will attend, that this progeny of the Father was begotten of him before all creatures, and that which is begotten, as all know, *is different in number* from that which begets it, that is, they constitute two beings numerically distinct.† On this point the language of Justin is too plain to be misunderstood. Trypho had challenged him to show that there is mentioned in the Old Testament, any other Lord and God except the Supreme. In reply, he maintains that there is another often spoken of, and who appeared to the Patriarchs, the Son and minister of the Supreme, voluntarily begotten of him, not from eternity—this he nowhere asserts—but before the creation of the world, that he might be employed as an agent in its production.

Again, Justin frequently applies to the Son, such phrases as these,—'next in rank,' or 'next after' God; as the *logos*, or Son, is the first power, virtue, after God the Father and Lord of all.‡ Again, we reverence him *next after* God; and he sometimes states the ground of this reverence, which is not because he is of one essence with the Father, but because for our sakes he became man and partook of our infirmities, that through him we might be healed.§ Such phrases, we say, occur, not once, but repeatedly, and their import cannot be mistaken.

Of the derivation of the Son from the Supreme God, and his subjection to him as the minister of his will, of his names

* Dial. p. 222. Thirlb. pp. 413, 414.

† Apol. I. p. 63.

‡ Ib.

§ Apol. II. p. 97.

and offices, and especially of his title to be called God in an inferior sense of the term, the following account is given. He is God, *because he is the first-born of every creature*; *—the Lord of hosts *by the will of the Father giving him the dominion*. † Again, he *received of the Father*, that he should be king, and Christ, and priest, and angel, and whatever other such things, that is, titles, rank, and offices, he has and had. ‡ Again, he came according to the power of the omnipotent Father *given to him*. § God *gave glory* to Christ alone, whom he constituted a light to the nations. || Again, the Lord and Father of the universe is represented as raising him from the earth and placing him at his right hand. ¶ He expressed reliance on God, says Justin, for support and safety, nor, he continues, does he profess to do anything of his own will or power. He refused to be called good, replying, ‘one is good, my Father who is in heaven.’ ** Again, Justin speaks of him in the following terms; ‘Who, *since he is the first begotten logos of God, is God* ;’ †† that is, he is God by virtue of his birth; in other words, he derived a divine nature from God, just as we derive a human nature from human parents. This was what Justin and others meant when they spoke of the divinity of Christ.

Justin uses another class of expressions, which show that the supremacy of the Father was still preserved in his time. He represents Christians as approaching the Father *through* the Son. *Through* him, he says, they offered thanks and prayers to God; as, we do always beseech God, *through* Jesus Christ, to preserve us from the power of demons. ‡‡ And in the account he gives of the celebration of the supper, he observes, that the person presiding offers up praise and glory to the Father of the universe through the name of the Son and the Holy Spirit. §§ Again, in all our oblations we bless the Maker of the universe, *through* his Son and the Holy Spirit. |||| From these passages, as well as from the whole strain of Justin’s writings, it is evident that the Son was not regarded in his time as an object of direct address in prayer. No expression occurs in any part of his works, which affords the slightest ground for the supposition that religious adoration and prayer were ever offered up to him,

* Dial. p. 218.

† Ib. 184. Thirlb. 327.

‡ Dial. p. 162, 3.

** Ib. p. 196.

‡‡ Dial. p. 128.

|||| Ib. p. 83.

† Ib. 181, 182.

§ Dial. p. 320. Thirlb. 432.

¶ Ib. p. 129.

†† Apol. p. 81. Thirlb. 94.

§§ Apol. p. 82.

or that his name was ever directly invoked. Prayer was as yet uniformly offered to God *through* the Son, according to the models left in the scriptures.

We might multiply proofs, but it is unnecessary. We have adduced evidence sufficient, and more than sufficient, we conceive, to demonstrate beyond the possibility of cavil, that Justin regarded the Son as distinct from God, and inferior to him; distinct, not as forming one of three hypostases, or persons, three 'distinctions' or three 'somewhats,' but distinct in essence and nature, deriving all his powers and titles from God, constituted under him and subject to his will. *

Thus, then, the argument stands. The views which Justin entertained of the *logos*, or Son, as a rational power begotten of God, and his instrument in forming the world, distinct from him, and subordinate, cannot be traced in the Jewish or Christian scriptures. Neither the language of the Septuagint Version, in which the term occurs, nor the corresponding Hebrew, were regarded by the Jews as teaching them. They are not alluded to by the apostles and writers of the New Testament and their immediate successors; or if indirectly alluded to in one instance, it was only that they might be condemned. But they occur in the writings of the Alexandrine Platonists, precisely, or nearly in the same form in which they appear in Justin, who is the first christian writer in which they are met with, and who, as we learn from himself, was a Platonic philosopher before he was a Christian. To us the conclusion appears irresistible, that he derived them from the Platonists, and on his conversion undesignedly incorporated them with the christian faith. Nor is there anything surprising in all this. It would have been more surprising if the Fathers, educated as heathen philosophers, should have taken along with them none of their former sentiments on going over to Christianity. The human mind does not so easily part with early and long cherished opinions and prejudices. Then in the case of the Fathers, it should be considered, their fondness for allegory and mystical interpretations, and general want of skill as critics, a fault common to them with their heathen cotemporaries, deprived them of al-

* *Hypostasis* was used by the Fathers in the time of Justin as synonymous with substance. The technical sense, in which it has since been employed by theologians, was at that time wholly unknown. This has been placed beyond question by learned and impartial critics.

most the only means of correcting their misapprehensions, by a careful and discriminating study of the sacred writings.*

The modern popular doctrine of the trinity, it will be perceived from the foregoing remarks, derives no support from the language of Justin; and this observation may be extended to all the Ante-Nicene Fathers, that is, to all christian writers for three centuries after the birth of Christ. It is true they speak of the Father, Son, and prophetic or holy Spirit, but that they regarded them as three persons, or three distinctions in one numerical essence, cannot be affirmed with any appearance of truth. The very reverse is the fact. The doctrine of the trinity as explained by these Fathers, was essentially different from the modern doctrine. This we state as a fact as susceptible of proof as any fact in the history of human opinions.

The late Bishop of Lincoln, Tomline, quotes two passages from Justin in support of the doctrine of the trinity as held by the Church of England, and as we must suppose that he had learning and judgment sufficient to enable him to select those most to his purpose, we are authorised to infer, that they are

* The Fathers appear to have felt that some apology was necessary for the very frequent use they made of Platonic sentiments and illustrations, and hence contended, with great pertinacity, that Plato stole from Moses. To take from him, therefore, was in their view no plunder; it was only to reclaim pilfered treasures. That he borrowed from the Hebrews, is repeatedly asserted by Justin, but the notion did not originate with him. It was propagated long before by the Jews, who, with the exclusive spirit which always characterised them, claimed to be the sole depositaries of truth. The opinion may be traced to Aristobulus, a Jew, who lived in the time of Ptolemy Philometor, about one hundred and fifty years before Christ, and who, it seems, dealt plentifully in fables. Aristobulus affirms that both Pythagoras and Plato drew information from the Jewish scriptures, of which he says a Greek translation was made before that of the Seventy. But of this translation no vestige remains, nor, we believe, is any mention made of it by any other writer. The authors of the Septuagint Version make no allusion to it, and it therefore probably never existed. Josephus asserted, after Aristobulus, that Plato took Moses for his model, and they were followed by Justin, Clemens of Alexandria, and others, who found the doctrine exceedingly convenient, as it served in a measure to justify, what might otherwise have appeared an extravagant admiration of Plato and his opinions. We think, however, that the evidence adduced to show that Plato derived assistance from the compositions of Moses, is very unsatisfactory. He probably knew nothing either of the Jewish lawgiver or of his writings. The testimony of the abovementioned authors, in this case, is entitled to no credit, as it is founded wholly on conjecture. Then the whole spirit of Plato's theological speculations is opposed to the Mosiac doctrines, as may be seen from the slight comparison above instituted, with regard to his *logos* or second principle, to which there is nothing corresponding in the theology of Moses. This subject is amply discussed by Le Clerc, Crit. Epist. VII. and VIII. See also some observations of Brucker, T. I. pp. 635, 639. and Basnage's History of the Jews, B. IV. c. iv.

the strongest which the language of this Father affords. In quoting the first, however, he with marked disingenuousness suppresses a clause, which wholly invalidates his inference, and debars Protestants, at least, from all benefit of the passage as a proof text. The passage, as he gives it, stands thus; 'We worship and adore the Father, and the Son, who came from him and taught us these things, and the prophetic Spirit.'* Now not to insist on the ambiguity of the words, here rendered 'worship and adore,' which, if any regard is due to the usage of the best writers, admit with equal propriety of being rendered 'reverence and honor,' the passage abovegiven is in a mutilated form. As it stands in Justin, it reads thus; 'We reverence and honor him, (the Father,) and the Son who came from him and taught us these things, and the host of other good angels, who follow and resemble him, and the prophetic Spirit.'† In this form, as it will be readily perceived, it may be adduced to sanction the Romish doctrine of the adoration of angels, with as much propriety as in support of the worship of the three persons of the trinity. It is one of the passages usually appealed to by Catholics as evidence of the antiquity of that doctrine. If it prove anything, therefore, it proves too much for Protestant Trinitarians. This objection can be met only by putting on the passage in question, a construction manifestly forced and unnatural.‡

* Elements of Christian Theology, Vol. II. p. 92. Ed. 4th.

† Apol. i. p. 47. Thirlb. p. 11.

‡ This has been sometimes attempted with a singular contempt of the laws of interpretation. We will give the passage as it stands in the original. *ἀλλ' αἰκνόν τε, καὶ τὸν παρ' αὐτοῦ υἱὸν ἐλθόντα καὶ διδάξαντα ἡμᾶς ταῦτα, καὶ τὸν τῶν ἀλλῶν ἱπομένων καὶ ἐξομῶντων ἀγαθὸν ἀγγέλων στρατὸν, πνεῦμα τε τὸ προφητικὸν σέβομεθα καὶ προσκυνούμεν.* Now, it is maintained by some, that Justin only meant to say, that Christ taught us those things of which he has been speaking, and also the things relating to angels; by others, that he taught us and the angels those things. Bishop Bull contends for the first of these constructions, Grabe and Cave for the second. Langius also gives the same, and Thirlby has retained it. Both constructions, however, do the utmost violence to the original. Le Clerc was more honest, and gives the sense very correctly as follows. 'Nous le servons et nous l'honorons, et son Fils, qui est venu de vers lui, et qui nous a instruits de ces choses, et l'Armée des autres bons Anges, qui l'ont suivi, et qui lui ressemblent, et l'esprit prophétique.' Biblioth. Anc. et Mod. T. xxiii. pp. 18, 19. Whiston (Prim. Christ. iv. p. 66.) gives a similar version, and Dr. Priestley very accurately expresses the sense of the passage thus; 'Him (God) and the Son that came from him, and the host of other good angels, who accompany and resemble him, together with the prophetic Spirit, we adore and venerate.' Hist. Corruptions. Part I. sec. 7. Catholic writers, for assigning this sense to the words of Justin, the only sense, we repeat, of which they admit, were accused by the earlier Protestants of 'playing the Jesuit,' and 'knavishly dealing

The other passage referred to by the Bishop, is not more to his purpose. In fact, it teaches a doctrine decidedly opposed to the Trinitarian views of the worship due to the Father, Son, and Spirit. We worship, says Justin, God, the maker of the universe, offering up to him prayers and thanks. But assigning to Jesus, who came to teach us these things, and for this end was born, the 'second place' after God, and to the prophetic Spirit the 'third,' we not without reason honor them. Hence, he adds, addressing the Romans, you accuse us of madness, because, as you say, we assign the second place after the immutable and eternal God to a crucified man.*

With regard to the Spirit, Justin evidently regarded it as a divine influence, or mode of operation in the Deity. This the whole tenor of his writings satisfactorily proves. He uses no expressions which necessarily imply its distinct and proper personality; for we suppose that it will not be contended by any correct critic, that the phrase 'honoring the spirit,' or the 'prophetic spirit,' as he usually terms it, authorises us to infer that he considered it a real being. Those who think, that they can explain the phraseology of the bible consistently with the supposition that the Spirit is an influence, or mode of divine agency, will certainly find no difficulty in any expressions Justin employs on the subject.†

with their author.' And Dr Priestley has not escaped a most shameful attack from a writer of the present day, a clergyman of the Church of England, in a work recently published in England and reprinted and circulated in this country. We refer to a treatise on the Difficulties of Romanism, designed as a reply to a work of the Bishop of Aire in defence of the Catholic Church, by 'George Stanley Faber, B. D. Rector of Long-Newton.' This writer, after attempting in sufficiently bad taste to ridicule Dr Priestley as the veriest bungler in Greek, goes on to talk of those, who, as he is pleased very modestly to say, 'render Justin's Greek in the same manner as *myself*;' and he proceeds to give what he calls '*my own* English translation,' 'lest,' he adds, 'any inferior Latin Theologian should be tempted in an evil hour,—to produce Justin as a primitive advocate for angel-worship,' following what he sneeringly terms the 'unrivalled translation of Dr Priestley.' Such arrogance is intolerable.

* Apol. i. p. 51.

† He sometimes confounds the *spirit* with the *logos*. 'The power of the Highest overshadowed Mary,' he observes, in allusion to Luke, i. 35; and adds, by the spirit, or power of God, we are to understand no other than the *logos*, the first-begotten of God. (Apol. i. 64.) He sometimes speaks of the prophets, as inspired by the *logos*, and sometimes by the spirit. Others among the early Fathers, confounded the *logos*, or Son, the first production of God, with the spirit,—a fact, which shows how very imperfectly the first rudiments of the doctrine of the trinity, as explained in subsequent ages, had then disclosed themselves.

Justin nowhere asserts, that the Father, Son, and Spirit, constitute one God, as became the custom in later ages, after the doctrine of the trinity was fully

We will dismiss this topic with a few remarks concerning the chapter of Bishop Kaye on the Opinions of Justin respecting the *Logos* and the Trinity, in the work the title of which we have copied at the head of the present article. To say that we are not altogether satisfied with the chapter, would too feebly express our opinion of its defects. It is written in a style sufficiently dignified, and in general not uncourteous, but contains misstatements and errors, which we regard with no small surprise, for we are disposed, in the main, to think well of the Bishop's good sense and candor. The question of the Platonism of Justin, he professes to settle in the compass of eight loosely printed octavo pages, which contain a few observations of rather a trivial character, and very little to the point. We feel constrained to say, that the Bishop either does not understand the charge of Platonism, brought against the Fathers, or has artfully disguised it. His remarks, in fact, leave it wholly untouched. That Justin was 'indebted to the Platonic philosophy for the doctrines of the divinity of the *logos*, and of the trinity,' he says, 'is a position, to which we cannot yield our assent; because, in the first place, no sufficient proof has yet been produced, that even the germ of those doctrines exists in the writings of Plato.'* A very hardy assertion. But let that pass; admit that not even a *germ* of those doctrines exists in the writings of Plato; nevertheless, it did exist in the writings of his later followers, and it is from these, and not immediately from the writings of Plato himself, as Dr Kaye, we should think, must have known, that the Fathers are charged with deriving their notions of the *logos*.

Again, Justin quotes two passages from Plato, in confirmation of his own views of the *logos*, which passages Dr Kaye thinks nothing to the purpose. Therefore, he infers, Justin did not derive his sentiments concerning the *logos* from Plato.

matured. Strictly speaking, he was a Unitarian, as were the Orthodox Fathers generally of his time; that is, they believed the Son to be a being really distinct from the Father, and inferior to him,—which we take to be the very essence of Unitarianism. With regard to the *origin* of the Son, their views differed from those afterwards taught by Arius. With reference to his *distinct* and *subordinate nature*, however, they often used expressions, which the Arians found no difficulty in retaining. The germ of the trinity, however, was now introduced, and though the features it was afterwards to assume, were not yet defined, it from time to time received modifications and additions, till, about the end of the fourth century, amid the storms and agitations of controversy, it was moulded into something resembling the form it has since retained.

* p. 45.

We repeat, no one ever charged him with deriving them immediately from Plato, but from the Platonists of the Alexandrine school. We are grieved to witness such evasions in one whom we would willingly regard with a feeling of respect.

Once more, the Bishop asserts that Justin 'uniformly speaks of them,' that is, the doctrines he taught concerning the *logos*, 'as held not by himself alone, or the more enlightened few, but by *all the members of the Christian community*;' * a most unfortunate assertion, and one, the absolute falsehood of which is proved by the Bishop's own quotations on the very page in which the assertion is made. 'There are some of our race,' these are the words of Justin, as translated by the Bishop himself, 'there are some of our race,' that is, Christians, 'who acknowledge him to be Christ; yet maintain that he was born of human parents.' † How, we would ask, is this assertion of Justin consistent with the Bishop's statement, that he uniformly speaks of his own views as 'held by all the members of the Christian community?' The Bishop makes several other assertions of rather a surprising character, which, as we are unwilling to suppose that they are founded in ignorance or design, we must attribute to haste and inadvertency. Thus, 'that Justin asserted the divinity of the *logos* and a real trinity, is admitted,' he observes, 'even by those, who are most anxious to prove that the early Christians were Unitarians;' ‡—language evidently meant to leave the impression that the essential features of the trinity, as now explained, are found in what is taught by Justin; a statement, the correctness of which the Bishop, if he has read, however superficially, the writings of Unitarians, must have known is *not* admitted. Again, speaking of the generation of the Son, he says, 'The general opinion of the Ante-Nicene Fathers appears to have been, that, previously to this generation or emission, the *logos subsisted from eternity* in a state of most intimate union with the Father, though *personally distinct from him*;' † a statement directly the reverse of the fact, as learned Trinitarians themselves have proved, and the Bishop's own citations show, as regards Justin. Further, our author observes, that Jesus is said by Justin, 'to be the object of worship;' but he omits to add, that Justin expressly distinguishes between the worship or reverence due to God, as supreme, and that due to the Son, as the instrument through which he executes his will and commands.

* p. 49.

† lb. note.

‡ p. 44.

§ p. 56.

We might quote other assertions equally unguarded, but the above are amply sufficient to show that the Bishop's statements are to be received with some caution, especially on points, with regard to which his fidelity to the oath of subscription, rendered it improper for him to make any concessions.

But to return to Justin. Whatever may have been his speculative errors, there is much in him to commend, and something to imitate. His defects belonged to the times; his excellences were peculiar to himself, and to that noble band, who, by their lives and writings, stemmed the torrent of corruption and vice, and left monuments of their exalted courage and zeal in every land. We have already observed that he was a strenuous asserter of religious liberty. In fact, he was the great champion of liberal sentiments against the bigots of his day. There existed in the early ages of the church two classes of Exclusionists. One consisted of the primitive Jewish Christians, who were unwilling to admit, that the Gentile converts could attain to the rewards of the life to come, without conformity to the Mosaic ritual. The Gentiles, a little after, contended, in the same spirit of exclusion, that the Jewish converts, who still continued to observe the ceremonial law, forfeited the hope of salvation. To this opinion Justin alludes, and expresses his disapprobation of it. He allows that not only righteous Jews who lived before the time of Christ, would be admitted to the felicity of the future life, but those who lived afterwards, and who, with a profession of faith in Jesus united an observance of the Mosaic rites, are to be received, he says, as brethren entitled to christian fellowship and sympathy, provided they do not attempt to subject others to the bondage of Jewish forms.* He even contrives, though by a sort of finesse of reasoning, to save virtuous Heathens, who, as he says, were partakers of Christ, or the *logos*, the 'seed of which is implanted in every human breast.'

We will give another instance of his catholic and charitable spirit. He was himself a believer in Christ's preexistence; but this, he tells us, was not the universal belief of his age. There were some who rejected it, being believers in the simple humanity of Jesus. But though he expresses his dissent from their opinions, he treats them with respect, and readily grants their title to the christian name, character, and hopes. The whole passage, in which his views on this subject are contained, is worth quoting,

* Dial. pp. 142, 143.

as an instance of his liberality which does him great credit, and should put the spirit of modern intolerance to the blush. It proves that this Father, whatever his faults, was no Exclusionist.

To his views of Christ's preexistence, Trypho, who may be regarded as uttering the sentiments of the Jews of his and of all times, objects that they appear strange and incapable of proof. For as to your assertion that this Christ is a preexistent God, who afterwards condescended to be born and be made man, to me, he says, it seems not only paradoxical, but foolish. Justin replies, I know that this assertion appears incredible, especially to you Jews; but nevertheless, Trypho, should I fail of showing that he is the preexistent Son of the Father of the universe, and therefore God, and that he was born of a virgin, it cannot hence be inferred he is not the Christ of God; but since it is fully demonstrated that he is the Christ of God, whatever be his nature, even should I not succeed in proving that he is preexistent, and submitted to become man of like passions with us, having flesh, according to the counsel of the Father,—in this latter respect only would it be just to say that I have erred. Still you would not be authorised to deny that he is the Christ, although it should appear that he was a man, born of human parents, and it should be shown that he became Christ by election. For there are some of our race, that is, Christians, who acknowledge that he is the Christ, but affirm that he was a man, born in the ordinary way, from whom I dissent. To this Trypho replies, They who suppose him to be a man, and affirm that he was anointed, and became Christ by election, appear to me to hold an opinion much more probable than the sentiments you have expressed, for we all believe that Christ will be a man born of human parents, and that when he comes, he will be anointed by Elias.*

With regard to the great points, which, since the days of Augustin, have divided the christian world, usually called the Calvinistic Points, Justin held moderate and rational views. He nowhere states his opinion of the precise effect of Adam's fall, though he is decidedly opposed to the doctrines of hereditary depravity, original sin, and the inability of man to do the will of God, as explained in later times. He evidently knew nothing of the imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity. He is a firm advocate for human freedom and the capacity of man for virtue

* Dial. pp. 143, 145. Thirlb. pp. 233, 235.

or vice. Man has power, he maintains, to choose the good and refuse the evil. He earnestly combats the doctrine of destiny or fate. All will be rewarded or punished, he says, according to their merits. If character and actions were fixed, he argues, there could be no such thing as virtue and vice; for these suppose freedom, or the ability to choose and follow the one, and avoid the other. Men, he adds, would not be proper subjects of reward and punishment, if they were good and evil by birth, not by choice; for no one is accountable for the character he brings into the world with him. * This certainly does not look like the doctrine of predestination, and we are authorised to assert, with Bishop Kaye, that 'if Justin held the doctrine of predestination at all, it must have been in the Arminian sense.' †

Of the effects of Christ's death, and of justification, he usually speaks in general and figurative terms, much resembling those which occur in the sacred writings, and capable of a similar construction. He cannot, with any propriety, be adduced as an advocate for the modern popular doctrine of the atonement.

With the opinions of Justin we have now done. It only remains for us to mention a few interesting facts, recorded by him, connected with the history of Christianity. His writings illustrate the condition of Christians at the time he wrote, and the feelings with which they were regarded by Jews and Heathens. He represents the former as more implacable enemies of the Christians than were the Pagans. They sent persons, he tells us, into all parts of the earth to denounce them as heretical and impious. ‡ Their Rabbis pronounced curses against them in their synagogues, § and solemnly charged the people to hold no intercourse with them, particularly to listen to no exposition or defence of their opinions. || To the calumnies of the Jews, industriously propagated over all parts of the civilized world, Justin attributes the odium to which Christians were subjected on account of their supposed profligacy, and there can be little doubt, we think, but they were the authors of the foul slander. Certainly it could have originated only in the bitterest hatred; and this hatred, as thorough as ever rankled in the human breast, they appear, according to the testimony not of Justin merely, but of Tertullian, Origen, Eusebius and others, to have felt.

* Apol. i. p. 69.

† Dial. p. 117.

§ Ib.

† p. 81.

|| Dial. p. 204.

The stern opposition which Christianity encountered from Jews and Heathens, however, had not the effect of preventing its growth. Of its prevalence in his time, Justin speaks in the following terms, which, after due allowance for exaggeration and rhetorical embellishment, afford undoubted evidence of its extensive diffusion. 'There is no race of men, whether Greek or Barbarian, or called by any other name, whether they roam about in wagons, or with pastoral simplicity dwell under tents, among whom prayers and thanks are not offered up to the Father and Maker of the universe through the name of the crucified Jesus.'* He bears testimony, also, to its effects in reforming the lives of the converts. We, he observes, addressing the Romans, we who were formerly dissolute, are now chaste; we who were addicted to the use of magic arts, have now dedicated ourselves to the good and unbegotten God; we who made it our chief care to acquire wealth and possessions, now throw what we have into a common stock, and freely impart to those who have need; we whose lives were passed in mutual hatred and strife, and who refused to have friendly and social intercourse with those of a different tribe, now, since the appearance of Christ, live familiarly with them, and pray for our enemies, and endeavour to persuade those who unjustly hate us, that obeying the excellent precepts of Christ, they may have with us a common hope of the favor of God the Lord of all.†

That this statement, so honorable to Christianity, is in its essential features correct, we see no reason to doubt. Justin constantly appeals to the exemplary lives of the Christians as furnishing a satisfactory refutation of the shameless charges of immorality brought against them, and he makes his appeals in the tone of one who was confident of the goodness of his cause. There is often something peculiarly touching and noble in these appeals. The language in which they are made has an earnestness, a force, and pathos, which nothing but truth, and a deep sense of wrong done the Christians, could give.‡

* Dial. p. 211.

† Apol. i. pp. 51, 52.

‡ A bare recital of the cruel injuries and sufferings to which the followers of Jesus were exposed, is enough to make the heart thrill with horror. The following picture by Bishop Kaye, is substantiated by ample references, and faithfully represents the language of Justin on this subject. 'But though many might become favorably disposed to Christianity by contemplating the pure and blameless lives of its professors, and thus be induced at length to imitate the virtues which they admired, yet to the majority the Christians were the objects

The testimony of Justin to the purifying and ennobling influence of Christianity, is confirmed by that of cotemporary Fathers. Tatian, his disciple, as quoted by Dr Kaye, says, describing 'in his own person the moral character of Christians in his day,'—'I wish not to reign; I wish not to be rich; I avoid military office; I abhor fornication; I will not make long voyages through the insatiate desire of gain; I contend not at games in order to obtain a crown; I am far removed from the mad love of glory; I despise death; I am superior to every kind of disease; my soul is not consumed with grief. If I am a slave, I submit to my servitude; if I am free, I pride not myself on my noble birth. I see one sun common to all; I see one death common to all, whether they live in pleasure or in want.'*

Athenagoras, who flourished about the year 177 of our era, after observing that the 'Heathen teachers of knowledge, make their profession a mere flourish of words, and not a rule of practice,' proceeds;—'But among us you may find illiterate persons, and artisans, and old women, who, if they cannot benefit others by their words, benefit them by practice. For they do not commit words to memory, but show forth good deeds;—when struck, they strike not again;—when robbed, they have not recourse to the law—they give to those who ask, and love their neighbours as themselves. Is it likely that we should thus purify ourselves, unless we believed that God presided over the human race? No one can say so. But because we are persuaded that we shall render an account of our present life to

at once of hatred and contempt. They were regarded as the vilest of men, and treated with the greatest contumely and injustice. The most unnatural and revolting crimes were laid to their charge; they were accused of feeding on human flesh, and after their horrible repast, of extinguishing the lights and indulging in a promiscuous intercourse. They were also charged with atheism and impiety, because, as Justin states, they would not worship the gods of the Gentiles, or offer libations and sacrifices to dead men. No measure, which promised to accomplish their destruction, was rejected on account of its iniquity or atrocity; their domestics were solicited to inform and give evidence against them; and Justin in one place states that murders were purposely committed by others, in order that the Christians might be charged with the guilt; and that their servants, their children, or their wives were then put to the torture, in the hope that some expression might drop in the moment of agony, which might furnish matter of accusation against them. So strong was the current of public opinion against them, that Justin ventures to ask of the Emperors no more than this—that when the Christians were brought before the tribunals, they should not be condemned merely because they were Christians; but should be dismissed, unless they were convicted of some crime. "I do not," he adds, "go the length of calling upon you to punish our accusers." pp. 115, 116.

* p. 208.

God who made both us and the world, we choose the moderate and benevolent, and, in human estimation, despised course of life ; thinking that even if we lose our lives, we cannot suffer any evil *here*, to be compared with the reward which we shall receive *hereafter* from the great Judge, on account of our gentle, and benevolent, and temperate behaviour.*

These and similar testimonies not only illustrate, in a forcible manner, the moral influence of Christianity as contrasted with Heathenism, but show, that, however the learned might amuse themselves with abstruse speculations, the people regarded Christianity chiefly in its great practical bearings. In fact, they appear to have known and cared little about the subtleties of the philosophizing converts. They adored the one God and Father of All, and received Jesus as a teacher sent from him ; but of his divine nature as the preexisting *logos* of God, they seem to have been ignorant. This was the doctrine of the learned, and was confined to them.

The account which Justin gives, near the close of his first Apology, of the mode of celebrating the rites of baptism and the supper, and of the observance of Sunday in his time, is exceedingly interesting and valuable. It shows that the simplicity of scripture forms was yet, in a great measure, though not in all respects, retained. He speaks of baptism as a regenerating rite. Whoever, he says, believe those things which are taught by us, and profess their determination to live conformably to them, are required by fasting and prayer to seek of God the remission of their sins, we fasting and praying with them. They are then taken to a place where there is water, and are there regenerated in the same manner as we were regenerated, for they are washed with water in the name of God, the Father and Lord of All, and of our Saviour Jesus Christ, and the Holy Spirit. For Christ, he adds, has said that except ye be regenerated ye cannot enter the kingdom of God.† This regeneration, as we have seen, Justin supposes takes place at baptism. He states the necessity of it, which is not that men inherit a corrupt nature from Adam, but since, he says, we are born without our knowledge and consent, and educated in corrupt morals and customs, therefore, in order that we may not remain children of necessity and ignorance, but may become children of choice and of knowledge, and ob-

* pp. 211, 212.

† Apol. I. p. 79.

tain the remission of sins before committed, the name of the Father and Lord of All is pronounced over him who wishes to be regenerated, and has repented of his transgressions.*

Having received this rite, the person was considered as entitled, by virtue of it, to all the privileges of a follower of Christ, and immediately participated in the rite of the supper, there being at that time no distinction between the church and the congregation of believers. After we have thus washed the believer, says Justin, we take him to the place where the brethren are assembled, and there offer up prayers in common for ourselves, for him who has been enlightened by a knowledge of christian truths, and for all men. After prayer is ended we salute each other with a kiss. Bread and a cup of wine mixed with water, are then brought to him who presides over the brethren, which he takes, and sends up praise and glory to the Father of the Universe, through the name of the Son, and Holy Spirit, and gives thanks that we are deemed worthy to receive these gifts. All the people then say, Amen. Those whom we call deacons then distribute the bread and wine and water, over which thanks have been offered, to those present, and carry a portion of them to the absent.† Justin adds, we do not receive these as common food and drink, and proceeds to speak of them as the flesh and blood of Jesus, in terms which the Catholics regard as teaching the doctrine of transubstantiation. They are certainly a little obscure and mystical, but that Justin did not mean to teach by them that the bread and wine were really converted into the body and blood of Christ, is, we think, rightly inferred from the manner in which he expresses himself in other parts of his writings. The language of the scriptures on this subject is strongly figurative. We believe that Justin meant to be understood as speaking in a similar figurative style.

It is worthy of observation, that, in the above account, the person, who administers the Eucharist, is called simply the *president of the brethren*. No mention is made of bishops, priests, or presbyters in this or in any other part of Justin's writings. Further, nothing is said of the *consecration* of the elements, in the technical sense in which the term is used by some Protestant churches. We are only told that the president of the brethren *offered thanks* over the bread and wine, and

* Apol. I. p. 80.

† Apol. I. pp. 82, 83.

that they were then distributed. Prayers were offered while the people were standing, and, as it seems to be implied, without the use of forms ; but nothing is said of the position of the recipients.* The term *altar* does not occur, and Jurieu asserts that it is not found in the acknowledged remains of any writer of the second century.†

On Sunday, the day of the sun, as Justin's phrase is, all, he says, whether in town or country, assemble in one place, and the memoirs of the apostles and writings of the prophets are read, as time permits. When the reader has finished, the person presiding instructs the people in an address, and exhorts them to imitate the excellent things they have heard. We then all rise and together utter prayers, after which, as before related, bread, and wine and water are brought for the Eucharist, which, it appears, was administered every Lord's day. This was followed by a collection, the proceeds of which were deposited with the president, who, as Justin observes, assists with it orphans and widows, and those who in consequence of sickness, or any other cause, are in want, those who are in bonds, and strangers sojourning among us, and in a word, takes care of all who have need.‡

The reasons Justin assigns for assembling on Sunday, are simply that on that day God commenced the work of creation, and on that day Jesus left the tomb, for he was put to death 'the day before that of Saturn, and the day after, which is the day of the Sun, he appeared again to his disciples.'§ On this ground, and on this alone, Justin puts the observance of Sunday. He evidently did not consider it in any sense a substitute for the Jewish Sabbath, or as deriving any sacredness from the injunction laid on the Jews to observe and hallow that day.

* With regard to the changes which had taken place in the mode of celebrating the Eucharist since the days of the apostles, Bishop Kaye has the following remarks. 'When we compare this account with the notices on the subject of the Eucharist in the Acts of the Apostles and the Epistles, we find that considerable alterations had taken place in the mode of celebration ; occasioned probably by the necessity of correcting abuses and obviating inconveniences. The first converts [Acts ii. 46.] appear, daily after their principal meal, to have taken bread and drunk wine in commemoration of the death of their Saviour.' — 'At a later period the practice at Corinth was, that the brethren assembled together in some one appointed place, for the purpose of eating the Lord's supper, still connecting it with their meal. [1 Cor. xi. 20.] Probably the abuses which prevailed there, and were condemned by St Paul, or others of a similar nature, rendered it eventually expedient to make the celebration of the Eucharist entirely distinct from the meal ; which appears, from the passage just cited, to have been the case in Justin's time.' p. 91.

† Pastoral Letters, VI.

‡ Apol. I. pp. 83, 84.

§ p. 84.

Justin believed, that the power of working miracles had not been withdrawn from the church in his time. He mentions, in general terms, the gifts of prophesy, of healing, and of exorcising demons, as still retained by Christians. But as he specifies no instances of a miracle actually performed, his statement, we suppose, is to be received with some caution and distrust.*

After all, the writings of the Fathers may be considered valuable chiefly as establishing the authenticity of the books of the New Testament. Justin has been generally supposed to quote from our present Gospels, and Lardner has adduced him as furnishing important evidence of their authenticity.† He alludes to a document or documents, which he calls the *Memoirs of the Apostles*, portions of which, he informs us, were read in the assemblies of the early Christians, every Lord's day, and the quotations, which exist in different parts of his writings, correspond to passages found in our present Gospels, with some trifling variations of language. At the same time it is admitted, that he does not expressly name the authors of those Gospels. 'It is certain,' as Bishop Kaye very justly observes, 'that the only book of the New Testament expressly referred to by Justin, is the Revelation, which he ascribes to the Apostle St John.'‡ A question has therefore arisen, whether his quotations were made from our present Gospels, or from some prior and similar document, extant in Justin's time, but which has since perished. Some German theologians have strenuously contended for this latter opinion, and Herbert Marsh § is an avowed advocate for the same. This opinion is combatted at some length, by Bishop Kaye. It is not our intention to embark in the controversy. In a practical view, we consider it of very little importance, and our principal motive in alluding to it, is, to take notice of a very gratifying tribute to

* Bishop Kaye concludes that this power 'was not extended beyond the disciples, upon whom the Apostles conferred it by the imposition of their hands,' and that it 'consequently ceased with the last disciple on whom their hands were laid.'—'I perceive,' he adds, 'in the language of the Fathers, who lived in the middle and end of the second century, when speaking on this subject, something which betrays, if not a conviction, at least a suspicion, that the power of working miracles was withdrawn.' See his *Ecclesiastical History of the Second and Third Centuries*, illustrated from the Writings of Tertullian, pp. 98, 100, 101.

† *Credibility of the Gospel History*. Works, Vol. I. pp. 344, et seqq. Ed. Lond. 1815.

‡ p. 134.

§ Marsh's *Michaelis*, Vol. I. p. 360. Ed. Lond. 1819.

one of our distinguished fellow citizens, with which the Bishop concludes his observations. 'I will conclude my remarks,' he says, 'on this interesting question, with the words of an able writer, who, at the same time that he protests against a gross misrepresentation, which has been made of the learned prelate's [Bishop Marsh] opinion, thus expresses his dissent from the opinion itself.'* The quotation is from Mr Edward Everett's *Defence of Christianity*, published in Boston in 1814. Our readers will require no apology for its insertion in this place.

'In fact the modern German divines appear to have been the first who thought the verbal diversity of Justin's quotations from the present text of the evangelists to be of any consequence. As a question of criticism, I own it is a difficult one; and did I think that Justin had not quoted our present books, I should not hesitate a moment to avow it. But when we reflect that there is no difference in the *facts* mentioned; that the verbal coincidence is sometimes exact, and sometimes so great as to appear exact in a translation; that Justin calls his books by the name of Gospels, and says that they were written by apostles and apostolic men, which precisely corresponds with ours, two of which are by apostles, and two by apostolic men; and that Irenæus makes no mention of any other books so similar to ours as those of Justin were, if they be not the same; when we reflect on these things, we shall find it hard to believe that Justin quoted any other gospels than ours. If, however, it be thought necessary, notwithstanding all this, to grant that he did not quote our books, then it will be an inference scarcely less favorable to Christianity, that a set of sacred writings, different from ours, did yet testify to the truth of the same facts.'†

We conclude with observing, that the work of Bishop Kaye, with the exception above made, relating to his chapter on the *Logos* and Trinity, is highly creditable to his industry, candor, and judgment, and he has done an acceptable service in giving it to the public. It fully accomplishes what its title, which is sufficiently modest, promises; but it is not adapted, nor was it intended, to introduce its readers to an intimate acquaintance with Justin's intellectual character and habits, his modes of illustration and reasoning, and the literary merit of his productions. It speaks of him with the respect he deserves, but contains no labored and extravagant panegyric. The Fathers have often

* p. 151.

† *Defence of Christianity*, pp. 474-5.

been both praised and censured with too little discrimination. We are to judge of them by the standard of their own age; and with this standard, as we have said, they will certainly bear a very favorable comparison. They are entitled to our gratitude for what they performed, and to our indulgence for their deficiencies. Even their weaknesses and errors are not without their use. They may go to confirm our faith in the heavenly origin and truth of Christianity, for they show that it was propagated not by human eloquence, by 'excellency of speech, or of wisdom' in its early preachers; that its success in the world, according to an observation of Le Clerc, is to be attributed to a Divine Providence, and the beauty and excellence of its doctrines, rather than to the discourses of its advocates. *

ART. IV.—*Memoirs of the Extraordinary Military Career of John Shipp, late a Lieutenant in his Majesty's Eighty-seventh Regiment.* Written by HIMSELF. New-York. J. & J. Harper, 1829. 2 vols. 12mo.

MILITARY literature has been very abundant of late years. We have had memoirs of corporals, sergeants, subaltern and superior officers, histories of campaigns, and narratives of battles, till even the vast curiosity of the public seems to be in some degree satisfied. They are found to be all, with some varieties of circumstance, histories of the severest trials and sufferings which human nature can endure. These, combined with the bad passions excited by war, the callousness which almost necessarily takes possession of the heart of one who is the constant spectator of the sufferings of others, and the recklessness with which men sacrifice themselves, form a picture of horror, which can hardly be realized as a description of actual scenes, by those who have not been engaged in them, and which by those who have, cannot be contemplated or recollected without pain. It is not surprising that this species of writing has so much abounded. The military events of the close of the last century and the beginning of the present, were so extraordinary, and the interest which men feel in others for the dangers they have passed, is so strong, that we cannot wonder many

* Biblioth. Anc. et Mod. T. XXIII. p. 40.

should be found desirous of telling at least all that they know, and all that they have done. And we rejoice at it. Let the tale be told as often and as vividly as it may be. Let it be repeated till every one shall be fully impressed with its horrors. Let those who delight in 'the pomp, pride and circumstance of glorious war,' tell us what they know, disclose the charm, the fascination which leads them on to fill the world with tears, that we may judge of its value, and compare it with the sacrifices it require.

We trust we are not insensible to the excellence of the quality of courage; or to the sublimity which often attends its exercise; but we are persuaded that in this, as in many other gifts of nature, her liberality has been prodigal. To insure a sufficiency, she bestows a superfluity. Hence we see so many unnecessary displays of it; and hence a quality, which, under the guidance of reason, is one of the noblest and most important endowments of man, so often degenerates into a physical instinct, or a savage, brutal ferocity. There are few things more sublime than the spectacle presented by the man who is willing to sacrifice his life in defence of those rights which make life dear; and there is nothing in the history of the human race more sublime than the vindication of those rights by a whole people, through toil, poverty, suffering, and death. But what a vast, what an infinite distance between one of such a band of true heroes, and the soldier, who, for the pittance called his pay, hazards his own life, and that of others, in a cause which he neither understands nor cares for. Doubtless even he may imagine he is devoting himself to his country, to her glory or her advantage; and this redeems his course from the entire condemnation it would otherwise deserve. But how many thousands and tens of thousands have been enticed into the mad game, by the glitter of a uniform, or the splendor of a parade, without a thought of anything but the importance they would acquire by a red coat, or an epaulet. Is this a consideration sufficient to compensate for all the hardships and sufferings of a soldier? Is it for this that blood is to be poured out like water? Our readers will be better able to answer the question when they shall have perused a few extracts from the work before us. We do not undertake to vouch for the authenticity of these memoirs. John Shipp may be a mere *nom de guerre*; but we should imagine it impossible to describe so vividly the most striking scenes of a soldier's life, without having witnessed some-

thing similar. Take for instance, the following description of one of the attempts to storm Bhurtpore :—

‘Our ascent was found, for the fourth time, to be quite impossible: every man who showed himself was sure of death. The soldiers in the fort were in chain armour. I speak this from positive conviction, for I myself fired at one man three times in the bastion, who was not six yards from me, and he did not even bob his head. We were told afterward, that every man defending the breach was in full armour, which was a coat, breastplate, shoulderplates, and armlets, with a helmet and chain face-guard; so that our shots could avail but little. I had not been on the breach more than five minutes, when I was struck with a large shot on my back, thrown down from the top of the bastion, which made me lose my footing, and I was rolling down sideways, when I was brought up by a bayonet of one of our grenadiers passing through the shoe, into the fleshy part of the foot, and under the great toe. My fall carried everything down that was under me. The man who assisted me in getting up, was at that moment shot dead: his name was Courtenay, of the 22d Light Company. I regained my place time enough to see poor Lieutenant Templer who had planted the colour on the top, cut to pieces, by one of the enemy rushing out, and cutting him almost in two, as he lay flat upon his face on the top of the breach. The man was immediately shot dead, and trotted to the bottom of the ditch. I had not been in my new place long, when an—earthen pot, containing combustible matter, fell on my pouch, in which were about fifty rounds of ball cartridges. The whole exploded: my pouch I never saw more, and I was precipitated from the top to the bottom of the bastion. How I got there in safety, I know not; but when I came to myself, I found I was lying under the breach, with my legs in the water. I was much hurt from the fall, my face was severely scorched, my clothes much burnt, and all the hair on the back of my head burnt off. I for a time could not tell where I was. I crawled to the opposite side of the bank, and seated myself by a soldier of the same company, who did not know me. I sat here, quite unable to move, for some little time, till a cannon ball struck in the ditch, which knocked the mud all over me. This added greatly to the elegance of my appearance; and in this state I contrived, somehow or other, to crawl out of the ditch. At this moment the retreat was sounded, after every mortal effort had been made in vain.

‘The case was now deemed completely hopeless, and we were obliged to give up the contest, having lost, in killed and wounded, upwards of three thousand men (braver, or more zealous, never lived) against this fort. Of the twelve gallant fellows who com-

posed the third forlorn hope led by me, not one returned to reap the proffered reward of the Commander-in-Chief. Add to this, the loss of one of the best officers in our army, Captain Menzies, of the 22d Grenadier Company, Aid-de-Camp to Lord Lake. He fell endeavouring to rally some Native troops that were exposed to a galling fire, and began to give way. In this heroic attempt he lost his life, regretted by the whole army. Of our two companies, scarce a soul escaped uninjured. Near the breach, the dead, dying, and wounded, would have melted the heart of the most callous wretch; and, had not the little party who stormed the eleven-gun battery proved successful, few, if any, would have escaped the dreadful carnage. You must permit me to draw the gloomy shroud of mourning over this scene of misery and terror. The sad details of this siege have years ago been before the public; and here my personal services at Bhurtpore ended, leaving impressions, both on mind and body, that can never be obliterated.

‘In the course of the siege, frequent overtures were made from the fort, but of what nature I do not pretend to know. They were at last, however, obliged to come to our terms, which compelled them to pay all the expenses of the siege, &c., after which we raised the siege, and returned to camp. The loss of the enemy must have been immense; report said, five thousand men, women, and children; and, from the immense concourse of inhabitants in the town, with their families, that number does not appear to be at all improbable. Certain it is, that they must have been as heartily tired of it as we were.’—pp. 106–108.

It is difficult for men of peace to imagine, that the advantages acquired in war by a nation or by individuals, are anything like equivalent to the misery which it causes. The cost of it is seldom, if ever counted; and indeed it is not easy to estimate the value of life and limb, to measure pain of body or anguish of mind, to determine the precise amount of groans and tears, which may be balanced by the joy of victory, the pride of glory, or the more substantial rewards of power and profit. As the sufferings, therefore, which are the result of this scourge of nations, are, in their nature, inappreciable, we conceive that the only good cause of war, the only reasonable or plausible justification of a people or an individual, for engaging in the desperate struggle, is the acquisition or defence of rights, of powers, or of possessions, the value of which is equally above estimation. We are not, and we would not be thought to be, so foolishly recreant as to say there is nothing worth contending for. There is much with which God has blessed us, which we would defend at all hazards, and which can be enjoyed on no other terms.

Personal liberty and rights, the welfare of those who are dear to us, and the independence of our country as the means of possessing these, are to be struggled for, if need be, at the risk of life, because life, without them, is of little worth. These are things which the best men in all ages have thought worth fighting for, and which those who have learned to value them by their own experience, will surely never give up from fear of what man can do unto them. They are *our* birthright, and we trust none are to be found among us, who would not defend them at the same cost and risk by which they were won. They are well worth the purchase. But here we stop. There is nothing else in the wide circle of human motives which we can regard as a sufficient cause, either in an individual or a community, for incurring the tremendous risks and sufferings which war renders inevitable. Language is too feeble to express the feelings with which we think wars of ambition and conquest should be regarded; yet these have constituted by far the greatest portion of the wars which have desolated the world. Contests for national or personal independence, have been, and, one would think, must naturally be of rare occurrence, and as the world grows older and wiser, it is to be hoped they will become less and less necessary. Liberty will be achieved by less violent methods. If, then, men could be persuaded to regard with a just abhorrence, those wars which have for their object the acquisition of territory, and the aggrandizement of a nation or an individual at the expense of others, there would be an encouraging prospect of comparative repose to the world. And we cannot believe it impossible that men should learn to prize what is really valuable, and to avoid what is really pernicious. If there be anything more desirable than liberty and peace, or more hateful than oppression and war, we have it yet to learn; and we are far from despairing or even doubting that the time will come, when 'nation shall not rise up against nation, neither shall they learn war any more.' We think we can discern, in the course of God's providence, strong symptoms of the gradual, and therefore sure approach of such a period. We can only glance at a few of the indications of this result; it would lead us too far to follow the subject in detail.

Vast empires, founded upon force, and held together by fear, have always crumbled into pieces as rapidly as they have risen and just in proportion to the oppression with which their power has been exercised, has been the suddenness and appalling

character of their overthrow. On the contrary, possessions obtained without violation of the rights of others, and supported by the determination of men who respect themselves as well as their neighbours, have been confirmed by time, and strengthened by the course of events. Warlike ambition must receive a check by the establishment of republican governments in so large a portion of the civilized world as is now either in possession of them, or struggling to acquire them. By republican forms men are enabled to govern themselves, and however strongly they may desire to see others in the same circumstances, they will surely not undertake to force them to adopt the means of self-government by warlike aggression. The arts of peace and of self-defence are almost necessarily those which distinguish free governments. Every day is confirming the strength of such as already exist, and brightening the prospect of those which are forming. If we look, therefore, to the past, we find a valuable lesson from experience; and if we look to the future, we see new prospects opening upon the world of liberty and peace, which are, in the highest degree, consoling and delightful. We know that the progress of mankind in this, as in all other good, must be slow; it is enough for us that it is certain.

We look upon such books as the one which we have mentioned, as accessories of no mean value to the good work of improvement. The memoirs of Shipp are not the labored production of a student in his closet, but the vivid descriptions of a man who has been strongly impressed with what he has seen. There is sometimes a tone of exaggeration, but we feel little doubt that the work is, in the main, a faithful picture of the life of a soldier and a subaltern. We have seldom read such horrid narratives of wholesale destruction of friend and foe, or seen so bare an exhibition of inadequate motives, as in this book. Our readers have had a specimen of the descriptions, though we assure them, by no means the most dreadful, and we shall not pain them by presenting the most shocking. Our author says, in one place, on the occasion of receiving some commendation from his superiors, 'Glory had been my motto; laurels were my crown!' And what, after all, was the amount of his glory and his laurels? Distinguishing himself by his boldness in battle, he twice rose from the ranks to a lieutenancy. The first time, he sold out, to raise money to pay for some foolish extravagances; and the second time, he was

dismissed the service in disgrace. What a glorious reward for years of alternate *ennui* and violent excitement, for wounds, danger, and toil. And how flattering to others of similar character, that a man who had acquired so large a share of the glory they seek, should be unable to keep the commission he had obtained; that a cashiered officer should surpass them all in the pursuit of—honor.

One other remark is suggested to us by a passage of this book. The intense excitements of war are often alleged as a sort of apology for those who devote themselves to the profession. Doubtless the love of excitement is very powerful in all men; but we think it will admit of a question whether the lives even of foxes and hares ought to be sacrificed to that passion; and we conceive there can be no question that a rational being should find some other way of gratifying it besides taking the life of his fellow men. Who can wish to be in the condition described in the following sentences?

‘In action man is quite another being: the softer feelings of the roused heart are absorbed in the vortex of danger and the necessity for self-preservation, and give place to others more adapted to the occasion. In these moments there is an indescribable elation of spirits; the soul rises above its wonted serenity into a kind of phrenzied apathy to the scene before you, a heroism bordering on ferocity; the nerves become tight and contracted; the eye full and open, moving quickly in its socket, with almost maniac wildness; the head is in constant motion; the nostril extended wide, and the mouth apparently gasping. If an artist could truly delineate the features of a soldier in the battle’s heat, and compare them with the lineaments of the same man in the peaceful calm of domestic life, they would be found to be two different portraits;—but a sketch of this kind is not within the power of art, for in action the countenance varies with the battle: as the battle brightens, so does the countenance; and, as it lowers, so the countenance becomes gloomy.’—pp. 86, 87.

Does any man wish to look and act like a maniac? Is it any justification of war as a trade that its excitement is great? Surely not. ‘It is the cause, it is the cause!’ alone, which can incline any wise man to the infliction or endurance of its evils.

ART. V.—*Sources of Infidelity ; the Tenth Discourse, in the new Volume of Buckminster's Sermons.* Boston. Carter & Hendee. 1829.

WE have lately taken notice of this volume of sermons, and we now single out one of them and place it at the head of the discussion which we propose to ourselves in the following article, partly because it falls in with the general design of the observations we have to offer, and partly because it suggests a remark naturally prefatory to our present undertaking. For it is a singular fact, and if the matter were not one of very grave import, we should say it is curious, that while the publications of no class of Christians contain more frequent and earnest defences of Christianity against unbelievers, while we constantly maintain that our own views, as we think, are, for inquiring minds, a safeguard from skepticism, we are nevertheless, in the teeth of all this evidence to the contrary, and in spite of all the disclamations that language can utter, pertinaciously and perpetually charged with being ourselves infidels. Is this a day when Christianity can so easily afford to part with whole hosts of its professors and defenders? For, in truth, if unbelievers were disposed to take us at our word, they might allege that not much less than half of Christendom is either already infidel, or rapidly hastening to the denial of its faith ; for the one or the other of these allegations Protestant sects are constantly making against each other, or Catholics are making against them all. It is indeed a sad state of things, but it yields one comfort ; for we think that the weakest member of our denomination must feel relieved from all anxiety about these gratuitous and gross charges which are brought against us, save that which he feels for the honor of Christianity itself.

We have now made the remark suggested by the sermon before us, and, we might add, by other productions bearing the same hallowed name, as well as by the current and cherished works of the christian apologists that are constantly recommended and circulated among us. It is when we think of the blessed spirits that have departed from us in the faith of Jesus, it is when we call to mind, too, that many and many a one whom we know, is resting an aching head and a broken heart on that precious reliance, that we are tempted to write words of indignant remonstrance against such attacks as have lately been made

upon us in a neighbouring publication. But our 'spirit takes another tone' at the present time, and it is one, we think, which the occasion as well as the gospel we profess, should awaken. And indeed we are disposed to offer some calm and useful observations, if we can, on this great subject of belief and unbelief, rather than to enter the lists of personal recrimination with those who ought to feel, if not too much as brethren, at least too much as men, to exult with apparent delight, over what they profess to think our fatal skepticism.

It has become very important, as it seems to us, that the advocates of a divine revelation should carefully and accurately define the ground which they undertake to defend. In logical order, this task is preliminary to the defence itself. Our position is to be taken before it is to be maintained. What *is it* to believe in a revelation? Or, in other words, what is the question between the believer, and the unbeliever? This we shall undertake to define, in the first place, and then shall offer some general remarks on belief and unbelief.

There are two methods by which mankind may arrive at the knowledge of truth. The one is, by observation, by reflection, by reasoning, by the natural exercise of the human faculties. The other is, by a supernatural communication from Heaven; and this is different from, and superior to, reasoning, observation, intuition, impulse, and every known operation of the human mind. Now we contend that it is in a communication of this nature that our scriptures originated.

But let us consider more particularly the vehicle of this communication—the scriptures. It is on this point that believers differ somewhat among themselves. And it is from rash positions on this subject, or from marking too negligently and too broadly the lines of defence, that the advocates of a revelation expose themselves to the strongest attacks of infidelity. The scriptures, then, it might seem needless to say, are not the actual communication made to the minds that were inspired from Above; but they are a '*declaration* of those things which were most surely believed among them.'* They are not the actual word of God, but they are a '*record of the word of God.*'† They are of the nature of a testimony. '*We speak that we do know, and testify that we have seen.*'‡ This distinction, obvious as it may seem, is not without its importance; and it

* Luke i. 1.

† Rev. i. 2.

‡ John iii. 11.

unhappily derives some consequence from the earnestness with which it is opposed. To say so simple a thing as that the bible is not the original, the very revelation made to the prophets and apostles, but the record of that revelation, is an excess of temerity, thought to be worthy of the most heinous charges.

But the distinction is intrinsically important. It is important to make the discrimination, and to say, that the communication of light and truth was one thing, and the record of that communication another. The communication was divine ; the record was human. It was, strictly speaking and every way, a human act. The manner, the style, the phraseology, the choice of words, the order of thought, the selection of figures, comparisons, arguments, to enforce the communication, was altogether a human work. It was as purely human, as peculiarly individual in the case of every witness, as his accent, attitude, or gesture, when delivering his message. And, indeed, we might as well demand that Paul's gesture or intonation on Mars' Hill, should be faultless, as to demand that the style of his letter to the Galatians should be faultless ; for, in truth, the action and the accent were as truly a part of the communication, as the words employed to set it forth. We are about to argue for this general position, and in doing so we shall more clearly define and guard it ; but we wished to state it with some precision in the outset. If there ever were productions which showed the free and fervent workings of human thought and feeling, they are our scriptures. We know not how it is possible for any one candidly to read, or thoroughly to study them, without coming to this conclusion. And we say, therefore, that the question between the believer and the unbeliever, is, not whether the words of this communication are grammatically the best words, not whether the illustrations are rhetorically the best illustrations, not whether the arguments are logically the best arguments ; but the question is, whether there is any communication at all ? Let any man admit this, let him admit it in any shape, and though there may be difficulties and disputes, we shall find no difficulty in settling beyond all dispute, some truths from the scriptures—and truths, too, of dearer concern to us than all the visible interests of this world.

But is this view of the bible a right and safe one ? To this question let us now proceed.

1. Let us, as the first step, proceed to inquire of the scriptures themselves. We say, then, that what has now been stat-

ed, is the natural, and we might say the unavoidable impression which a reader would take from the perusal of the scriptures. The vehicle of revelation is language. The things we have to deal with are words. They are not divine symbols of thought; they are not pure essences of ideas; they are words. The vehicle, we say, is language. We shall soon undertake to show, that language is, from its very nature, an imperfect instrument of communication. But, for the present, we only say, that the language of revelation is the natural language of the period to which, and of the men to whom we refer it. The idioms of speech, the peculiarities of style, the connexions and dependences of thought and reasoning, the bursts of feeling, all seem to us as natural in the bible as they are in any other book. We see ideas, indeed, that we ascribe to inspiration; but we see no evidence, we can discern no appearance of any supernatural influence created upon the *style*, either to make it perfect, or to prevent it from being imperfect. Let us compare the scriptures with other writings. If we open almost any book, especially any book written in a fervent and popular style, we can perceive, on an accurate analysis, that some things were hastily written, some things negligently, some things not in the exact logical order of thought; that some things are beautiful in style, and others coarse and inelegant; that some things are clear, and others obscure or 'hard to be understood.' And do we not find all these things in the scriptures? What is a sound and rational criticism but a discernment of just such things as these? What is peculiarity of style but something preceding from the particular mind of the writer—but something, therefore, partaking, not of divine ideas, but of human conceptions? And who has more of this peculiarity of style than John, or Paul? And now suppose that Paul had written a letter to any one of his friends on religion, and had written not in his apostolical character—that he had said, as he sometimes did say, this is 'not from the Lord?' Can any rational man doubt, whether that letter would have exhibited the same style as his recorded epistles?

If such, then, be the natural impression arising from the perusal of the scriptures, we are so to receive them, unless they themselves direct us otherwise. Do they direct us otherwise? Do they anywhere tell us that the manner of writing, the style, the words, came from immediate divine suggestion, or were subject to miraculous superintendence? To us it is clear that

the passages usually adduced in support of these views of inspiration, fall entirely short of the positions they are brought to establish. 'All scripture is given by inspiration of God;' and 'holy men spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost;'—these are the passages. Now the question is, whether these declarations refer to the matter of revelation, or to the style; to the substance of the communication, or to the form; to the thing testified, given, spoken, or to the manner of speaking, imparting, testifying. We say, to the matter, the substance, the thing testified. Others insist, that reference is had to the style, the form, the manner, also. There is nothing in the words to decide between us, and we must have resort, therefore, to general considerations. We must go to the general aspect and obvious character of the sacred writings. And on this subject we have a statement to make, which is worthy of special observation. So strong is the aspect of *naturalness* upon the whole face of the scriptures, so marked are the peculiarities of individual thought, manner, and style, that many of the most learned and profound Orthodox scholars have given up the doctrine of immediate suggestion, and retain only that of a general superintendence. But we surely may remind them, that the scriptures themselves furnish as little warrant for the doctrine of superintendence as for that of suggestion. If the passages before quoted prove anything with regard to style, they prove immediate suggestion. If they prove nothing on this point, then the bible does not anywhere; for they are the strongest in the bible.

The doctrine of superintendence, undoubtedly, comes not from the scriptures, but from what is thought to be the exigency of the case. It is introduced to save the sacred writings from the charge of possible error; a charge which we shall by and by undertake to show, does not, in anything material, attach to them, on what we think to be a more rational and unincumbered theory. We see no need of supposing the apostles, for instance, to have spoken and written under any other influence than that of truth and goodness—truth supernaturally communicated to them, but not by them supernaturally taught. The teaching, in short, is full of nature and truth. And we should, with as much reason, demand that Paul's speech should have been freed from that impediment, or infirmity, which made some among the Corinthians declare it to be 'contemptible,' as that his style should be freed from those obscurities

those imperfections, in other words, which made Peter say that it is 'hard to be understood.' And we might as well say, that when his accent or gesture was liable to be wrong, there was a divine superintendence or interference to put it right, as to say this with regard to his written expressions, his figures and illustrations, his style and mode of communication.

2. That there was no supernatural perfection, or accuracy, or infallibility in the scriptural style or mode of communication, we think any one may be convinced by considering, in the next place, the very nature of language.

Human language is essentially and unavoidably an imperfect mode of communication. It is sufficiently correct; but the idea of absolute perfection or infallibility, if it were rightly and rigidly considered, does not and cannot belong to it. We are not merely saying, now, that the style of our christian teachers is not perfect, according to the laws of rhetoric; that it is not perfect Greek. That is admitted on all hands. But we say that it is not perfect, because it cannot be perfect, as an instrument of thought. Perfection and imperfection in this matter are words of comparison. Absolutely, they do not apply to language. Excellence, or, if any one pleases to call it so, perfection in style, is something relative. It is relative, for instance, to the age and country in which it is delivered. What is perfect for one people and period, is not perfect for another. It would happen, then, that even if the sacred style had possessed some unintelligible perfection for its own age, it would have lost it for the next, and for every succeeding age. Is it not felt by every judicious commentator, that the ancient phraseology in which the scriptures are clothed, throws great difficulties in the way of understanding them? Are not these difficulties such, that the mass of mankind cannot, of themselves, understand certain passages, and must receive the explanation of them on trust? To what purpose is it, then, to argue for the infallibility of the sacred style?—Language is also relative to the mind—the mind absolutely considered. A perfect or infallible language must be that which conveys perfect or infallible thoughts to the mind. But now when we talk about perfect or infallible thoughts, are we not very much beyond our depth? Can any instrument convey to us thoughts which are perfect, which are capable of being no more clear or true, which are never to be changed in the slightest degree, in all the coming and brightening dispensations of our being? To us,

it seems as if there were great presumption in the prevailing language about truth and error. As if any sect or any set of men, called Christians, or called by any other name—as if any human being held the absolute, the abstractly pure, and unchangeable truth! As if any creed, or language, or human thought *could* escape every taint of error—as if it could put off all limitation, obscurity, peculiarity and everything that marks it as belonging to a finite and frail nature! ‘To err is human.’ It is a part of our dispensation to find our way to truth through error. The perfect is wrought out from the imperfect. We see this in children; and in this respect, we are all but children. ‘Error,’ says Goethe, ‘can never be cured, but by erring.’

The thought came pure from the All-revealing Mind; but when it entered the mind of a prophet or apostle, it became a human conception. It could be nothing else, unless that mind, by being inspired, became superhuman. The inspired truth became the subject of human perception, feeling, and imagination; and when it was communicated to the world, it was clothed with human language; and that perception, feeling, imagination, lent its aid to this communication, as truly as to any writings that ever were penned. It is this, next to the authority of the scriptures—it is this naturalness, simplicity, pathos, and earnestness of manner, that give them such life and power.

The case, then, stands thus. It has pleased God to adopt human language as the instrument of his communications to men—an instrument sufficiently correct, though not absolutely perfect. We might as reasonably demand that the men should be faultless, as that the style should be faultless. Neither were so. And as the faults and mistakes of the men, do not invalidate the sufficiency of their main testimony, still less would any faults or inaccuracies of their style, figures, illustrations, or arguments, if proved to exist, set aside the great, interesting, and, among Christians, the unquestioned matters of revelation, which they have laid before us.

3. A word, now, in the third place, on the unavoidable or actual concessions, upon this subject, among all intelligent and sober Christians. Let us see if they do not lead us to the same result. It must be admitted that the inspired penmen usually wrote in conformity with the philosophy of their respective ages,—in conformity, therefore, with some portions of natural and metaphysical philosophy that are false. The com-

mon remark on this subject, is, that they did not profess to give instructions on astronomy, demonology, or metaphysics, but on religion. In briefly passing this point, we should like to ask those who so zealously insist that the phrase, 'All scripture is given by inspiration of God,' refers to every word, or to every idea in the bible, what they are to do with the Mosaic theory of the solar system, and of the starry heavens? But to proceed with the concessions to which we have referred. It cannot be denied that there are some slight discrepancies in the evangelical narratives. And, indeed, the common and the very just answer to this allegation in our books of evidences, is, that these differences, so far from weakening the testimony, strengthen it, by showing that there was no collusion among the witnesses. Once more, it is common now to admit, that the bible is to be interpreted as other books are. But we do not see how it is possible to enter thoroughly into the spirit of this rule, unless the *composition* of the bible is looked upon as a human work—a work produced by the natural operation of human thought and feeling. If there was frequent and supernatural interference with the writer's natural mode of expressing himself, such a fact, it seems to us, would seriously disturb the application of the rule laid down, and would, in fact, warrant many of those superstitious and irrational views of the scriptures, which are fatal to just criticism and sound scholarship.

If, then, it be admitted that there are among our sacred books, mistakes in philosophy, and discrepancies, however slight, in statements of facts, and if the bible is subject to the ordinary rules of criticism on language, the inference seems unavoidable, that these writings, so far as their composition is concerned, are to be regarded as possessing a properly and purely human character.

4. But we come now to the great difficulty and objection. It is said that if these views are correct, the bible is a fallible book, and unworthy of reliance. We maintain, therefore, in the fourth place, that the infallibility which many Christians contend for, and upon the defence of which unbelievers are willing enough to put them, is, in our apprehension, unnecessary to the validity and sufficiency of the communication.

What is a revelation? It is simply the communication of certain truths to mankind; truths, indeed, which they could not otherwise have fully understood or satisfactorily determined; but truths nevertheless as easy to be communicated as

any other. Why then is there any more need of supernatural assistance in this case, than in any other? We are constantly speaking to one another without any fear of being misunderstood. We are constantly reading books without any of this distrust—and books, too, written by men in every sense fallible, which the scripture writers, in regard to the revelation made to them, are not. Nay, we are reading books of abstruse philosophy, in the full confidence that we understand the general doctrines laid down. But the matters of revelation are not abstruse. They are designed to be understood by the mass of mankind. They are designed, like the light, to shine upon man's daily path. What if a man should say he cannot trust the light of the sun, and will not walk by it, because it comes through so earthly and fallible a medium as the atmosphere? The air, certainly, is an imperfect medium of light. There are motes and mists and clouds in it. Yet we have not the least doubt, that we see the sun, and the path that we walk in, and the objects around us. It does not destroy the nature of light that it comes to us through the dense and variable atmosphere; and it does not destroy the nature of truth that it comes to us through the medium of human language.

But let us descend to particulars. What particular truth, then, that either does belong to revelation, or has been conceived to belong to it, requires an infallible style, or a supernatural influence for its communication? Not the Messiahship of Jesus, and his living, teaching, suffering, and dying to save us from sin and misery; not the assurance of God's paternal love and mercy and care for us; not the simple but solemn and most glorious doctrine of a future life; not precept, not promise, not warning, nor encouragement, nor offered grace and aid. But suppose it be contended that more belongs to the revelation—'fixed fate, free will, foreknowledge absolute.' Suppose it be conceded, that the matter of any or every creed that Christians have made, belongs to it. Yet their makers, we presume, will not maintain that any inspiration or supernatural guidance is necessary to set forth these matters. *They* surely cannot feel any particular distrust about the powers of language. They who have made creeds on purpose to remedy the imperfections, or clear up the obscurities, or settle the uncertainties of the scriptural communication—*they* surely are not the persons we have to contend with in this argument.

'But ah!' it is said, 'this sort of reasoning leads to infidel-

ity.' 'Save us from infidelity,' the objector might more truly say. This, at least, is the purpose of our reasonings; and we believe it is their tendency. Unbelievers have derived more plausible and just objections from the prevailing theological assumptions with regard to our sacred books, than from any other quarter. The attacks which are usually made upon the philosophy of Moses, the imprecations of David, the differences among the apostles, the obscurities of Paul, and upon instances of puerility, coarseness, and indelicacy in style, or inappositeness in illustration, are all of this nature. If it were considered that the successive communications which God has made to the world, have borne upon them the signs and marks of their successive ages—if it were considered, that the light, in its visitations to the earth, has struggled through the medium of human imperfection, through mists of prejudice, and clouds—often, indeed, gorgeous clouds of imagination, many difficulties and objections of this sort would be removed.

'But how shall we know what is true and what is false; what belonged to the age, and what to the light?' This difficulty is more specious than real. When applied in detail to the scriptures, it will be found to amount to very little. There can be no doubt, for instance, about matters of morality and duty. Indeed, it has often been admitted by our christian apologists, that a revelation was not so much needed to tell us what is right, as to give sanctions for it. Then, again, with regard to these sanctions, with regard to the future good and evil, we believe no one has ever pretended to deny them, or ever will, on the ground that the sacred writers may have been mistaken. Very few, indeed, do deny them. The great body of Universalists, as we are informed, now believe in a future retribution. And so, as to all the absolute doctrines of scripture, there is no dispute about the authority on which they rest. The only question is, whether some of the illustrations are judicious, belonging as they do to the school of Jewish allegory; and whether one or two of the arguments of Paul are logical. But this question, surely, does not touch matters that fairly belong to the very different department of immediate inspiration. 'Whoever appeals to reason,' it has been very justly said, 'waves, *quo ad hoc*, his claim to inspiration.' When an inspired teacher says to us, 'This doctrine is true'—that is one thing—we receive the declaration on his simple authority. But when he says, 'I can prove this to you by a series of arguments'—that is another thing. When he says, 'this is true, be-

cause'—the utterance of that word arouses our reason. It is not implicit faith that is then demanded, but an attentive consideration of the force of arguments. The thing argued demands faith; but the argument, from its very nature, appeals to reason; and it is the very office of reason to judge whether the argument is sound and sufficient. And so when a sacred writer says, 'This doctrine is true, and it is *like* such a thing, or it may be so illustrated,' he appeals to our judgment and taste, and we may, without in the least questioning the thing asserted, inquire into the fitness, force, and elegance of the illustration, allegory, or figure, by which it is set forth.

5. If now any one shall say that this amounts to a rejection of Christianity—if for any purpose, fair or unfair, if with any intention, honest or dishonest, he shall take it upon him to say, that in advocating these views of inspiration we are no better than infidels in disguise, we cannot descend from the ground we occupy, we should not think it decent, with the known professions which we make, to dispute the point with him. But we would remind him, since he seems to need instruction more than argument, that many of the brightest lights and noblest defenders of our religion fully maintain the ground we have taken, to be christian ground. Erasmus says, 'It is not necessary that we should refer everything in the apostolic writings, immediately to supernatural aid. Christ suffered his disciples to err, even after the Holy Ghost was sent down, but not to the endangering of the faith.' Grotius says, 'It was not necessary that the matters narrated, should be dictated by the Holy Spirit; it was enough that the writer had a good memory.' 'It is possible,' says the learned Michaelis, 'to doubt, and even to deny the inspiration of the New Testament, [he means inspiration not only of words, but of ideas, which we do not deny,] and yet to be fully persuaded of the truth of the christian religion.' Because, he argues, the facts being true, the testimony being one of ordinary validity, the religion must be true. On this observation of Michaelis, Bishop Marsh says, 'Here our author makes a distinction which is at present very generally received, between the divine origin of the christian doctrine, and the divine origin of the writings in which that doctrine is recorded.' 'The wisdom contained in the Epistles of Paul,' says Dr Powell, late Master of St John's College, Cambridge, 'was given him from Above, and very probably the style and composition were his own.' Dr Paley makes the same distinction. 'In

reading the apostolic writings,' he observes, 'we distinguish between their doctrines and their arguments. Their doctrines came to them by revelation, properly so called; yet in propounding these doctrines, they were wont to illustrate, support, and enforce them by such analogies, arguments, and considerations as their own thoughts suggested.' To the same purpose, Bishop Burnet. 'When,' says he, 'divine writers argue upon any point, we are always bound to believe the conclusions that their reasonings end in, as parts of divine revelation; but we are not bound to be able to make out, or even to assent to, all the premises made use of by them in their whole extent, unless it appear plainly that they affirm the premises as expressly as they do the conclusions proved by them.'

We have thus endeavoured to free the scriptures from the burden of supporting a character, to which, as we believe, they nowhere lay any claim—the character, that is, of being, in every minute particular, perfect and infallible compositions. The question, we now repeat, the momentous, the most interesting question between the believer and the unbeliever, is, whether God has made special and supernatural communications of his wisdom and will to man, and whether the bible contains those communications? To us, it appears of great consequence, that the controversy should be disembarassed from all extraneous difficulties, and should be reduced to this simple point. We repeat it, therefore, that when prophet or apostle presents himself to us as a messenger from God, we receive him in the simple and actual character, which has been marked out in this discussion. We consider him as saying, 'I bear to you a message from God, to which I demand reverent heed; I give you, from divine inspiration, assurance of certain solemn and momentous truths; but I do not say that every word and phrase I use, every simile and allegory and consideration by which I endeavour to explain or enforce my message, is divine, any more than that my countenance, speech, and action are divine. The distinction is easy, and you ought not to misapprehend it. I speak to you from God; but still I am a man. I speak after the manner of men, and for the peculiarities of my own manner, mind, country, and age, I do not presume to make the Universal and Eternal Wisdom answerable.' It is as when an earthly government sends its ambassador to a revolted province. The person invested with such a character has a two-fold office to discharge. He has to lay down propositions, to

make offers of forgiveness and reconciliation. These are from the government. He has to explain and urge these propositions and offers, by such language, illustrations, and arguments as the exigency requires. These are from himself. 'It is thus,' might the ambassador of God say, 'it is thus that I address the children of men. My message is divine; my manner of delivering it, is human.'

And albeit it were a man that spoke thus to us, and however it might be that he spoke after the manner of men, yet if he could say with a voice of authority and assurance, 'God is love; like as a father pitieth his children, so God pities you; he watches over you with a kind care; he offers you forgiveness, and redemption from sin; he opens to you the path of immortal life;'—if he could say these things, it would be a message which no words could adequately express. We should not say as the ancient skeptics did of Paul, 'His bodily presence is weak, and his speech contemptible,' although he should offend our taste, or our prejudices, in every phrase or figure by which he communicated the glorious truth. We should rather, with the Galatians, 'receive him as an angel of God,' and would kiss the hem of his garment though the storms of every sea, and the dust and stripes of every city had rent and soiled it. There *is* nothing on earth of privilege, distinction, or blessing to compare with this simple faith. How many a stricken and sorrowing mind has been supported and soothed by that holy reliance. How many a bleeding heart has stanchèd its wounds in that healing fountain. How many a spirit, wearied with the vanities, or worn down with the cares of this world, has sought that blessed refuge. Nor is it trouble, or sorrow, or sickness, or bereavement only that has resorted here, and could go nowhere else; but the boundless, the ever craving soul, that sighs for an immortal life and an infinite good, how often has it exclaimed, 'To whom shall I go?—Thou hast the words of everlasting life!' To tell us that all which we believe is nothing, because it does not come up to the demands of some technical creed, or for any other reason, seems to us an absurdity and madness of assertion, at which, instead of inveighing, we can only wonder.

We not only believe ourselves, and believe things as matters of divine revelation, that are of transcendent and inexpressible interest, but we are anxious that others should believe. We are anxious, if our pages should fall into the hands of any

who are disposed to doubt, to say a few words to them on this great subject of believing and disbelieving. We are of opinion, indeed, though it may seem very presumptuous in us to say so, that the full strength of the argument for Christianity has not yet been exhibited. We think that the clearer developement of certain moral truths, and of the mind itself, is throwing light upon this subject.

But the pages of a review do not afford space for so wide a discussion. Instead of advancing into this field—and our aim thus far has been only to define its boundaries,—we shall now recede a step, in order to view it in those broader aspects, which must present themselves to men as men, whether believers or unbelievers; which must present themselves to beings constituted and circumstanced as men are.

We say, then, in the first place, that to all men it is desirable to believe. It is desirable to believe that there is a God; that he is a good being; that he exercises a providence over the earth; that he has made communications of his will to men, both special and ordinary; that Jesus Christ is really a teacher from God; that Christianity, in its pure precepts, its enlightening doctrines, its gracious encouragements, its comforting assurances of God's love, its great revelation of immortality, is true. We say and insist, it is desirable to believe these things. Every man must wish them to be true. At least, every man, in his senses, we were ready to say—every good man, certainly, who is not insane, must wish them to be true. They must appear intrinsically desirable to him; desirable for their own sake; desirable, because, if truths, they are most glorious truths. Put skepticism in the place of any of these matters of belief; let atheism stand instead of the acknowledgment of a God; let infidelity be true and Christianity be not true, or let distrust in general be substituted for reliance—and in each of these cases every one must feel, that he has put darkness in the place of light, and covered with blank desolation a region of life and beauty. Candid unbelievers have always acknowledged this. They have wished they could believe. We do not say that the desirableness of this faith is a sufficient sanction for it; we only say for the present that it is desirable.

But we go on, now, to observe in the second place, that a mind penetrated with a just and reasonable admiration for God's works and perfections, is, for that reason, much more likely to believe in his spiritual communications, in his visitations of

mercy and promise to the human race. There is a belief arising from this source, which is intuitive ; and which, although to some it may seem visionary, and sometimes perhaps is so, yet, being *rightly* derived, is capable, we think, of being vindicated, as altogether reasonable and well grounded.

Suppose a man with the bare light of nature to aid him, should come to entertain, as he well might, the most affecting and delightful conceptions of the character of his Maker. Suppose that his mind was often absorbed in admiration of God and of his works ; that he should feel, as he stood amidst the fair and beautiful creation, that God's wisdom was infinite, that his love was infinite, that he loved every creature he had made, that his ear of mercy was ever open to the cry of distress and want, that all things praised the gracious and tender kindness of the Creator. And now, should the voice of all things enter into his heart, and fill it with the most intense and impassioned love to the mighty and wonderful Being who made all things, we ask you, whoever you are that are capable of reasoning and feeling, if you would not approve of the emotions of his heart. There can be but one answer. But if you *would* approve of his feelings, let us remind you that those feelings, from their very nature, would be fast rising to reliance, and that reliance would naturally ripen into faith. A heart, swelling with emotions of gratitude and love, would find it easy to believe that the merciful Creator had interposed for the salvation of his perishing children ; that he had not left the soul to die for want of needful provision and care ; that he had opened to its panting desire and its passionate cry, the paths of an immortal life.

An affectionate heart is a confiding heart. A mind filled with the love of God, would feel a kind of assurance that God would not disregard its strongest and holiest aspirations, that he would not turn a deaf ear to its pleadings for light, and grace, and consolation. Such a mind would be ready to say, in the words of the ancient trust, 'The Lord will speak, and he will not keep silence.' Its prayer would be fast turning to assurance, and its faith to vision. Having the affectionate, that is the believing disposition, it would have 'the witness in itself Doing 'the will of God, it would know of the doctrine.'

We believe, that it is thus given as a kind of reward to the most pious and spiritual minds, to have no doubts. And we believe that it is by swerving from such a mind, by departing from the fervent and tender love of God, that some, not to say

many, fall into a general skepticism about providence, and the kind intentions of Heaven to its creatures, and its gracious promises of immortal life to the dying. We would not rashly trace speculative results to moral causes, to moral states of mind; that is, we would not measure a man's virtue by his creed. We know that professed unbelievers in the scriptures, for instance, have often possessed great amiableness, and a very high degree of social worth. But have they been equally distinguished for *the love of God*? This is the discriminative quality, of whose efficacy to prevent unbelief we are speaking. We know that doubting and believing spring from many causes; but we do think, that an ardent, generous, confiding piety, such as nature ought to inspire, would hold many minds to a faith, from which without it they may swerve. And surely he who does not devotedly love the Infinite Parent, lacks the most essential qualification for judging of what that Parent has done or will do, for his children. He who does not pray much, should not judge much; he who does not often and habitually place himself in the light of the divine perfections, should not judge much of their manifestation.

One thing, at least, we think is certain. A bad mind is more likely to disbelieve, than a good mind; a worldly more than a spiritual, an irreligious than a pious mind. A bad mind, estranged from God, averse to restraint, loving indulgence, and desiring impunity in sin, will not like to believe much concerning God's interference with human affairs; will not like to believe much of his inspection of the heart, his providence over the mind, his purpose to reward the good and to punish the guilty.

We do not say that unbelief has always arisen solely from such a cause. But we say, what every one, as a matter of mere logical inference, must admit, that such a cause is peculiarly favorable to it. We say, in fine, that the good states and tendencies of the mind, are much more likely to lead to belief in the great fundamental truths of our religion, than to disbelief.

But we now proceed to our third remark on the general subject of belief and unbelief. We have said that belief is desirable, and that it is natural to every good mind. We now say, that it is indispensable to the mind in its intrinsic nature and absolute wants. We mean, that to the mind by itself consid-

ered, to the mind left to itself, the great truths of religion are indispensable.

It is not often that the mind *is* so left; in the experience of some, it never is. They pass through life, or they pass many years of it, without well knowing what they are, or what they need; without once fully awaking from the sleep of the senses, or recovering themselves from the dreams of worldly cares, to feel what a nature God has placed within them. But did they feel this; did their thoughts sometimes retire to the secret and silent chambers of the soul; did the urgent and absorbing impression of outward things fade away from the mind, and leave it to itself, it would then be felt, as it will be felt when this world is actually fading from the senses forever, that the great truths of religion are indispensable; that they are the strength of the soul, without which it can no more be supported, than the body can be supported without its sinews; that they are the pillars of the soul, without which it must fall into irretrievable ruin.

There are some things that *bring* the mind to itself, and seem mercifully ordained by Heaven for this purpose. The long series of disappointments that ends in the extinction of all expectation from this world; the shock of calamity that breaks down and scatters all worldly reliances; the times of deep and chastened meditation, when all the riches and ambition and struggles of life pass before the mind as a 'vain show,' and the more spiritual hours which affliction ordains for us—the hours when the thoughts are all spiritual, when they dwell upon a spiritual world, when this world is all a dream, and the soul looks for its waking to life, to another and future being—these are seasons and scenes, which teach man, as with the voice of God, that nothing but the faith of what is spiritual and immortal can give repose or refuge to him. Pleasure may satisfy the senses, riches may satisfy avarice, and power ambition; but it must be some spiritual good which shall satisfy the soul, some enduring good that shall appease its immortal cravings, some boundless good that shall fill its infinite desires. Nay, even sensuality, avarice, and ambition, though but lower wants of our nature, yet partaking as they do of the vastness of the mind with which they are temporarily connected, can find nothing on earth to yield *them* entire satisfaction. How, then, shall the loftier powers, the unbounded demands of the spirit, be

ever met by anything less than the invisible and eternal objects of faith.

We say that human nature, in the calm and deep consciousness of what it is, or in that developement which trouble and calamity give it, cannot dispense with these objects of faith—a God, a providence, an offered mercy, and an eternal heaven. There are states or modifications of the mind, in which the want may not be felt; but it is not so with that mind itself, in its essential principles and its legitimate actings. The miser, by himself considered, can, amidst his sordid aims, dispense with loftier principles; the voluptuary, during his short lived pleasure, can dispense with them; the worldling, in his limited sphere, can do without them; but the *man* cannot dispense with them; the *man*, all-conscious, alive, awake, and glowing with the intense workings of thought and feeling, cannot do without them.

Take man in the noblest form of his character—take the man who is most truly man, and this which we have considered as a matter of reflection, will be seen to be matter of fact. We have an instance of this in the great poet of Germany—we refer to Goethe. His early days were days of skepticism; and they were days of as dark a struggle with despondency, *ennui*, and anguish, as ever shook almost to dissolution the elements that are mysteriously bound up in the human heart. In the bitterness of his sorrow, and the blackness of his despair, arising from religious skepticism, he often contemplated suicide; and many nights, he says, he laid a dagger by his bedside, hoping to gather up courage for the awful plunge into the certain realities of another world, or the dark gulf of annihilation. And it was only by struggling through these cloudy and chaotic elements of fear, doubt, and strife, to the firm ground of faith, it was only—we speak now of what his encomiasts say, and not as critics on his works,—it was only by welcoming to his heart the sweet peace of believing, and the needful supports of a religious trust, that Goethe recovered the power and joy of his existence, and became the light and praise of Germany. And it is in minds like his, that the need of religious faith and trust is most powerfully felt. It is sometimes said, we know, that believing is very important to the mass of mankind. It has been a skeptical adage indeed, conveying the scornful implication that faith is more needful than wise, and that it is needful, indeed, as the refuge of weakness and superstitious fear. Now

we believe that not only the implication, but the statement is altogether false. We believe it may be asserted, that if faith is important to the mass of the people, to the loftiest minds it is more than important, it is indispensable. And we repeat, that just in proportion as the mind rises towards this loftiness, just in proportion as it rejects all factitious modifications, and puts on the proper character of human nature, will it find religious faith to be indispensable.

There is, indeed, a kind of unbelief which does itself yield an artificial buoyancy and satisfaction ; but it is not the unbelief of calm, reasonable, thoughtful, feeling human nature. It is a scornful, contemptuous, sneering unbelief. It is not the true philosopher, it is not the true man, that so disbelieves ; but it is, if there ever were such a thing as demoniacal possession—it is a demon within the man, that sits mocking with insane laughter at the wreck it has made, or scowling with fiendish malignity over the desolation it has spread around it. Such a skeptic was Thomas Paine. But such was not Mr Hume. From that calm and clear, though mistaken mind, you hear the sighings of human nature over its doubts. ‘I am affrighted and confounded,’ says Mr Hume, ‘with that forlorn solitude in which I am placed by my philosophy. When I look abroad, I foresee on every side, dispute, contradiction, and distraction. When I turn my eyes inward, I find nothing but doubt and ignorance. Where am I, or what ? From what causes do I derive existence, or to what condition do I return ? I am confounded with these questions, and I begin to fancy myself in the most deplorable condition imaginable, environed in the deepest darkness.’

Yes, human nature must feel this, amidst the gloom and cheerlessness of skepticism. Why should Mr Hume strike out this passage from the later editions of his *Treatise on Human Nature* ? It is honorable to him. We can conceive of a man’s being a sincere and honest unbeliever. We can conceive of his entertaining such false views of Christianity, as to be induced to reject it. We can conceive of many influences at work upon his mind, to expose him to this result. But we could not conceive of being ourselves unbelievers, without being the most sorrowful and disconsolate of human beings. We should say with Job, in his season of gloomy doubt, ‘Let the day perish wherein I was born ; let darkness and the shadow of death stain it ; as for that night let darkness seize upon it,

let it be solitary ; let no joyful voice come therein.' We might be wrong in this complaining, but we could not help it. The birthday of such an existence, would seem to us to deserve no joyful commemoration, if all the thoughts of the mind, if all the dear and cherished affections of the heart, if all the blessed aspirations and hopes of our nature were to perish in the grave. And whether they shall actually perish there or not, if we have no assurance given us, such as the scriptures contain, all, to our minds at least—all that rests upon the tomb must be darkness and the shadow of death !

The matter which we have now taken in hand, may not be altogether without practical interest, we have thought, to some who may read our pages. It is a day of inquiry, and of believing and disbelieving of course, to some extent of those terms, and it behoves thoughtful men to consider whether they are inquiring rightly and safely. And if the general reflections we have now offered, are just, this is a matter which is not to be settled in a moment. The qualities of a rational inquirer, and of a rational doubter, are no ordinary qualities. It is not hasty surmise, nor headlong impulse, nor ready wit, nor flippant illustration, still less, contempt and scorn, or confidence and presumption, that will do here. Let no man think himself qualified to disbelieve, or to doubt, without a fervent and affectionate piety, without much reflection and sober thinking, and especially without understanding that nature in himself, on whose fate he is deciding. It is serious work which such a man has to do ; it is a serious question which he lays before him. It is serious, it is momentous even to the interests of this life. For a prevailing skepticism, not to say about the existence of God, but about a providence, about the wisdom and goodness of the power that deals with us, about moral obligation, about retribution, and the promise of future happiness to the virtuous and good,—a prevailing skepticism, we say, about these things, would be as certainly fatal to the morals and peace of society, as the silent and unseen coming of the pestilence to the health and happiness of our families.

We hold our pen a moment longer, to lay this solemn question, as we think it ought to be laid, before any one who may feel in himself an inclination to skepticism. And the point we wish him to consider is this ; ' Are you qualified to doubt ? ' The ordinary spirit that has prevailed in the school of unbelief,

we are perfectly certain, has amounted to a total disqualification. Not the self-sufficient, the scornful, the voluptuous, the light minded and slightly informed, are the fit judges in a case like this. We reiterate the question, 'Are you qualified to doubt?' The greatest and wisest men, men of the brightest genius, of the most extensive learning and of the most profound, calm, and retired study, who have investigated the subject as no infidel ever did, since they were examining the very foundations of their hope—such men have lived and died in this faith. If they had taken it on trust, the case would have been totally different. As it is, we think that they must be no common men who are entitled to deny a faith thus sanctioned. We put the question plainly, then, 'Are you an ignorant man?—Are you a worldly man?—Are you a man cherishing and gratifying the secret love of indulgence?—Are you a man averse to religion and prayer? If you are any of these, you are not qualified to disbelieve. For how shall ignorance judge of wisdom, or worldliness of a spiritual religion, or vicious indulgence of immaculate purity, or an irreligious mind of the great, the peculiar, the all-interpreting manifestation of God!'

ART. VI.—*A Dissertation on Intemperance, to which was awarded the Premium offered by the Massachusetts Medical Society, in June, 1827.* By WILLIAM SWEETSER, M. D. Professor of the Theory and Practice of Physic in the University of Vermont. Boston. Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1829. 8vo. pp. 98.

THE physicians of the United States deserve to receive the highest thanks of their countrymen for the decided manner in which they have expressed their opinion upon the subject of intemperance, and the use of ardent spirits. They have both individually and in their medical societies, taken numerous opportunities of publicly denouncing, not only the abuse, but even the moderate use of stimulating drinks. So far as personal influence can extend, nothing could be more salutary than the measures which they have pursued, since every one feels, that, as the guardians of the health of their fellow beings, they have abundant opportunity to observe the effects of ardent spirits up-

on the human constitution, and are alone possessed of the requisite knowledge properly to direct, and draw the correct inferences from, their observations.

In the year 1827, at its annual meeting, the Medical Society of Massachusetts offered a premium for the best dissertation on Intemperance. In 1828 the premium was not awarded, but in 1829 it was obtained by Dr Sweetser, Professor of the Theory and Practice of Physic in the University of Vermont, at Burlington, and an eminent practitioner in that place. This dissertation, which seems to have well merited the preference given to it by the Society, enters very fully into the physiological and pathological history of Intemperance, and describes, in a full and perspicuous manner, the effects which the use of ardent spirits gradually has in vitiating the actions of the several organs, impairing their structure, and finally inducing grave and incurable diseases.

We do not, however, notice the work for the purpose of giving any account of it, but merely for the purpose of recommending it to the public, as adapted to do good to the cause in which all are now so much engaged, and which seems to be going on under the happiest auspices. The perusal of it is calculated to impress, very strongly, that most important of all doctrines on this subject, that the *moderate use* of ardent spirits is at the bottom of the mischief; that the *moderate use* is pernicious; that the *moderate use* is totally and unreservedly unnecessary. This is the burden which should be rung in the ears of every man, woman, and child in the twentyfour States, till it is as familiar in their ears as household words; till parents know it for a proverb, and children for a byword. It is one of the truths of the same kind, and to be as undeniably proved, as that cleanliness is better than filth, pure air than foul, warmth than cold, for the preservation of life and health; and which yet, like these same axioms in times not very remote, has been forgotten or unperceived by the vast majority of mankind, though the evidences for it have ever been present in their view. It is true that the dissertation before us is not adapted for the perusal of all or most of those who require to have this truth enforced upon them; but it is adapted for those, who, by their superior information and intelligence, lead the opinions of the society in which they move. It will afford to such persons the facts and illustrations by which they may be enabled to enforce the known truths in regard to the use of ardent spirits, upon those with whom

they are conversant, and who have not the means of access to it themselves. It would enable them to give grounds and reasons for the opinions they express, and the advice they give. It is from this consideration, that we think it might be well worth while for Societies engaged avowedly in the business of reformation, to take some pains to recommend and distribute this pamphlet.

ART. VII.—1. *Pietas Londinensis; or the History, Design, and Present State of the various Public Charities, in or near London.* By A. HIGHMORE, Esq. London. 1810. 8vo. pp. 984.

2. *Philanthropia Metropolitana; or an Account of Public Charities in London, established since 1810.* By the late A. HIGHMORE, Esq. London. 1822. 8vo.

3. *A General, Medical, and Statistical History of the Present Condition of Public Charity in France; comprising a detailed Account of all Establishments destined for the Sick, the Aged, and the Infirm, for Children, and for Lunatics; with a View of the Extent of Pauperism and Mendicity, and the Means now adopted for their Relief and Repression.* By DAVID JOHNSTON, M. D., Fellow of the Royal College of Surgeons of Edinburgh, &c. &c. Edinburgh and London. 1829. 8vo. pp. 606.

THE subject of poverty, its sources, evils, and remedies, is exciting much attention at the present day. With respect, particularly, to the legal and established modes of relief, it is, like many other subjects of national or general interest, undergoing a strict investigation. In England, where, notwithstanding the large provision, public and private, legal and voluntary, for their relief, the poor have multiplied, till, by the proportion they bear to the whole population, they have become a formidable class of the community, and the burden of supporting them almost intolerable,—in England, it is not surprising it should be viewed with an anxious and almost trembling interest. The periodicals and daily journals groan with complaints of the enormous evil. It has afforded abundant matter for speculation; and statesmen in their cabinets, and philanthropists in their studies, have busied themselves in framing laws, or forming ingenious

theories upon the subject, proposing either the extirpation or decrease of the evil. In the mean time, paupers themselves are fearfully increasing; and impotent and defenceless as they would seem individually, they threaten by their numbers to be the scourge of the land.

For ourselves, as we have had occasion in a preceding number to remark, we have little confidence in sanguine schemes of reform, or in those pleasant plans invented by some ardent well wishers of mankind, for the extirpation of poverty and crime. 'The poor ye shall always have with you'—is not only the declaration of him who came to relieve them, but is a part of the established constitution of the world. It is the positive ordinance of God, the will and pleasure of the great moral Governor, that the poor shall never cease from the land; that in every community of men there shall be those, who, by their wants or their sorrows, their perplexities or straits, shall engage the sympathies and call forth the charities of their more favored fellow creatures, so that whensoever we will we may do good. We consider poverty, therefore, as one of the inevitable conditions of humanity, which it is not the design of Providence, and therefore not within the province, if it be even within the power of man, to remove; but which human wisdom and benevolence, prudent legislation and private charity, and above all, as combining and directing all these, the blessed influences of Christianity, may effectually relieve.

That mendicity, or, more properly, the state of poverty, can never be abolished, so that in any considerable collection of mankind, there shall be no poor, is evident from the slightest consideration of the causes that produce and continue it. Indeed, for this, as well as for most of the varieties of men's condition, there are causes continually at work in the social, civil, and moral constitution of things. The original diversities in the tempers, dispositions, faculties of men; their aptitude, or the contrary, to improve the opportunities with which they may be furnished; the inevitable changes of human life, wholly independent of man's control, by which, agreeably to the appointment of God himself, there is a perpetual alternation of prosperity and adversity, not only to the members of the same community, but to the same individuals and families; these, with innumerable other causes, local or temporary,—such as war and peace, or the unexpected change from either, a single year of famine or scarcity, a revolution, like that of France,

impoverishing the rich and totally changing the state and prospects of families for generations,—will never fail of maintaining the due measure of poverty in the earth. And even if, by some marvellous changes, all mankind were made as equal in their possessions or means, as they are imagined once to have been in their rights, this Utopian equality would last scarcely a day. The lazy and the wicked, and not they alone, but the shiftless, the extravagant, and improvident, would soon fall back into dependence; and shortly would there be the same necessity for poor laws and alms-houses, as is now the fruitful burden of complaint and system-building to lawgivers and philanthropists.

The provision made for the poor, in the earliest periods of the Jewish history, is a sufficient proof, that under no constitution of government, even among a people, like the Israelites, under the special guidance of the Almighty, is there to be expected an exemption from poverty or its attendant evils. Some of these provisions are no less beautiful than wise. They express a most considerate regard for the feelings and claims of those who have 'waxen poor.' What, for example, can exceed the tenderness and delicacy, with which the dwelling of the poor debtor is guarded from intrusion? 'When thou dost lend thy brother anything, thou shalt not go into his house to fetch his pledge.*' God himself was pleased to become the guardian of the poor man's hovel. Insolence or rapacity was not permitted to enter, and even charity itself must not intrude abruptly or unbidden. There might possibly be there some 'little monument of better days,'† some cherished relic of friendship, which no money could purchase, and which, not even for the relief of urgent want, could be resigned. At least, it might aggravate the suffering of the poor inmates to be compelled to expose to the eye of the stranger, or even of the neighbour whose aid was implored, all the humbling circumstances of their condition. Therefore, it is added, '*Thou shalt stand abroad*; and the man to whom thou dost lend, shall bring out the pledge abroad unto thee.' Other commands, inculcating the same humanity and considerate regard, more especially towards the widow and the fatherless, might be cited from the 'poor laws' of Judea.

* Deut. xxiv. 10-12.

† See Graves on the Pentateuch.

The means, which have been devised at different periods and under different religious institutions, for the relief of this great evil, have been, as might be expected, very various. Before the benign influences of Christianity were felt, the poor were but little regarded. The whole genius of Paganism, of every form indeed of idolatry, was unfriendly to benevolence. It was essentially cruel and hard hearted. The licentiousness which it either permitted or encouraged, had all its usual effect in destroying the kind sympathies of our nature, and the poor were left among the neglected and despised of the world. Nothing of the public charities, nothing of the system of relief, so common in christian countries, was known or even thought of before the appearance of our Saviour. He took the poor, if we may so speak, under his special protection. He offered to them an equal share in the blessings of his religion, and distinctly mentioned it, even in connexion with the miraculous testimony by which its truth was to be established, that his gospel was preached to the poor.

And who will deny, that Christianity, in its whole doctrine, spirit, and promises, is most graciously adapted to the wants and condition of the poor, or that charity, in its widest extent, is among its essential virtues? To what else but to its precepts and influence are to be ascribed, if not the kind sympathies, yet certainly the active benevolence, and the humane institutions, which are found everywhere in Christendom, and nowhere else? The instructions of Christ himself, the Acts of his apostles, and the early records of the Church; the appointment of deacons to act as guardians or overseers of the poor, and to provide especially that the indigent widows were not neglected in the ministrations of charity; the frequent mention of contributions in the Epistles; and the collections sometimes made through whole ecclesiastical districts, or communities of churches, as that of Achaia, or Galatia, for the relief of distant and needy brethren,—all attest the strong interest which was taken in the condition of the poor, and the high importance that was attached to this evangelic grace of charity. For a long period, also, perhaps for the space of two or three centuries, while the disciples retained in any good degree their primitive simplicity, their poor appear to have been relieved by individual benevolence, or by the stated contributions of their churches.

Afterwards, when the church of Rome had obtained the ascendant, and its peculiar institutions, with its wealth and re-

sources, were multiplied, partly to escape the odium of exorbitant or accumulating possessions, and partly, as it would be unreasonable to doubt, from a genuine benevolence, the poor were chiefly supplied at the gates of the convent or the monastery. And it must be conceded, that in these institutions, unnatural and corrupting as they were, there was, and even to the present day there remains, much of the spirit and of the good influences of christian charity. But that they were mischievous, on the whole, by *creating and aggravating the very evil they proposed to relieve*; that in the dependence they permitted and encouraged, upon their daily supplies, they encouraged also habits of idleness, with other vices most destructive of the morals and prosperity of a people, their whole history abundantly shows.

And here we must introduce to our readers the last and more recent of the works, the titles of which we have set at the head of this article, and to which we shall principally be indebted for the facts and details, which it is now our purpose to exhibit. This work, by Dr Johnston, recently published in Edinburgh, seems to us highly interesting and important. The writer proposes 'a general, medical, and statistical history of the present condition of public charity in France.' But in doing this, he has gone far back to the past; and though we have reason to complain of some defects in his arrangement, which leave his readers to no little trouble in uniting what he has scattered upon the same subject in different parts of his volume, yet when his statements are fairly set together, they present a full, and, we are ready to believe, a faithful view of both the ancient and the present state of charitable institutions in France. Nor is it the least important part of this work, that it enables the reader to form for himself, by the great variety of data afforded him, a fair comparison of the charities of France and England, or rather of Paris and London, an ample account of the latter of which will be found in the volumes of the late Mr Highmore, also before us.

In adverting to the ill effects of multiplying charitable institutions, in which he includes more particularly the monkish and the hospital charities, Dr Johnston remarks;—

'Effects of the worst kind are to be apprehended from an indiscriminate system of charity,—a system which makes it the right of every man to demand the relief, which, in general,

his own exertions ought to procure him. What the monkish institutions were in former days, an over-extension of establishments of public charity, and a morbid degree of charitable feeling among private individuals, will become in the present time. The effects of both will essentially be the same; and while the spirit that leads to the formation of too wide a system of charity is to be lauded, the consequences that arise from it cannot be too strongly deprecated. It may justly be said, with the illustrious author of the *Spirit of the Laws*,—"Malheur, malheur au pays qui a beaucoup d'hôpitaux!"—although, at the same time, in all respects, his opinions upon the subject of hospitals are not such as to claim the assent of the world in general.

'Upon inquiring into the state of hospitals and hospital-establishments during the earlier periods of history, it will be found, that their existence has become necessary very much in proportion to the progress of civilization. This may at first sight appear a direct contradiction to the opinions advanced in the preceding pages; but a little consideration will make it evident that it is not so. These opinions are only opposed to the evil of carrying too far a system, which, to a certain extent, is not only allowable and useful, but absolutely necessary to the present state of society. In the history of Greece and of Rome, little traces can be observed of any establishments resembling the hospitals of the present day; but this apparent deficiency in the institutions of people whose undertakings were so great and so brilliant, is easily accounted for. The adoption of slaves, and their connexion with private families, rendered the establishment of public charities almost unnecessary; for slaves, who might be supposed to come in place of the poorer classes of the community from which hospitals are filled, were so situated as never to be in want, their masters being called upon not merely to furnish the means of existence for them, but to comfort them in disease, and provide for them in old age. As slavery disappeared, the real condition of man was bettered; but for the same reason, public charity became more necessary as emancipation had absolved the rich from their former obligations, and the public was compelled now to do what individuals till then had done.' pp. 155, 156.

Of the evils resulting from multiplying and proclaiming institutions for relief, the history of the monastic charities in England, furnishes an exact illustration.

'When,' observes our author, 'Henry VIII. of England denied the supremacy of the Pope, and declared himself the visible head of the Anglican church, he destroyed the numerous abbeys, hos-

pitals, and houses of refuge, that existed everywhere throughout England, and in which so many persons were fed, lodged, and treated, when under the influence of malady. By this destruction, he laid the foundation of the future prosperity of his country. The resources of the nation, which were till then unattended to, and perhaps unknown, were thus forcibly called forth, and the inferior classes of society, no longer able to find the open and ready charity they had been accustomed to, found energies within them which till that time had lain dormant.

‘In opposition to this example, he quotes the hospital-system of Italy, in which, to use his own words,—“*Les hôpitaux mettent tout le monde à son aise, excepté ceux qui ont de l’industrie, qui cultivent les arts et les terres, et qui font le commerce.*”’ pp. 153, 154.

In a note, having remarked, that in Rome the charitable foundations are capable of containing five thousand paupers, that charity is open handed, and physicians are paid to attend to the poor sick at their homes, he adds ;—

‘Yet, with all this, beggary is everywhere prevalent, and in every quarter of the city strangers are besieged by crowds of idle beggars, which would lead him to believe that nothing at all is done for them.’ p. 155.

The immediate effect, however, of the dissolution of the monasteries, was injurious. For a time, it was followed by a great increase of poverty. The poor, being suddenly deprived of the relief to which they had been accustomed at the gates of the convents, and not yet taught to rely on their own resources ; the people, also, being as yet unused to the bestowment of voluntary contributions, hitherto made wholly unnecessary by the abundant charities of the monasteries, there was, as might have been anticipated, an interval of great suffering. Indeed, it could not have been otherwise, for, as Dr Johnston states ;—

‘The number of paupers was not diminished, while the funds, which had hitherto supported them, were all usurped by the king, and distributed among his favorites, to lay the foundation of the immense private possessions of the present day. How considerable these funds were, and how many poor their alienation must have thrown upon the community, may be judged of from the fact, that the revenue of the religious institutions abolished by Henry, amounted to £273,000 of that period, equal to about £5,000,000 of present money.’ p. 497.

There can be no question, that while on the one hand, the bestowment of so much charity was fruitful of mischief, the sud-

den withholding or diverting of it to other channels, must have produced dreadful misery. It was to remedy these evils, that taxes were first levied upon the people for the maintenance of the poor, and hence those poor laws, which, with successive changes and additions, have now become so burdensome. To some of our readers the following brief history of the origin and progress of the poor rates in England, as given by this exact writer, may not be familiar. It appears, that it was first ordered by Edward VI. in 1552, that;—

‘On a certain Sunday each year, the collector of the parish should fix the sum he might deem each person capable of paying the ensuing year for the support of the poor; and if, after two summonses, that was not paid, the person was to be taken before the bishop of the diocese, who was to exert his influence in inducing him to do it. By a statute of Elizabeth, any person refusing to pay his contribution was to be taken before the justices of peace, and, upon farther refusal, to be imprisoned. Finally, in 1572 and 1592, the contribution took the character it at present bears; since which time it has gone on gradually increasing.

‘In the year 1680, the poor’s tax of England amounted to £665,370; in 1764 to £1,200,000; in 1773 to £3,000,000; in 1822 to £6,358,702. Had a similar tax to a similar amount been levied in France, and gone on increasing in a like progression, its ruinous consequences may be easily conceived. The population of France is now about 32 millions, and a tax proportional to that of England would have amounted to about 450 millions of francs, or not far short of half the annual revenue of the kingdom.’ p. 498.

It will be perceived, that Dr Johnston extends his statements only to the year 1822. The amount of these poor rates, enormous and almost incredible as it would seem, has, as we learn from authentic sources, been still increasing, and it may reasonably be inferred, that with the seven last years of more than usual commercial and manufacturing depression, by which the laboring classes in England, as well as elsewhere, have so largely suffered, the poor tax, if in 1822 so near to it, can now scarcely fall short of eight millions sterling, or *about thirty-five millions of dollars annually.*

Were it not for official and unquestionable testimony, it could scarcely be credited, that a sum so enormous should be levied upon any people for such, or indeed any single purpose. Except in the annual expenses of the English ecclesiastical establishment, it has, we believe, no parallel.

With such an example before them, we surely cannot be surprised, that the French government, when at the time of the Revolution reforming their code of public charity, should have anxiously endeavoured to *avoid the least resemblance to the English system of poor laws*. They had its dangers in full view, and wisely resolved to guard against them. Indeed, in this, as in some other of their national institutions, they have undeniably the advantage of their British neighbours. The government, —by which, though he immediately refers to the Directory of the Revolution, yet as his work is published within the present year, we understand our author to intend equally the reigning monarchy,—the government took the asylums and hospitals of the whole kingdom at once under their own direction; and, in prescribing for them a uniform system, and subjecting them to an exactness of inspection, resembling the minute *surveillance* of the whole French police, prevented many of the abuses which so easily creep into public charities, and secured a more wise and faithful management of them. In the twelfth chapter of his valuable history, Dr Johnston has exhibited a minute account of the system at present adopted for the maintenance of the poor throughout France. The whole survey is far too extended for our limits, and its various parts are also too closely connected to admit easily of separation. We shall therefore endeavour to exhibit to our readers only some of the more prominent features, or of the most important results of the system; and this, as far as we can, in the words of our very intelligent author.

‘By the law of the 7th Frimaire, an. 5, (27th November, 1796), there were instituted in each canton of the republic, one or more *Bureaux de Bienfaisance*. These Bureaux were charged with the distribution of the *Secours à Domicile*; they were to receive legacies and donations made in favor of the poor; and, in fine, were to take charge of all matters connected with the public administration of charity.’ p. 517.

Having given a distinct view of the present territorial divisions of the kingdom, as necessary to understand the nature of these institutions, or, as they are termed, *Charity Bureaux*; having stated, that the law has established them in every part of the kingdom, and detailed the manner, in which the two great commissions for administering hospices and the *Bureaux de Bienfaisance* are formed and made responsible for all their acts

and expenditures to the government,—Dr Johnston informs us that ;—

‘ Besides these there is a third species of council connected with the public distribution of relief to the poor, termed Council of Charity, which holds a sort of surveillance over the other two. These councils exist wherever the establishments of charity are of sufficient importance to render them necessary. Their *ex officio* members are archbishops, bishops, first presidents, and procureurs-généraux of Royal Courts, or, in their place, presidents and procureurs of Tribunaux de Première Instance, presidents of tribunaux of commerce, rectors of academies, senior curés, presidents of consistories, vice presidents of chambers of commerce, and senior justices of the peace. The ordinary members are to the number of five in communes having fewer than 5000 inhabitants ; 10 in those having more. They are nominated and changed in the same manner as the members of the Bureaux de Bienfaisance. The councils of charity sit twice a year, in conjunction with the hospital commissions and charity bureaux, when the different matters connected with the administration of the poor are taken under consideration, and plans of improvement proposed.

‘ The principal duty of the Bureaux de Bienfaisance is to distribute what the French term *Secours à Domicile*, that is to say, to give assistance, as far as possible, whether in health or sickness, to the poor at their own homes. This may with justice be said to form the most interesting branch of public charity ; it ought to form the basis or groundwork of the whole system, and hospitals and hospices should be but a supplement to it.* They are necessary to but a limited portion of the poor community, and to that portion only when in a state of disease and absolute want, without relations, without friends, and without any personal means of subsistence. To the great mass of the poor, the *Secours à Domicile*, if properly administered, will in every way apply. It is more satisfactory to the feelings of a poor man to be succoured in his own house, there to receive the care and attention of his wife, children, or parents, than to find himself in a state of isolation in a hospital or poor’s house, among individuals attach-

* ‘ Les Bureaux de Bienfaisance, étant les auxiliaires nés des hospices, peuvent éviter à ces établissemens une grande dépense, au moyen d’une sage distribution de secours à domicile. En effet il n’est point de père de famille qui ne s’estime heureux, lorsqu’il est atteint de maladie, de pouvoir rester près de sa femme et ses enfans ; et pour cela il suffit d’alléger une partie de sa dépense par des distributions de médicamens et d’alimens à domicile. En conséquence, on ne peut mieux entendre la charité qu’en multipliant les secours à domicile, et en leur donnant la meilleure direction possible.—*Instruction de M. le Conseiller d’Etat chargé de l’Administration Générale des Hospices, &c. près le Ministère de l’Intérieur.*’

ed to him by no tie of kindred or friendship. Public morality cannot but be a gainer in a system which tends to strengthen the bonds of family affection, and to aid children and relatives in fulfilling the duties imposed on them by nature. The report made to the General Hospital Council of the capital, which contains many sentiments similar to those just used, observes, that the *Secours à Domicile*, as at present administered, were an object of desire long before the circumstances of the times allowed of their establishment.' pp. 522-524.

At the same time, it is admitted, as indeed the smallest experience might anticipate concerning even the best systems of beneficence, that the practical results do not always correspond with what might be expected from the wisdom of the plan. And we are happy in quoting also the judicious reflections with which this admission is connected.

'In France, if a system does work well, it is in the capital that its perfection is to be found. It too frequently happens that elsewhere a laxity prevails in putting the good intentions of the law into effect. It must be allowed, that in no country of the world are such good regulations to be found as in France. Every city, every town, every village, has its laws, decrees, and regulations, which in the statute book appear perfect and worthy of all praise. Inquiry, however, will often show a lamentable deficiency in their execution; and to this fact is owing the difficulty frequently experienced in ascertaining the exact state of France in many points connected with its internal administration. The precision of its laws, and the imperfect manner often in which they are put into effect, tend to bewilder and confuse the observer, and to warp his judgment. On the one side, by an admiration of these laws, he is induced to overrate the advantages of the country; while on the other, by remarking how imperfectly they are at times executed, he may be induced to give a more unfavorable account of it than it deserves. It is a common remark among Frenchmen, (for the most enlightened of them are not unaware of this imperfection,) that in England the laws are bad, but are well kept, while in France they are excellent, but ill kept. In the laws which concern the poor, as well as in others, the faults just mentioned are perceptible; but it must be allowed, that of late years improvement in this respect, if it has not been universal, has still been gradually extending over the country. In the capital the institution of *Bureaux de Bienfaisance* has been of the greatest service, and the successive improvements made since their first establishment, in 1801, have brought them to a high state of perfection.' pp. 524, 525.

Again, on the subject of the visiting and inspection of the poor, we learn that this is entrusted to persons appointed by the *Bureaux* under the title of Visitors. Having remarked on the great importance of this duty, as the only means of ascertaining the just amount of the distribution to be made, the author adds;—

‘The Roman Catholic church, in allowing too great merit to the giver of alms, has done much mischief to the community. The givers of charity, content with having given, cared little or nothing to what manner of persons they gave it. The act was, in their estimation, not the less praiseworthy, because the charity bestowed was ill applied and abused. But reserve, and even severity, are absolutely necessary in the administration of poor’s funds, from a principle of common justice; for if all the poor cannot be equally relieved, they at least ought to be so in proportion to their distresses and their wants. The appearance of misery, then, must not be the guide; the poor must be examined as to their age, infirmities, families, causes of misery, resources they have or once had, the cause of the loss of these resources, their moral conduct, the care they have taken of their children, and various other points. It must also be ever observed as a maxim, that it is not sufficient to grant assistance; it is also necessary to inquire diligently how that assistance is employed, and if the use made of it has been proper.

‘The assistance given to the poor is of three kinds, annual, temporary, and extraordinary; and it is necessary that this division should be rigorously defined and adhered to. Let the funds be ever so flourishing, it is impossible, and to a certain degree it would be improper, to administer to the total wants of those for whom they are destined; they must only be partially assisted. To extend the assistance indiscriminately to all, without inquiring how far that assistance is necessary, and demands to be continued, is to destroy the power of relieving such as, from real misfortune, claim a full and constant assistance. Each Bureau, then, is required to keep a register of its poor, divided in the manner mentioned. The indigents admitted to annual relief are, the blind, the paralytic, the cancerous and infirm, persons aged above 65, heads of families with at least three children below 12 years of age. In the partition of assistance these are divided into four classes, according to the extent of their privations or wants. The first class comprehends the blind and those above 80 years of age; the 2d, Persons from 75 to 80 years of age, and those afflicted with severe infirmity; 3d, Aged and infirm persons below 75 years of age; 4th, Fathers with young families.

The number of individuals to be admitted into each of these classes is determined by the General Hospital Council, on the proposition of the Bureaux of Charity. This number is on no account to be exceeded. At the same time an allotted sum is voted, and the division enables this to be done with more ease and precision, the cost of each class being determined beforehand. The annual assistance thus given by the Bureaux of Charity is in some respects analogous to that given in the hospices; the amount and extent of it is fixed, and if the numbers admitted to participate in their benefits are complete, others must wait their turn as they would do in a hospital, and, in the mean time, they may receive temporary assistance.' pp. 528-531.

Again;—

'The indigents admitted to temporary relief are those who, from malady, want of work, or similar causes, are reduced to a state of necessitous poverty. Extraordinary relief is given in extraordinary cases, such as fires, robbery, or accidental misfortunes. The Bureaux enjoy a latitude in the distribution of their assistance; they must, however, as far as that is possible, give it in kind (*en nature*). Great reserve is maintained in the distribution of money; and if that cannot altogether be avoided, it is, at least, practised as little as circumstances will allow. The annual relief given to persons totally unable to earn their subsistence, consists of bread, soup, meat, linen, clothes, firewood, and money, if it be accounted necessary or proper: all this to the value of a certain sum, which must not be exceeded. It requires considerable attention to distribute these articles proportionally to the wants of the different seasons; were they given once a year, there would exist no difficulty; but as it is, it is often a difficult matter, as their quantity is limited, to make the proper partition. All cases of assistance given to the poor in form of money are cases of exception; and on this head the system is excellent, and has been attended with much moral benefit. The caution with which such relief is given, keeps temptation out of the way of many whose principles are too feeble to be altogether beyond it, and, at the same time, it insures a proper subsistence to many, who, did they purchase the necessaries of life themselves, might be exposed to loss from ignorance or fraud.' pp. 531, 532.

We observe here another excellent regulation.

'To persons out of employment temporary assistance is given; but as much as possible work is made a condition of this assistance. Whenever an allowance is made to a pauper in this situation, it is not delivered to him directly, nor is money given him to purchase it. He receives an order upon some person employ-

ed by the administration, who gives the quantity of meat, bread, or whatever may be therein contained, and whose account is paid at regular intervals; the articles being charged at a rate agreed upon between him and the administration.' p. 534.

There is something particularly considerate and humane in the following royal ordinance of August, 1816.

' "It often happens, that, through ignorance, the poorer classes of the community neglect their own interest, or, deceived by bad advice, become exposed to the loss of any trifling patrimony they may possess, and which is perhaps almost their sole means of subsistence. To persons in such a situation it will be valuable to have it in their power to obtain gratuitously the advice of enlightened magistrates or lawyers." For this purpose, these legal advisers are attached to the Bureau of Charity; and so liberal is the administration, that, upon their recommendation, it will advance money to prosecute any question that may promise advantageous results to a family or individual unable otherwise to incur the expense of legal proceedings.' pp. 535, 536.

An objection might naturally arise to this system of national charity, that it must discourage or embarrass all private institutions. Upon this, as well as upon another subject immediately connected with it, the difficulties of which have been sensibly felt among ourselves—and we now refer to those arising from the multiplicity and interference, not to say rivalry, of voluntary institutions for the same general objects—Dr Johnston presents some useful suggestions from the Report annexed to the royal ordinance of 1816, in connexion with which he says ;—

' It is particularly observed with respect to the various existing charitable institutions, that the wish is not to destroy or diminish them, but to augment and improve them, and refer all to one and the same general system, but without interfering in anything that is not contrary to the views of government. Whilst it strongly expresses the advantage of private associations making the bureaux of charity their rallying points, and concurring with the members of those offices as to the modes of multiplying and improving the means of assistance and relief, it, at the same time, confines itself to the expression of a wish on this subject.' p. 542.

And again ;—

' One of the most interesting features of the public administration, and the other charities of Paris, is the entire agreement that prevails between them. A few instances will prove this harmo-

nious feeling. The Society of Maternal Charity, for giving assistance to mothers suckling their infants, is obliged to limit the amount of relief it affords; but those thus excluded are relieved at the different Bureaux of Charity, upon the recommendation of the society. In the same spirit, the Philanthropic Society, which distributes various necessities of life to the poor, has apparatuses in its own bureau for making soups, of which it freely gives the use to such of the Bureaux of Charity as are not supplied with them.' pp. 543, 544.

In conclusion, to show the good results that may be anticipated throughout the kingdom from the universal adoption of this system; viz. that of the *Bureaux de Bienfaisance*, our author extracts from M. Dupin, the following account of the mode of charitable administration in a single town. The details, though somewhat minute, cannot but be interesting to our readers, and may supply, at the same time, some useful suggestions to those whose official situations, or charitable dispositions may engage their attention to the subject.

'Niort is a small town,' not far, we believe, from Bourdeaux, 'of 15 or 16,000 inhabitants. Since 1802, not a single beggar has been seen in it, and this happy result has been obtained by the judicious zeal and attention of the administrators of charity. The Bureau de Bienfaisance divides the town into four sections, to each of which are attached a commissary, a baker, and an officier de santé. Two apothecaries and one butcher perform the service of the four sections. The bureau visits all the indigent families in the town; it ascertains the number of individuals composing them, their age, and their means of subsistence. It makes itself acquainted with the value of the labor of the head of each family, calculates how far that is sufficient to its maintenance, takes a note of the deficit, and makes it up to the standard it lays down. No healthy person in a state of idleness is assisted by the bureau; it says to the poor, "Work and you will gain your livelihood,—if you fail in procuring it, we will find it for you; but if you consume your time in idleness, your wages in debauchery, you will get no assistance; if you beg, you will be imprisoned." If a laborer is charged with the support of aged and infirm parents, or with young children, and cannot with the produce of his labor support them, the bureau comes to his aid; but only to make up the difference which it judges to exist between the resources and exigences of the family. *The relief given is moderate*; the bureau acts the part of a parent or guardian, who, by constant attention, forces the people to virtue by means of occupation. The indigents are divided into two classes, healthy

and infirm: the assistance given to the former consists of bread of second quality. During the most rigorous months of the winter, 5 centimes (equal to one halfpenny) are added to each kilogramme of bread. The sick are treated at their homes by the surgeons of the bureau, and are supplied with bread, meat, soup, and medicines.' pp. 554, 555.

Again;—

'New born children are put to nurse at the expense of the administration, when the mother's health or occupation does not allow of her suckling her child. It also causes them to be vaccinated; sends them to school, and afterwards apprentices them to some trade consistent with their strength and constitution. It is not deemed sufficient to comfort existing misery; pauperism must be extirpated from its root; and to do this properly, the young race must be removed from the view of that laziness, the example of which would necessarily in the end lead them to ruin.' p. 556.

An important question here arises as to the expense of all this system, exact and judicious as it would seem. In answer to this, the writer tells us, 'it is but trifling.' And this he proves by a detailed statement of the whole expenses of the year 1812, when the price of provisions was high, and when distress and difficulty, in consequence, were unusually pressing. These details are somewhat too minute to be extracted, more especially as they are expressed in French measures and coins. But the result is thus summed up.

'The expense of each individual, therefore, treated at his home, was no more than 27 centimes, a little more than twopence halfpenny English, and in ordinary years would not have been more than 18 centimes,' or somewhat less than two pence sterling, per day. p. 558.

This allowance is not, indeed, for the whole support of an individual, which requires, as we learn from a credible source, nearly three times this sum. Still it may be taken as an evidence of the minute exactness and economy which pervade the whole system of public charities in France, and which, we doubt not, might with great advantage be adopted in some of our own institutions.

This entire control by the government over all the charities of the kingdom, whether by itself established or by individuals, and the reduction of the whole to one uniform system, is liable to one evil effect, viz. that of checking private be-

nevolence, and restraining those voluntary associations, so numerous and efficient in Great Britain and among ourselves. Yet this seems not to be the case to the extent that might be anticipated. For 'charity,' says our author, 'is not a rare virtue in France;' and he adds, 'that could a statement be procured of all that is given or bequeathed for the various interests of benevolence, the sum would appear enormous.'

It will be remembered in any view to be taken of this subject, *that there is no direct tax, or contribution for the support of the poor, in France.* This is exclusively the care of the government; and though the burden must ultimately rest upon the people, yet something is gained by a freedom from those direct and not seldom oppressive exactions, which tend to produce hostility both against the poor for whom they are imposed, and the government by whom they are levied. As, too, there is much less of dependence on the fluctuations of trade and manufactories than in England, the French are exempted also, from those extraordinary demands on their charity, so common in those seasons of commercial depression, by which the laboring classes in England are occasionally overtaken, and which impose for their relief almost intolerable burdens upon the other classes of the community. If, however, such seasons of distress should occur, the government, as Dr Johnston particularly relates of the year 1812, interpose, and by soup-establishments and other means wholly under their own direction, provide for the exigence.

It will be obvious, that there must be many advantages in such a system; more particularly, in the greater equality of the burden imposed upon the community; in the superior vigilance, economy, and fidelity, with which it is conducted—the government requiring from its agents frequent and exact returns of their management;—in the greater security it may ensure from the impositions to which all proclaimed charities are exposed, and, above all, in that which ought to be the effect, and is the best evidence of the benefit of relief,—the diminution of poverty itself.

We now ask our readers to turn with us from this view of the state of charity in France, to that in England, where we find, at once, the most various and opposite features. We have already adverted to the poor laws, imposing an annual tax, upon the kingdom of nearly eight millions sterling. And certainly it might be expected, that, with such a sum, no possible form of

poverty would remain unrelieved. Yet who does not know, or who has not heard, of its utter insufficiency? Enormous as it is, burdensome to the middling classes almost beyond endurance, hanging as a dead weight upon the government and upon the necks of the people, it still leaves an incalculable amount of want and wretchedness to tax private sympathy and to require the aid of voluntary associations. Nor is this the only evil. A habit of dependence, one of the bad effects of publicly proclaimed institutions, is encouraged; the poor become claimants, as by a legal right, of that relief which ought to be the fruit of their industry. By the facilities for obtaining it, they are tempted to idleness and improvidence. They lose, or they never acquire, a just self-respect. A sense of shame, and with it, also, the sentiment of gratitude, so essential to character, is almost obliterated, and, as this judicious writer remarks, and as the history of the English poor, beyond that of all others, evinces, 'they are in perpetual danger of passing from idleness and beggary into intemperance and irreclaimable profligacy.'

Nor, on the other hand, are the evils small to those who are compelled to contribute to this tax. By its pressure, united with other severe exactions, as in tithes for the church, and the various demands of government, not an inconsiderable proportion of those between the middling and the poorer classes, are almost driven into the ranks of dependence themselves. The consequence is, a great moral as well as political mischief. The good feelings and sympathies, which a reasonable provision for the poor might cherish, are lost in the impatience of an insupportable burden. What should be done with cheerfulness, as from a sentiment of benevolence, is yielded only to the stern demands of law. Disaffection to the government, with hatred and hard heartedness to the poor, are engendered; and among other effects, to say nothing of their riots at home, is the annual emigration of multitudes of British subjects, either to their own colonies, or to these United States, seeking refuge from exactions, and from a dread of poverty too, no longer tolerable.

From this view of the subject, which to an Englishman, we should suppose, could be no other than alarming, and to every philanthropist must be painful, we turn to the various charities of another class, private and public, national and individual, which have been established in that country for the relief of want, misfortune, and suffering of all kinds. It would be impossible, within our limits, to present even a catalogue of these.

But for this, and much more, we may refer our readers to the two works of Mr Highmore, before us. The former, under the significant title of *Pietas Londinensis*, is already well known; having been long before the public, and frequently cited as a faithful record. Under the distinct heads of hospitals, dispensaries, and medical charities, colleges,—under which are to be classed respectable asylums for aged widows and a better class of poor, as well as schools for the maintenance and education of youth,—alms-houses, and miscellaneous charities, we have a detailed history of the benevolent institutions in and near London. This single work occupies almost a thousand pages. Yet it includes only those institutions, which were in existence in 1810, the period of its publication, and the intelligent author, whose decease we regret to notice in the last public journals, followed it in 1822 with a second volume, almost as bulky as the former, embracing those which had to that time been established. This volume, with equal propriety called *Philanthropia Metropolitana*, has, as yet, scarcely found its way among us; but, taken with the former, it exhibits indeed a noble monument of British charity. The number of these humane establishments; their various objects and endowments; the venerable antiquity of some, reaching back through centuries; the curious history of others, and their adherence to original statutes and usages, notwithstanding all modern changes; the splendor, munificence, and imposing exhibitions of a few, and, as is not to be doubted, the real utility and salutary influence of more,—present together a truly interesting subject for contemplation. And could it only appear, for any considerable proportion of them, that the good proposed is actually accomplished; that not only suffering in individual cases is relieved, but the general mass of misery diminished; that idleness, profligacy, and beggary are gradually improved to industry, good morals, and comfort; and that, on the whole, the public order and virtue are advanced—the poorer raised from the dust, and the rich not only relieved of their burdens, but of their hatred of the very name of poor; then would these institutions be indeed what they have been called—the ‘glory of England,’ her best earthly defence from ruin.

But ‘alas!’ and we must here repeat the remark of Montesquieu, ‘alas! for that country, that has many hospitals.’ And the actual state of England at the present moment, is a full justification of the remark. For, notwithstanding all that is giv-

en, and all that is extorted for the poor, the profusion of her charities and her incredible taxes, the benevolence and self-devotion of individuals, and the wisdom, amidst all its exactions, of her government, it is hardly, we presume, to be questioned, that at this moment the mass of want and wretchedness is increasing. And though we are not unmindful of the fallacy to which such general conclusions are liable, yet looking only at the condition of the suffering classes in England, and contrasting it with this vast provision for their relief, we should be ready to infer that all publicly proclaimed charities, separate from moral influences, multiply and aggravate, and through the dependence they encourage, even create the poverty, which they are designed to relieve. The testimony of Dr Franklin upon the subject is altogether to this point. 'In my youth,' says that sagacious philosopher, 'I travelled much, and I observed in different countries, that the more public provisions were made for the poor, the less they provided for themselves, and, of course, became poorer; and, on the contrary, the less was done for them, the more they did for themselves, and became richer.'

Of the soundness of this testimony, which we believe all observation and experience will confirm, we have also a remarkable illustration in the history of one of the most ancient charities of France. Among the splendid acts of the reign of Louis XIV., as we are told by Dr Johnston in the work to which we have so frequently alluded, was the establishment of the 'Hospital General of Paris.' This institution was originally designed to receive all mendicants in that city, who had no means of gaining a livelihood. '*But no sooner was it put upon a proper footing, than Paris swarmed with beggars from all parts of the country.*' The poor of the provinces hastened up to the capital. Idleness forced many to this measure, want of work others; and at last, instead of the foundation of the Hospital General becoming a benefit, it proved an injury in many ways.' Various ordinances were proclaimed by the king, with a view to check the alarming evil. But, as the author expresses it, '*the more the means of relief were multiplied, the more the number of mendicants was increased.*' The intentions of Louis were not attended with any benefit, for a plain reason; his plans were proposed merely for providing relief for an evil already existing, without attempting to prevent that evil from arising. The attention of government was not called to a consideration

of the state of the poor from feelings of charity for their condition, but forced into it by the scandalous disorders and outrages that were committed, to the annoyance of the respectable part of the community. The establishment of Hospital General, therefore, like many other acts of Louis's administration, was better calculated to strike the imagination of the public and of the world, than to accomplish any real benefit to society.'

Now, what is asserted of France in 1675, is, we have reason to believe, a just description of the present state of charity in England, where, as the means of relief are multiplied, the number of claimants is increased. We do not include Ireland, because, in that devoted country, political, as well as other causes, are in continual operation to distress the people. And in Scotland, where there are no poor rates, and comparatively few great charitable endowments, as in England, there is also nothing like the extremity, or, as in the manufacturing districts, the desperateness, of its poverty. It might then be an interesting subject of inquiry, how far these facts and conclusions may be applied for any practical uses to our own country, and to the interests of charity among ourselves.

We do not profess to enter into this enquiry ; for we find ourselves already exceeding the due limits of this article, and have had no sufficient opportunities of personal investigation or official experience, to authorise our confidence in the views we might propose. It must, however, occur to the most superficial observation, that any conclusions, drawn from the state of charitable institutions abroad, must be adopted, always, with full allowance for the difference in the extent and character of our population, the spirit and habits of our people, and, as yet, happily, the greater facilities, enjoyed for obtaining the means of subsistence. But as we have seen, that want in some form or other is perpetually created by the inevitable changes of life, it will at once be conceded, that a certain description of charities, as alms-houses for the aged and infirm, for the helpless and deserving, and dispensaries for the supply of medicines to the sick who can by no other means procure them, are absolutely necessary. With establishments of this class, no large community can dispense. Yet the least experience, even with these, will show, with what caution and vigilance, with what prudence as well as kindness, they should be conducted ; while of others it will appear, that, though in a multitude of cases beneficial, the tendency to abuse must be watch-

ed with the most considerate and careful eye. Let as few publicly proclaimed institutions be established, as the absolute exigences of the community will admit. Let these be managed by benevolent and judicious individuals, who have no favorite theories to support, but are able to devote something of their time to personal investigation. We need for the direction of all our charities, men of sound judgment, firmness, and true benevolence, who are wise and experienced enough not to be imposed upon, and who, at the same time, will not suffer their official familiarity with distress to blunt their sympathies, or to betray them to unreasonable distrust. It is always to be regretted when the sacred cause of charity loses anything of its tenderness, or its considerateness, in the bustle of official duty, or that its ministrations should become less kind, and therefore less useful, because bestowed, on the one side as a matter of business, to be despatched with as little expense of time or feeling as possible, or because received, on the other, as a matter of right. There is nothing also, that so effectually defeats the very end of charity as successful imposition. Men will soon cease to bestow, when they find they have been deceived, and are too ready, after a short experience, to allow themselves in a universal distrust, and even a hatred against the poor, alike unjust and indiscriminate. To prevent this, it is desirable that the case of every claimant should be fully investigated, and that there should be a mutual intelligence or correspondence between charitable institutions—at least, between those which propose kindred objects, and therefore invite applications from the same classes and descriptions of the poor. This object might be accomplished by mutual and periodical returns of the names and families of those who receive their assistance, or by occasional conferences of the officers, or the almoners of these societies. Thus also might we prevent the imposition, unquestionably too successful, of obtaining the same kind of relief, at the same time, from different societies.

Especially do we wish to see our benevolent institutions delivered from the blight and mildew of vanity, and from being abused as the instruments of personal distinction. Next to absolute hypocrisy, or ostentation and trick in devotion, there is nothing more revolting than vanity and exhibition in the management of charities. We turn from them with utter loathing; and, though, as we well know, a public institution must be conducted in some measure before the public; yet

even here let the spirit of our Lord's injunction be observed, and as far as individual fame is concerned, let not the left hand know what the right hand doeth. We have been sickened at the sight of silly men and women, parading their subscriptions or their schemes of philanthropy, and making the real or supposed distresses of their fellow-creatures, the ministers to their absurd and contemptible vanity.

Upon this subject, as well as a passion for magnificent plans of charity, a folly not seldom found in close connexion with it, we adduce the remarks of a judicious observer.

'Men are too fond of doing things on a large scale, in a body. At the commencement of a society, too often more is attempted than can be accomplished. It is rare, that the vanity of parade and show can be kept under. In proportion to its reputation, it gives distinction to its associates; and men seek to become its associates for the sake of this distinction. Hence a seat has become a sinecure of honor; and the soul and spirit, which centered in a few, becomes clogged and shackled with the paraphernalia of dress. Yet to all societies nothing is more important, than the preservation of that soul and spirit, which first brought them into action.'

It was our purpose to have observed on the importance of connecting with the ministrations of charity for the relief of outward necessities, judicious moral and religious instruction. We are aware, considering the great diversities in religious opinion and feeling, in the characters moreover and capacities of those who are called to dispense relief, either as municipal, or other officers, that this may be attended with serious practical difficulties. In unskilful hands, and when under the direction of a blind or misguided zeal, tempting to officious and impertinent intrusion upon the sacredness and modesty of domestic life, it becomes no less than an odious and intolerable nuisance. And we have heard of religious instruction connected with charity, under forms so revolting, that we could hardly wonder, if both the gift and the instruction had been alike rejected, and the officious teacher repulsed, as was once an intruder of old, with 'Thy money perish with thee.'

But to guard most effectually against the abuses, and to extend most widely, with the best moral and religious influences, the benefits of charity, we would recommend above all things else, the duty and practice of private benevolence. Let individuals, and let families feel more of their obligations to this

great christian duty. Let them search out for themselves, and, according to their means and opportunities, relieve, by their alms and their counsel, their friendly visits and effectual sympathies, those whom, on investigation and acquaintance, they find most needy or deserving. Could a sense of the importance of this duty be more extensively impressed, the work of benevolence would be better performed, and we might easily dispense with some of our corporations or public societies. And for the superior moral influence that might be thus exerted, both upon the receiver and the giver, we adopt again the words of the writer just quoted, whose past official situation and experience give weight to his suggestions.

‘No one can be ignorant,’ says he,* ‘with what different sensations public and private charity is received; the one bestowed by the administrator of the police, the other by the voluntary will of the benevolent individual. Private charity is always moistened with the tear of gratitude. Public charity is often demanded as the appropriate proportion of the public fund.

‘Private charity carries with it some recognition of a providential interposition; creates some disposition in the most vicious towards reformation; or, at least, removes the murmur of being forgotten and outcast. Public charity has neither the warmth of personal interest, nor the attachment of obligation. Hence, the claimants of public charity often come forward with boldness to display their miseries and compel relief.’—‘Hence, too, great as are the benefits public charities confer, they encourage so many impositions, and generate such certain evils, that many doubt the utility of funds raised for supplying, generally, specific articles, even of the first necessity;’ and such persons, as we may add, will absolutely deny to a public institution what they freely bestow in private benevolence.

ART. VIII.—*On the Future State of Man.* For the Christian Examiner.

THERE is no subject of human thought that calls so earnestly for the most strenuous exertion of our minds, and for the most ardent aspirations after light from on High, as the state of man after death and that judgment without appeal which shall

* Miscellaneous Remarks on the Police of Boston. 1814.

assign to each human being his place and standing in the world of spirits. It is true, that in this life nothing is certain except its end ; and every temporal interest, however great, must vanish in the prospect of eternity. The consideration of that inevitable event to which we are hastening, could not fail to excite in us the strongest desire to obtain the clearest possible conception of it, though we could do no more towards it than meet it as passive gainers or sufferers by the unalterable judgment of God. Who would refuse a grateful welcome to the most distant star that sheds a feeble ray upon the night of death ! But this natural desire after light on this great subject, becomes a sacred duty to those who believe that the final judgment is to be founded on our own conduct. As common prudence instructs us to guard against the destructive cold of the approaching winter, or to secure the rich profits of autumn by laying out our industry in spring, so the voice of heavenly prudence calls upon our souls and all that is within us, to prepare for the great harvest of life and of death, in the land of promise and of retribution beyond the grave.

The thought of the final account we shall have to render of all we have done or left undone in this life, should be deeply impressed on our minds on all occasions, and particularly when we think and speak of that solemn event itself. We should be careful not to leave any opportunity unimproved, but faithfully to exert all our faculties to obtain, in regard to our future condition, the most perfect views we are capable of conceiving. The prospect of the life and judgment to come, should make us anxious and importunate in the pursuit of truth, but fearless as to the result of our faithful inquiries.

The opinions of men concerning the future state are divided in various ways ; and it is easy to account for this fact. The life to come could not be conceived of in any other mode than as a continuation of the present. It was natural, therefore, that the various views of human life and happiness, should be transferred to the future state. Accordingly, while some men were looking forward to a world of perfect justice, wisdom, and love, others were led to anticipate a paradise of all their appetites and passions. This source of controversy concerning the future state, has been made more abundant by the vague use of language on all sides. Men did not understand each other, and complained of misconstruction of their views, because they did not understand or distinctly express themselves. Still more, the language of that record from which the most important views of man's immortality

were to be derived, ceased to be a living tongue before it became the object of a truly learned and sound interpretation. Yet such an interpretation was the only means whereby that part of its contents, which was calculated to remain the common property of all reflecting minds, could be freed from the idiom in style and thought, by which it was peculiarly suited to those to whom it was immediately addressed.

If these circumstances are calculated to multiply religious controversy on this subject, these differences themselves are perpetuated by the unwillingness of most men to search the scriptures and their own nature, for themselves. They would rather enlist in the service of one of the pretenders to infallibility in religious matters. Thus controversies are multiplied in number as they diminish in real importance, while men are differing, not so much about the teachings of nature and scripture, as about what some commentator of note has said, or is said to have said. Any objection raised against such standard creeds, is apt to be felt as an insult offered to all who wear, and think themselves bound to defend, the same religious uniform.

Under these circumstances it seems to be the fairest and safest mode of proceeding, first, to give a sketch of the most important views which have been and are entertained on the future state of man, without ascribing either of them to any individual or sect, and then simply to state the writer's own opinion.

All nations, civilized and savage, that we have any exact knowledge of, agree with us in the belief that the present life of man is not the whole, but only the beginning of his existence. The immortality of the soul, is, and has been at all times, a fundamental article of the general creed of mankind. Even before the daybreak of divine truth in the gospel of Christ, there were forereaching minds that read in the sunset of this earthly life, presages of a glorious resurrection of light, and who taught their fellow men to free themselves of the fear of death by extending their desire of life beyond it. But those who believe in a life to come, differ in many of their views of the future state. Their opinions disagree, first, in regard to the *condition* itself in which men may be placed after death; and secondly, concerning the *grounds* on which any particular condition will be actually assigned to an individual.

In the first place, the *condition* itself in which men may possibly be placed hereafter, differs according to the views of different sects, in its *kind*, *degree*, and *duration*.

If you ask some persons what *kind* of condition will be assigned to a human being after death, they will answer, that all men will be made happy, whatever be their conduct in this life ; while others are of opinion that only a portion of the human race will be blessed, while others will be made to suffer, or be annihilated.

If you inquire further about the *degree* of human happiness or unhappiness, some persons will tell you that there will be only one degree of joy for the blessed, and one degree of misery for those who are doomed to suffer ; that the former will be perfectly happy, and the latter completely miserable. Others, on the contrary, suppose that there will be various degrees of joy and of pain in the future, as well as in the present condition of man.

If you ask, in the third place, what will be the *duration* of the condition which may be assigned to any individual, many persons will answer, that, whatever condition, and whatever degree of happiness or unhappiness may be conferred upon an individual on his entering the future state, be it immediately after his death or after the final judgment, it will remain the same throughout eternity. Other persons, on the contrary, are persuaded that there will or may be changes in the condition of men even after the divine judgment. Among those whose belief admits of such changes, there are many who think that some men will be condemned to suffer for a time, or pass through a purgatory, before they are admitted to a state of unchangeable bliss. There is room for still another opinion ; namely, that in the future life, as well as in this, it will be in the power of each individual to change his condition for the worse or for the better, by his own conduct.

I have mentioned the principal differences in opinion with respect to the condition itself, in which men may possibly be placed after death ; and I now proceed to mention the most important views concerning the *grounds* on which either of those conditions will be actually assigned to each individual.

All believers in a future state agree in maintaining, that, whatever be the condition of an individual, it is conferred upon him by the law or judgment of God. But the principal difference consists in this, that some think God will bestow happiness or unhappiness on each person in proportion to his own good or ill desert, while others believe in a distribution of joy or suffering by the absolute decree of God, without any reference to the relative merit or demerit of the individual.

Those who suppose the future condition of men founded on the mere and unconditional will of God, either deny altogether the existence of a free will in man, all his actions and intentions being predestined with absolute necessity by God ; or they believe that the choice, the good or ill desert of the individual, has no influence upon the divine judgment.

On the other side, those who hold that the future state of man will depend on his own desert, generally suppose that his conduct in this life alone, will be the ground of his future condition ; while there is room also for believing, that, in the future state as well as in the present, the happiness or unhappiness of each human being will depend on his conduct, his own good or ill desert.

I have stated the principal views of the future condition of man, and of the grounds on which it is supposed to depend. With respect to all these different opinions, I am persuaded, that either of them, however erroneous in itself, may be embraced with a sincere conviction of its truth, and that he who thus receives it, is right in rejoicing against the day of judgment. On the other hand, I verily believe that no view, however true in itself, can lead to peace and happiness, unless it be adopted on free and full conviction. Seeing, then, that we have such hope, I shall use great plainness of speech. I would not be understood as attributing either of the views I shall have to examine, to any one denomination of Christians ; and still less as censuring the believer for what I suppose to be erroneous in his faith, sincerely convinced that human judgment is fallible, and that we shall be judged, not according to the talents we have received, nor according to the fruits they have yielded, but according to the faithful or unfaithful use we have made of the advantages we enjoy.

The views I intend to offer, I shall endeavour to prove by such observations of human nature as every person is able to make on himself, and by the simplest declarations of scripture ; so that whatever there may be of truth or error in the following remarks, may be easily perceived by all.

All believers in a life to come, Heathens as well as Christians, agree in this great principle, that the future state will be an ultimate exhibition and complete vindication of divine justice. From the earliest times, among all nations, we find doctrines, like those of the ancient Greeks and Romans of Orcus and Elysium and the three incorruptible judges in the world be-

low. There are many, I know, who would proudly reject these and all the early religious traditions of heathen nations relative to a future state of retributive justice, as mere fables. But he who delights in studying the gradual progress of the human mind in religious knowledge, will not be ashamed of the childish essays of his race. Nay, he will hail them as prophetic dreams that have shadowed forth what the gospel of Christ has brought to light, that 'the hour is coming, in the which all that are in the graves shall hear his voice, and shall come forth; they that have done good, unto the resurrection of life; and they that have done evil, unto the resurrection of damnation.'*

I have said that all who look forward in faith to a life to come, agree that the future state will be a confirmation, or at least not a refutation of our trust in divine justice. All unite in professing and magnifying the perfect justice of God; but not all understand what they extol. Otherwise their views of the future condition of man could not be essentially opposed to each other. In asserting that God is just, we ascribe to him a quality which constitutes part of the moral character of man. What we consider essential to human excellence, we attribute in its perfection to the Author of our moral nature. Justice, human and divine, though different in degree, must be the same in kind. In what then does it consist? Some will say, justice consists in the strict and impartial execution of the laws. God, accordingly, is just, because he will faithfully judge each one according to the laws he has given and made known to all.—Now it is true that justice demands the execution of the laws; yet this alone is not justice, otherwise any law, however partial and absurd, would be justified by its strict and impartial application. How can we say that justice rules over a country or the whole universe, if the laws, however faithfully administered, are in themselves unjust? Would you indeed maintain, that it becomes a loyal subject of the Most High to profess that all things are just with him, because with him all things are possible? Those who attempt to magnify the omnipotence of God at the expense of his justice, those who dread to offend against the divine majesty by trusting in his righteousness rather than his partial mercy, blaspheme the God they thus ignorantly worship. Knowledge and power, if they be added to injustice, are no longer perfections of the moral character, but, on the contrary, aggravate its immorality. However

* John v. 28, 29.

powerful, however wise, however merciful you may think him, and however privileged and exalted above the rest of mankind you may suppose yourself to be by his special favor ; yet, if you consider God as a respecter of persons, as a generous but arbitrary disposer of his creatures and their destiny—you may indeed fear him, and look up to him with admiration, even with grateful affection, yet you cannot, whatever dreadful consequences you may ascribe to this mode of thinking, you cannot truly respect him. You cannot with a concordant heart join in the sublime ascription with which the inspired teacher of the one true God begins his immortal song ;—‘ He is the rock, his work is perfect ; for all his ways are judgment ; a God of truth and without iniquity ; just and right is he.’*

There is in the mind of man a standard of right and wrong, by which he is enabled and commissioned to try, not only the actions and decisions of men, whether they be conformed to established laws, but also these laws themselves, whether they be sanctioned by eternal justice. And not only human actions and decisions are to be judged by this inborn principle of justice, but He himself who has endowed us with this divine attribute, does not disdain, nay, invites us to judge of his own actions, so far as we can comprehend them, and says, ‘ O house of Israel, are not my ways equal?’†

It is from the simple and clear decisions of our moral sense, that we learn the true nature of justice, human and divine. Let us examine some of the plain decisions of reason and conscience. A father does justice to his children, if he educates them according to their natural capacities. Society is bound in justice to protect the natural rights of each of its members, to acknowledge and encourage every kind of merit, industry, talent, learning, and skill, and to discountenance every false pretence, and punish every crime. With regard to animals, we think it unjust to abuse instead of using them according to their nature and destination. Those in particular which we have deprived of their natural freedom for our own advantage, seem to have a claim on us for shelter, food, and protection. A refined sense of justice extends even to plants, pointing them out as objects of due care to him that raised them. Justice is due even to inanimate objects, to works of art, and literary productions, which require a just estimation of their nature and character. Justice, in the highest sense of

* Deut. xxxii. 4.

† Ezekiel viii. 29.

the word, ought to characterize our ideas of the Author of all animate and inanimate existence.

In all these instances, the true character of justice cannot be mistaken. He alone can be called just, who adapts his actions and sentiments to the nature and character of every being. When we say, therefore, that God is just, we mean that his intentions and actions are adapted to the nature and character of all his creatures. Man trusts in the justice of God, when he believes that God adapts the course of events to the nature he has given him. He believes that the faithful Creator will supply the necessary means to unfold all the faculties and tendencies he has implanted in human nature. This trust, therefore, implies the belief in a divine education, by which the human race, and each individual, is furthered and guided to the end for which he was created.

The importance of this doctrine of divine justice, with reference to the future state of man, is self-evident. If there be in human nature anything that can be considered as implying a divine promise of an existence after death ; if there be a germ of life which waits for the heavens' opening upon it that it may unfold in the sunshine of another world, we may rest assured that He who sowed the seed, will not withhold from it the light and the dew and a paradise to grow in forever. God is just. He does, and will do justice, therefore, to the immortal capacities he has given us.

Believing then, as we do, that the whole of man's existence is regulated by divine justice, we possess in the constitution of our own nature a revelation of the life to come. We are led to inquire what will be the future state of man, if justice be done to the nature and faculties he possesses ; and our faith in divine justice assures us, that the result of the present inquiry, if the inferences drawn are correct, will be confirmed by future reality. The eternal stars of his destiny, which are hidden from the sight of man by the broad glare of the ruling interests of the day, he descries when he descends into the depths of his own mind. And to ascertain the length and the breadth, the depths and the shallows of the soul, there is no guide so sure as the gospel of Christ, the recorded wisdom of him who knew all that was in man.

I have said, that in order to obtain correct views concerning the life to come, we must search our own being, since our belief in divine justice assures us, that the future state of man

will be in accordance with his present nature. This view of divine justice, therefore, confirms and aids our reasoning from *analogy*, which rests on the self-evident supposition that the future life of man will resemble the present, if the former be really a continuation of the latter. Even independent of our previous view of divine justice, reason would prompt us to examine the actual state of our being, in order to ascertain, from its nature, in what the future is likely to resemble the present. It is the same manner of reasoning which we apply to all other future events, with a degree of confidence proportioned to the time, the extent, and the accuracy of our observation of the previous state of things. Thus our knowledge of the capacities of the infant, enables us to form an idea of the possible and probable attainments of the man. The more his faculties unfold, so much the clearer is our preconception of his future stages of improvement. The longer and the more we know a person, so much the surer is our anticipation of his future conduct; though this preconception can never become certain foreknowledge. For the same reason, the idea we form of the future state of man from all the various stages he has to pass through in this life, is even more likely to be correct than the view we may form of the man from the character of the child. Still more, experience shows that general remarks concerning the faculties, wants, and propensities of mankind, derived from manifold experience and history, are more likely to be correct than our conception of the peculiar character of an individual. This circumstance cannot but strengthen our faith in the inferences we draw from the present to the future condition of man, since our object in view is not the future state of each or any individual in particular, but of men in general. Accordingly, in reasoning on the future state of man from analogy, we may safely and freely use all that history and experience teach us concerning his nature and character in various parts and ages of the world, without being exposed to mistakes arising from an imperfect knowledge of the peculiar nature and character of any individual.

The course of the present inquiry is pointed out by the previous remarks. It is not my intention here to adduce all the reasons we have for believing in man's immortality. My object is to obtain some just conceptions of the future state, from what by continued observation we know to be the nature of man, its essential properties, faculties, and tendencies, to which we trust justice will be done, by Him who implanted them in man.

I mention, first, the deepest and most powerful of all the

desires of man, his yearning after an endless continuation of his existence. Every being most intensely desires, not only that the human race, but that he himself, his existence as an individual, should never end. This desire does not imply a wish to preserve unchanged *all* the properties and appurtenances of our present being. On the contrary, the principle of change belongs to the actual constitution of man as much as that of stability. The innate longing of man after immortality, consists in the desire, that of the various endowments and attainments of the present life so much at least may be preserved from destruction, as to enable him still to recognise himself as essentially the same being. I mention attainments together with endowments as essential to the identity of our being, because it is evident that the man who has developed all the faculties with which he was endowed by nature, would no longer recognise himself as the same being, if in a future state merely the faculties themselves should be restored to him without the attainments he has made. What then are, I ask, those powers and properties of man, which we consider indispensable to the identity of his being?

It is manifest, in the first place, that the material part of our being, that is, all that may be perceived by the senses, our bodies and all that properly belongs to them, cannot be considered as essential to the individuality of man. The body consists of various parts and material elements, into which it is divided and resolved by death. Indeed, its various organs, faculties, and desires die away even before the close of our earthly life. And in the prime of physical health and strength we are conscious that our bodies are not ourselves, so that 'it is indeed more difficult to comprehend how the mind can exist in the body, than without it.' What man truly calls his own self, and the immortality of which he anticipates with the most intense desire, the direct object of his self-conscious reason, is a single and indivisible being. It is that principle within him, which thinks, feels, and wills, and is conscious of all its operations as various effects of the same permanent cause, which we call the human mind. Accordingly it is not the body, but the mind, in which we must seek an answer to the question, what powers and attainments of man are likely to survive the death of the body, and form the basis of his future state.

But though it is necessarily the nature of the human mind from which we must draw inferences concerning his future being, yet there is one view in which his body too furnishes coin-

cident information. Though the material parts, the members and organs be dissolved, yet the corporeal existence of man itself must be considered as an important starting point for the mind in its continual advancement. That he might be made acquainted, fully and intimately, with the material world, the mind of man, itself a living spirit, 'was made flesh;' that is, assumed a corporeal frame which enabled him to enter into the inmost nature of every order of beings in the material universe. Being himself made to exist in a body, he is able to comprehend, through his own experience, the coexistence of innumerable bodies. Man, moreover, was made to grow like the plant—to move, perceive, and feel like the animal, that he might assume and assimilate to himself every degree of perfection that exists, grows, and lives on this dark planet, before he ascends to brighter spheres of existence. For it seems to be a law of nature, that he who leaves his native land as a stranger to its own peculiar condition and interests, is not fit to be naturalized in any other part of the world.—In this point of view, then, the corporeal existence of man cannot be considered as a transitory state, which is to vanish at death. Although those material frames which we now possess, are to be destroyed by death, yet we know that those particles of matter of which the body at any time happens to consist, are not essential even to our corporeal existence. For our body is continually changing its materials; so that in a few years hence not one particle of that frame which we now call our body, will be the same, while we still preserve the identity of our corporeal existence.

The dissolution of the body by death, then, is not a sufficient reason for believing that even our corporeal existence is confined to the present life. On the contrary, analogy leads me to suppose, that the capacity to live and move, to have a being also in the material world, will not be destroyed, but perfected in another stage of our existence. The impressions we receive through our senses, such as light, sound, and resistance, will not, as some suppose, vanish as mere affections of our various organs, but be confirmed as perceptions of real qualities of material objects. This power of perception, as well as that of motion, will be increased. That each of these physical and organic powers of man, is capable of indefinite improvement, is evident from the fact that they exist even now in different degrees of perfection in men and animals. There are birds, and other animals, which surpass us in various powers of motion and sensation, as much as there are plants which excel us in growth; and inanimate

bodies, which possess a greater power of resistance and duration. From experience we know that all our senses, as well as other bodily powers, may be improved continually, particularly when they are made the instruments of the ever extending operations of the mind. In the service of the mind the bodily powers of man have sufficed to change the face of the earth, to make the sea an inexhaustible field of human enterprise and industry, to explore the heavens. Of each of these various objects of pursuit it can still be said, as a celebrated astronomer said of his own science, that it is the result of bad eyes with a great deal of curiosity. Is it reasonable to suppose that nature, which has given us this infinite thirst after knowledge, will not give us also vessels to draw with from the deep wells of creation, instruments more perfect than those with which human art supplies the weak eye and the feeble hand? But these contrivances of human art themselves, seem to point out the way in which nature will furnish us the means of accomplishing designs expressed in the constitution of our being. It is indeed highly probable, that we who stand here gazing at the portal of His temple, shall be admitted to the mysteries of the sanctuary when the sabbath of eternal life shall open the temple gate. But it is not likely, according to the universal law of gradual progression in nature, that the mind of man will be enabled to penetrate the inmost being of the material world without any material organs. I suppose, therefore, that we shall be born again with an organization similar to our present, and suited to the moral and intellectual state in which we leave this world; with a 'celestial body,' adapted to the future, as much as this terrestrial frame is to our present existence.

But whatever may be thought of the resurrection of the flesh, the restoration of man's physical organization, it is certain that the elements of man's immortality do not lie in his body, but in his mind. The doctrine of the future state, therefore, must be founded chiefly on the nature of the human mind, its essential faculties, and most important attainments. To this, then, let us now direct our inquiry.

When we contemplate the human mind, the tree of life which God has planted within us, we see three branches striving upward to heaven, the Intellect, the Affections, and the Moral Power of man. We all perceive that whatever change we may experience by death, if it should deprive us of our intellect, our affections, and our moral power, such a change would be equal to an annihilation of our being. Without in-

telligence the world would not exist to us, nor should we be conscious of our own existence ; without affections, the brightest perceptions of our intellect would be images reflected in a dead mirror ; and without the power of virtue, of moral exertion, man would rank with the brute, though possessed of the clearest views and the warmest affections. It is the tendency of these three powers after infinite expansion, which we have a right to consider as an earnest of our immortality. From the nature of these three immortal endowments of our being, I shall endeavour to draw inferences concerning the life to come.

I shall speak first of the Intellect of man, which may be defined as the power to form ideas. When we survey the immense variety of ideas which the mind is capable of conceiving, we observe one important difference in these productions of the intellect, which is characteristic of its nature, and essential to its progress. We perceive many things by our senses, which we call material objects ; such as sounds and colors. Others we perceive without the instrumentality of our senses, by our intellect alone ; such as thoughts, feelings, desires, and resolutions. Our conceptions of material,* as well as immaterial objects, agree in this respect, that they are accompanied with a belief that there are real objects corresponding to our ideas. Such ideas we call *perceptions*. But we form also ideas which are not accompanied with belief in their reality, which we term productions of the *imagination*. Of these conceptions of the imagination, there are some of which we know that there is no object corresponding to them ; such as dreams and works of fiction. In regard to others we do not know whether and how far they are true or fictitious ; such as the supposition that the stars are inhabited by living and rational beings. Besides these two essential faculties of the intellect, Perception and Imagination, we possess the power of comparing our ideas, whether real or fictitious, with each other, and judging of the relations they bear to one another. It is this third power of the intellect, which we call Reason, by which we perceive the connexion between cause and effect, all the differences and resemblances of things and ideas in quantity and quality, as well as their relative probability.

When we contemplate the dawn of intellectual life in the child, we find the various mental capacities and energies wrapped up, as it were, in one all-absorbing tendency, the innate

* Whenever the word *material* is used in this treatise, it means simply and exclusively all that we perceive by our five senses ; which is indeed the only tenable definition of *matter*.

and ever active principle of curiosity. As the intellectual nature unfolds by healthy exercise, the three powers of perception, imagination, and reason, become prominent. The intellectual life of man consists in the vigorous and harmonious exercise of those three faculties, each of which is capable of infinite expansion. All that is, is an object of perception ; all that can be, all that is possible or conceivable, is an object of imagination. The extension of knowledge and of fiction being an inexhaustible source of new ideas, there is consequently an infinite field laid out for the exercise of reason, in judging of the relations they bear to each other. The intellectual progress of man receives its first and ever increasing impulse from innate curiosity ; while it is insured particularly by that mediatory and regulating power which reason exercises with respect to perception and imagination. Thus, before the fifteenth century, what we now call the old world, was the only object of knowledge to our European ancestors, while the continent on which we live, existed only in the imagination of a few minds exercising their reason to ascertain, from that part of the earth which they knew, the probability of the existence of one which at last became an object of knowledge through perception. And thus every great discovery in the world has its origin in the previous perception of certain objects which formed a starting point for the imagination, roaming over the wide ocean of possibilities, and guided by reason, particularly reasoning from analogy, until the shore of a new continent of knowledge rises before the prospective mind. As soon as our boldest anticipations become realities by actual perception, imagination wanders and reason directs to higher regions of light.*

Thus the human mind has pressed onward from the simplest to the most wonderful discoveries of every kind. By the aid of philosophy, the eye of the observer has discovered thousands of living beings in one drop of water ; while it has opened his mind to the contemplation of the universe, in which this earth, and the whole of our earthly knowledge, appear but as one drop

* To those who are not acquainted with the history of intellectual philosophy, the above view of the three principal functions of the intellect, will appear, I hope, not as anything new, but as well understood and familiar. Those to whom it may appear otherwise, will find the reason of its novelty, and of the failure of so many ingenious theories concerning the human intellect, from the time of the Greeks to the present, in the hopeless way in which the end was pursued, either by subtle expositions of terms, or by endeavours to explain the manner in which an affection of the organ, by a kind of transubstantiation, becomes a conception of the intellect.

in the unbounded ocean of existence and life. The human mind has travelled, and is still travelling on, in search of new worlds, and further, to the inexhaustible Source of all being. By the light of reason and divine revelation 'the spirit of man searcheth all things, yea, the deep things of God.'

Such is the nature of the human intellect. The mind of man yearns after truth, as the plant turns towards the sun. Every attainment in knowledge, instead of quenching, only increases the thirst after intellectual light. Our highest intellectual pleasure arises, not so much from the knowledge we have at any time acquired, as from the prospect of infinite progress. We do not fully enjoy, we even feel dissatisfied with any degree of information, however great, unless we see in it the preparation for higher attainments, the promise of a still more plentiful harvest of light. If, therefore, as I believe, the future state will not be a subversion, but a continuation of our nature, a free and full developement of the faculties we already possess, what will be the condition of our intellect in the life to come?

We have seen that it is the nature of the human intellect to expand by degrees, but without end, under the ever increasing impulse of curiosity, and the cooperation of perception, imagination, and reason. It seems, therefore, most natural to suppose, that, in the life to come, we shall neither be confined to our present knowledge, nor be made omniscient; but that the power, the desire, and the opportunities of acquiring new ideas, will be increased indefinitely, in proportion to the attainments we are continually making. All the knowledge we have acquired, that in particular which is calculated to guide us into all truth, will abide with us forever. Our knowledge of nature, of man, and of God, will grow in extent and in truth according to our own intellectual efforts. The fondest and boldest wishes which the soul sends forth from its earthly enclosure to the unknown regions of futurity, will there find a resting place, where all desire of returning will vanish in the prospect of a new land of promise. As the boundaries of human *knowledge* are extended, may it not be supposed that a *new poetry*, the glorious offspring of the regenerated imagination, will spring up and rise beyond the realms of knowledge, as a prophetic vision of worlds to come, which yet exist only in the creative mind of God?

I have spoken of the probable condition of the human intellect in the life to come, and shall next proceed to make some remarks on the immortality of the affections.

[To be concluded in the next number.]

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ERRATUM.

Page 283, 15th line from the bottom, for 'its own,' read 'itself.'

